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Summary
This thesis investigates the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty, fiscal and
financial shocks, which are analyzed within a nonlinear time series framework. It
consists of four self-contained chapters. In each chapter, empirical methods are
used to extend the empirical literature, and evaluate the importance of different
transmission channels of macroeconomic shocks suggested by theoretical models.
Chapter 1 investigates the effects of financial regulation policy uncertainty
(FRPU) in the U.S. economy, using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. It
focuses on two important issues in the empirical context of uncertainty: the
role of financial frictions as a transmission mechanism of uncertainty shocks,
and the relevance of financial regulation policies as a source of uncertainty.
Policy uncertainty is quantified with a news-based index developed by Baker,
Bloom, and Davis (2013). To assess the relevance of financial frictions for
the transmission of uncertainty shocks, I model credit spreads along with a
number of key U.S. macro variables. I then compute impulse responses of
these variables to a shock to the FRPU index. My results suggest that FRPU
shocks trigger increases in spreads as well as a persistent negative impact
on the real economy. Next, I study whether these effects differ if the shock
hits during a recession rather than in a non-recessionary phase. To do so, I
estimate a nonlinear Smooth-Transition VAR (STVAR) model and compute
state-dependent impulse responses of the same variables to the same shock.
My nonlinear estimates show that FRPU shocks have an asymmetric impact
over the business cycle. Credit spreads and unemployment, for example, are
estimated to increase three times more during bad times than in good ones.
Importantly, forecast error variance decompositions indicate that FRPU shocks
account for large shares of the variability of macro aggregates.
Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Giovanni Caggiano and Efrem
Castelnuovo. It digs deeper on the nonlinearities of U.S. uncertainty shocks
by investigating i) whether the effects of economic uncertainty are different in
good and bad times, and ii) how systematic monetary policy interacts with
uncertainty in these two states of the economy. To answer these questions,
we first model a standard set of macro variables with a STVAR model, and
compute Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) à la Koop, Pesaran,
and Potter (1996). Our GIRFs provide clear-cut evidence of asymmetric effects
of uncertainty shocks over the business cycle. In recessions, real activity follows
a drop-rebound-overshoot pattern after the shock. Differently, in expansions
the drop is milder and recovery takes place very slowly, with no overshoot in
the medium term. The policy rate reacts to uncertainty shocks in both states,
although its decrease is more marked during recessions. Turning to our second
question, we then simulate some counterfactual exercises in which systematic
monetary policy remains still in spite of an uncertainty shock. Our results point
to policy ineffectiveness in bad times, i.e. the negative peak of real activity
remains exactly the same. On the contrary, monetary policy plays an important
role during expansions, i.e., in absence of an accommodative policy, the drop
in output would have been almost twice the one observed in the unconstrained
scenario. We provide a possible interpretation for our results, based on the
theoretical work by Bloom (2009) and Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-
Eksten, and Terry (2012), by emphasizing the role of time-varying financial
frictions and/or labor and capital adjustment costs.
Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Giovanni Caggiano, Efrem Castelnuovo
and Valentina Colombo. It estimates state-dependent fiscal multipliers for the
U.S. economy by explicitly addressing the issue of fiscal foresight. Simple
theoretical examples show that foresight produces equilibrium time series with
a non-invertible moving average component, which misaligns the agents’ and
the econometrician’s information sets in standard VARs (Leeper, Walker, and
Yang, 2013). We deal with this issue by appealing to sums of revisions of
expectations about future government spending. We then model these fiscal
news shocks, along with a set of standard macro-fiscal variables, by using a
nonlinear Smooth-Transition VAR framework. To compute fiscal multipliers
in recessions and expansions, we use Generalized Impulse Response Functions
(GIRFs), which allow us to endogenize the possibly stabilizing effects of fiscal
policy, and most important, to distinguish between "extreme" and "moderate"
business cycle phases. As a result, this Chapter establish some new stylized
facts about government spending multipliers in the U.S., in particular, the
fact that firm evidence of state dependent multipliers arises only when looking
at extreme phases of the cycle, i.e., deep recessions and strong expansionary
periods.
Chapter 4 looks at the real effects of credit supply shocks originating in
U.S. corporate bond markets. It does so by distinguishing once again between
phases of the business cycle. However, this Chapter differs substantially from
the previous ones in terms of methodology. I estimate linear and nonlinear local
projection models (Jordà, 2005), in which the credit supply shock is proxied by
the excess bond premium (EBP) developed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012).
In short, the EBP is a measure of marketwide corporate bond spreads net of
expected default losses. I use the local projection estimates to compute two
sets of impulse responses of real activity to an EBP shock: one conditional on a
linear view of the world, and the other allowing the economy to react differently
in recessions vs. normal times. The linear estimates provide evidence that the
financial sector may very well be an originator, other than propagator of shocks.
When economic activity is allowed to respond asymmetrically to the EBP shock,
evidence of nonlinearities arise. Specifically, a drop-rebound-overshoot pattern
is found when the credit shock hits the economy in recessions. Whereas a long-
lasting, hump-shaped reaction is found in normal times. Given that these results
echo recent findings in the business cycle literature as for uncertainty shocks, I
ensure that my estimates are not driven by misspecification by undertaking a
number of robustness checks. Finally, I provide an interpretation of my results
based on Dow, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2005) and Philippon (2006), who
develop theoretical models able to replicate amplification and persistence of
otherwise i.i.d. shocks during upward phases of the business cycle.

Chapter 1
Financial Regulation Policy
Uncertainty and Credit Spreads
in the U.S.
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. financial regulation system has come under criticism in the aftermath
of the financial crisis of 2007-08. Since then, policymakers have instituted
various reforms, and have thereby substantially increased public uncertainty
about the financial regulatory framework. Regulatory reforms play an important
role in re-establishing trust in the financial system. The reforms underway in
the U.S. are aimed at making markets and institutions more transparent, less
complex, and less leveraged. These features are a precondition for restoring
appropriate levels of credit growth to support economic recovery. However,
the ongoing reforms may trigger undesirable effects on the economy due to
the policymaking process concerning implementation being surrounded by
uncertainty.
This Chapter quantifies the macroeconomic effects of financial regulation
policy uncertainty shocks within a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework.
Financial regulation policy uncertainty can be thought of as the increased
volatility of the expected outcome resulting from changes in the regulatory
framework, which is unforecastable from the perspective of economic agents.1
The fact that there is no directly observed measure of uncertainty in the
1The definition of financial regulation policy uncertainty is adopted from Jurado, Ludvig-
son, and Ng’s (2015) definition of economic uncertainty: “at a general level, uncertainty is
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economy poses a significant problem for researchers, who have to resort to
uncertainty proxies. The empirical counterpart of uncertainty employed in
my analysis is the news-based financial regulation policy uncertainty index
(henceforth, the FRPU index) developed by Baker et al. (2013). The FRPU
index quantifies perceived macroeconomic uncertainty concerning U.S. financial
regulation policies since 1985. My investigation aims to provide empirical
evidence on the linear and nonlinear effects of FRPU shocks in presence of
financial frictions. To do so, I focus on the role of FRPU shocks in driving
corporate credit spreads and some key macroeconomic aggregates, namely
industrial production, unemployment, inflation, and the federal funds rate.
The early theoretical literature has extensively analyzed the real-option
channel as a transmission mechanism of uncertainty shocks to the real economy.
Bernanke (1983) and Dixit (1989), for instance, show that real-option effects
materialize within the framework of irreversible investment, where uncertainty
plays a role in delaying investment decisions. Within this framework, firms defer
investment decisions that involve sunk costs whenever facing a highly uncertain
environment, because uncertainty increases the option value of waiting (the
real-option) until new information about the state of the economy arrives. As
a result, increases in uncertainty are typically followed by drops in investment.
The real-option channel has also been recently investigated by Bloom (2009).
Using a linear VAR, he provides evidence that uncertainty shocks in the U.S.
generate a rapid drop, rebound, and overshoot in economic activity. He then
replicates this evidence with a model in which firms face a region of inaction in
the hiring and investment space. The region of inaction arises from non-convex
labor and capital adjustment costs in the model. Under high uncertainty, the
region of inaction expands, and in the aggregate firms become less reactive to
business conditions and adopt a "wait-and-see" strategy.
Another growing strand of the literature focuses on financial frictions as
an additional mechanism by which uncertainty interacts with the business
cycle. Intuitively, uncertainty shocks may reduce the expected profitability
of firms, which increases their actual or perceived riskiness. Under imperfect
financial markets, increased risk raises firms’ expected default probabilities,
making outside borrowing more expensive. Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2013)
explore this hypothesis within a general equilibrium model where heterogeneous
typically defined as the conditional volatility of a disturbance that is unforecastable from the
perspective of economic agents".
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firms face time-varying uncertainty, non-convex capital adjustment costs, and
financial market frictions. They show, both theoretically and empirically
(via a SVAR model), that unanticipated increases in uncertainty—based on
aggregate idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns—significantly widen corporate
credit spreads, which in turn influences investment dynamics. Bonciani and
van Roye (2013) set up a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model featuring a frictional banking sector to analyze uncertainty shocks in
the presence of frictions in the supply-side of the credit market. They assume
monopolistic competition and sticky retail interest rates in the banking sector,
which determine an imperfect pass-through of the central bank interest rate to
the private sector. As a result, monetary policy is ineffective in offsetting the
dampening effects of uncertainty shocks. Therefore, these frictions considerably
amplify the negative effects of uncertainty shocks and make them more persistent
than otherwise. Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012); Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-
Corugedo (2013), and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014), among others,
also find amplification effects of financial frictions in the context of uncertainty
shocks. My study adds to this literature by providing empirical evidence on
the effects of financial regulation policy uncertainty on credit spreads.2
Most of the empirical literature employs linear VAR models to investigate
uncertainty shocks. A non-exhaustive list includes Alexopoulos and Cohen
(2009); Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013); Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013);
Bloom (2009); Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2013); Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng
(2015), and Leduc and Liu (2013). However, to the extent that empirical proxies
of uncertainty show extreme values during economic downturns and are rather
muted in non-recessionary periods, nonlinearities might be a concern. To deal
with this issue, I analyze the effects of FRPU shocks within linear and nonlinear
frameworks. As for the linear specification, I estimate a Structural VAR model
and appeal to the standard Cholesky approach to identify FRPU shocks. In
addition to the linear VAR, I then estimate a nonlinear Smooth Transition
VAR (STVAR) model following Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Groshenny (2014a),
who investigate the effects of uncertainty shocks on unemployment dynamics.
2Studies investigating the links between financial markets and overall economic policy
uncertainty include Antonakakis, Chatziantoniou, and Filis (2013); Brogaard and Detzel
(2013); Pástor and Veronesi (2012); and Sum (2012). The macroeconomic effects of policy-
specific uncertainty shocks are assessed by Bauer (2012); Born and Pfeifer (2013), and
Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012b). However,
these contributions focus on uncertainty related to fiscal and monetary policies.
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Their findings reveal strong asymmetric effects of uncertainty shocks over the
business cycle. Bonciani and van Roye (2013) also emphasize the importance
of nonlinearities within their DSGE model. To simulate a "distressed" scenario
(i.e., a recession) in their model economy, they simultaneously hit the system
with a TFP level shock and an uncertainty shock. They then show that the
effects of the uncertainty shocks are significantly stronger in times of deep
economic downturn.
The results of my linear VAR model show that a one-standard deviation
shock to the FRPU index is associated with an increase in the cost of external
finance due to a widening in corporate credit spreads. The credit spread
measures which I consider in my analysis are the benchmark Baa–Aaa credit
spread, the Aaa– and Baa–10 Year Treasury bond spreads, and a new corporate
credit spread index constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), the GZ
spread. Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) use an extensive dataset of prices of
individual U.S. corporate bonds traded in the secondary market to construct the
GZ spread, which is shown to be a highly informative financial indicator in terms
of future economic activity. Using an empirical credit-spread pricing framework,
they then decompose the GZ into two parts, i.e., a component measuring
movements in default risk, and a residual part beyond the compensation for
expected defaults—the excess bond premium. I examine the reaction of each
component of the GZ spread to FRPU shocks. This exercise shows that FRPU
shocks increase the expected probability of firms’ default, suggesting that
the financial frictions on the demand side of credit markets might matter
in the transmission of uncertainty shocks. On the real side of the economy,
FRPU shocks considerably and persistently reduce industrial production, whose
cumulative growth rate is about 6 percent below its trend one year after the
shock. Further, the unemployment rate is estimated to increase by 0.15 percent,
while prices fall by more than 1 percent. Thus, FRPU shocks act as negative
aggregate demand shocks. This finding lines up with those of Leduc and Liu
(2013); Caggiano et al. (2014a); Colombo (2013), and Kamber, Karagedikli,
Ryan, and Vehbi (2013), who focus on different definitions of uncertainty.
Overall, my linear results are qualitatively robust to richer VAR models that
condition the economy’s responses to FRPU shocks to movements of additional
macroeconomic and uncertainty indicators.
According to the STVAR estimates, the effects of FRPU shocks tend to be
larger during recessions than in non-recessionary periods. An exogenous increase
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in the FRPU index is followed by a positive reaction of the Baa-Aaa spread
which is three times larger during a recession than during a non-recessionary
phase. The negative impact on unemployment and industrial production is also
stronger during recessions. These results provide evidence of the asymmetric
effects of FRPU shocks over the business cycle, and corroborate the findings of
the above mentioned contributions dealing with nonlinearities of uncertainty
shocks. I then compute forecast error variance decompositions to assess the
relevance of FRPU shocks for business cycle fluctuations. Within the linear
framework, FRPU shocks account for large shares of variations in unemployment
and spreads, i.e., respectively more than 19 and 15 percent at a 6 months
horizon. As for the nonlinear model, conditional on short-horizons, FRPU
shocks tend be more relevant during recessions.
1.2 The FRPU index
The FRPU index is a news-based empirical proxy for U.S. financial regulation
policy uncertainty developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013). It is computed
as the monthly number of articles containing jointly references to financial
regulation policies, uncertainty, and the economy.3 The articles are obtained
from the NewsBank Access World News, a database covering about 2,000 U.S.
newspapers. To deal with changing volumes of articles, Baker et al. (2013)
divide the raw counts in each newspaper by the total number of articles in the
same newspaper for each given month. They then normalize each newspaper
index to have a unit standard deviation over the period 1985-2010 and add
up the indices for all newspapers. The monthly index is then rescaled to have
an average value of 100. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of the FRPU index
since 1985. The variations of the index are substantial, and capture noticeable
financial-related events. Examples are the "Boesky Day" in November 1986,
which is considered a defining moment in the history of federal securities
law enforcement; the Black Monday in October 1987; the "Friday the 13th
minicrash", which refers to a stock market crash dated October 1989; the
Japanese Asset Price and the Dot.com bubbles; the WorldCom’s collapse in
3The key terms are the following: uncertainty, uncertain, economic, economy, regulation,
banking supervision, Glass-Steagall, tarp, bank supervision, thrift supervision, Dodd-frank,
financial reform, commodity futures trading commission, CFTC, house financial services
committee, Basel, capital requirement, Volcker rule, bank stress test, securities and exchange
commission, sec, deposit insurance, FDIC, FSLIC, OTS, OCC, Firrea, truth in lending.
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July 2002; and more recently, the Great Recession. It is worth stressing that
the FRPU index quantifies perceived policy uncertainty. Thus, it also shows
peaks in correspondence with events not strictly related to financial regulation,
such as the 9/11 terrorist attack.
Given the lack of an objective measure of economic uncertainty, it is desirable
to evaluate the adequacy of the FRPU index as a proxy for financial regulation
policy uncertainty.4 Figure 1.2 plots the FRPU index along with two indicators
of aggregate economic policy uncertainty, namely the "NewsBank" EPU and
the EPU indexes (Baker et al., 2013), and a measure of financial markets
volatility, i.e., the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility index (VIX).
The "NewsBank" EPU is constructed in the same way as the FRPU, except
that the selected articles contain no terms related to any specific-policy area.
Indeed, the FRPU index is a sub-category of the “NewsBank" EPU. The EPU
relies on three components: news coverage of economic policy uncertainty, the
number U.S. tax code provisions set to expire in future years, and disagreement
among economic forecasters.5 By contrast, the VIX index measures markets’
expectations of volatility conveyed by S&P500 index option prices. Many
studies have employed the VIX as a proxy for economic uncertainty. Examples
are Bloom (2009); Caggiano et al. (2014a); Kamber et al. (2013); Leduc and Liu
(2013). Not surprisingly, the four uncertainty indicators show similar patterns.
To analyze the informational content of the FRPU index in comparison
with the other uncertainty indexes, I run several Granger-causality tests based
on bivariate VARs(6). The results, which are reported in table 1.1 (p-values),
show that the FRPU Granger-causes the "NewsBank" EPU and the VIX (first
column), but not the EPU index. However, no statistical support is found for
the FRPU to be Granger-caused by any of the uncertainty indicators considered
(first row). This evidence indicates that the increases in the FRPU index tend
to anticipate (or, at least, are not anticipated by) those in the "NewsBank"
EPU and in the VIX. As for the comparison between the FRPU and the
EPU, I then regress the Baa-Aaa spread on a constant and lagged values of
the dependent variable, the two policy uncertainty indexes, and all variables
4Few recent papers propose new econometric measures of uncertainty. For example,
Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) define macro uncertainty as the common variation in
the unforecastable component of a large number of economic indicators, which is estimated
using a latent factor model and principal component analysis for large datasets. Their
broad-based macro uncertainty measure is strongly countercyclical and more persistent than
other standard uncertainty proxies, such as the VIX.
5The reader is referred to Baker et al. (2013) for further details on the EPU index.
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included in the baseline VAR model (i.e., industrial production growth, inflation,
unemployment, and the federal funds rate). This specification corresponds
to the baseline VAR equation for the spread augmented with the EPU index.
Next, I compute two F-tests, one on the exclusion restriction concerning the
statistical significance of the FRPU, and another on that of the EPU.6 The
p-values associated with the F-statistics are 0.005 and 0.150, respectively,
indicating that the FRPU index contains relevant information on the variation
of credit spreads. More important, this information is statistically significant
when controlling for the information already conveyed by the aggregate policy
uncertainty indicator (EPU).7
1.3 The SVAR model
To analyze the effects of a FRPU shock on the U.S. economy, I estimate the
following Structural-VAR model:
B0X t =
p∑
i=1
BiX t−i + εt (1.1)
The vector X t = [frput,∆yt, πt, ut, it, st]′ contains the variables under
scrutiny, where frput is the FRPU index, ∆yt denotes the annualized monthly
log-difference of real industrial production, πt stands for the annualized monthly
CPI inflation, ut represents the total civilian unemployment, it is the (nominal)
federal funds rate, and st is the difference between Moody’s Baa- and Aaa-rated
corporate bond yields. Apart from the FRPU index, the source of these data is
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ database. Conditional on the availability
of the FRPU, the sample spans the period 1985:1 – 2012:10. The reduced-form
model features a constant and six lags, which are chosen to eliminate residual
serial correlation. The VAR satisfies the stability condition, with all roots of the
characteristic polynomial being outside the unit circle. The identification of the
FRPU shock is achieved by appealing to the commonly used Cholesky approach,
with the ordering being the one indicated above. By placing the uncertainty
measure first, I assume that the FRPU index responds with a lag to changes
6The lag length of six, regarding both the Granger-causality tests and the F-tests, is
chosen to match the number of lags subsequently employed in the VAR model.
7When conducting robusteness checks, in section 1.5, I also show that the effects of FRPU
shocks survive to the addition of the "NewsBank" EPU, the EPU and the VIX indexes to
the vector of observables.
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in the remaining variables, a very common restriction in the literature (e.g.
Alexopoulos and Cohen, 2009; Bachmann et al., 2013; Baker et al., 2013; Bloom,
2009; Caggiano et al., 2014a; Jurado et al., 2015). However, as a robustness
check, I allow uncertainty to react contemporaneously to macroeconomic shocks
and the results are qualitatively unchanged.
1.4 Results
Figure 1.3 presents the impulse response functions of all six variables in the
baseline model. An unanticipated increase in financial regulation policy uncer-
tainty induces long lasting adverse effects on the economy. After the FRPU
shock, firms face higher costs of external finance, as documented by the increase
in the Baa-Aaa spread. In terms of magnitude, the increase in the spread is
not particularly high (7 basis points), although it is statistically significant. It
is worth noting that the size of the shock (one-standard deviation) amounts to
90 points increase in the FRPU. To have a sense of this magnitude, the index
has increased by more than 700 points in correspondence with the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers. Such a shock would increase credit spreads by about 50
basis points. According to my SVAR estimates, FRPU shocks also lead to a
persistent disinflation of more than 1 percent after two months. The federal
funds rate decreases by 0.2 percent, which is in line with a monetary policy
easing to counteract adverse economic developments, and return inflation to
its target. On the real side of the economy, industrial production bottoms out
at about 6 percent below the trend, roughly one year after the shock. The
unemployment rate is estimated to increase by about 0.15 percent within the
same horizon. Taken together, my results classify FRPU shocks as negative
demand shocks, corroborating previous findings in the literature. Leduc and
Liu (2013), and Caggiano et al. (2014a), for example, focus their analysis on the
impact of uncertainty shocks on the U.S. unemployment rate. Colombo (2013),
and Kamber et al. (2013) investigate international spillovers of U.S. uncertainty
shocks to the Euro area, and to the New Zealand economy, respectively. All
these studies document macroeconomic dynamics similar to those following
negative demand shocks, i.e., uncertainty shocks decrease economic activity,
and induce a negative co-movement between the responses of inflation and
unemployment in the short-run.
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Interestingly, FRPU shocks do not induce the "wait and see" effect on
industrial production as identified by Bloom (2009). Rather, the adverse effects
of FRPU shocks are fairly persistent. Bachmann et al. (2013); Baker et al.
(2013), and Jurado et al. (2015) also document a persistent negative reaction
of industrial production to uncertainty shocks within a linear framework. As
stressed by Bachmann et al. (2013), uncertainty shocks may propagate through
other mechanisms in addition to the "wait and see" channel. In this regard,
Gilchrist et al. (2013) point to financial distortions as the main mechanism
through which fluctuations in uncertainty affect macroeconomic outcomes.
They develop a general equilibrium model and show that financial distortions
amplify the negative response of aggregate investment to uncertainty shocks by
altering the effective supply of credit.
Alternative credit spread indicators To complement the previous results,
and shed some light on the financial frictions channel of uncertainty shocks, I
re-estimate the baseline SVAR model by replacing the Baa-Aaa spread with
alternative credit spread measures. These measures are the yield spread between
Aaa- and Baa-rated bonds and the 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds (respectively,
the Aaa–GS10 and the Baa-GS10 spreads), and the GZ spread. As previously
mentioned, the GZ has been developed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). It
is a novel credit spread indicator constructed as the yield difference between
bonds issued by U.S. non-financial corporations and a hypothetical Treasury
security with exactly the same cash flows as the underlying corporate bonds.
Interestingly, by employing the "distance to default" framework developed in the
seminal work of Merton (1974), Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) decompose the
GZ spread into two components, one capturing systematic changes in default
risk, and a residual component representing a risk premium beyond expected
losses (the excess bond premium). They then show that the excess bond
premium fluctuates closely in response to movements in capital and balance
sheet conditions of key financial intermediaries. Therefore, both components
can be considered as credit market frictions. The default risk component is
a proxy for frictions characterizing the demand side, while the excess bond
premium represents frictions in the supply side of the credit market. I analyze
the effects of FRPU shocks on the differently defined credit spreads as well as
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on each of the GZ components.8 Figure 1.4 plots the impulse responses, along
with the 90% confidence bands calculated with the bootstrap-after-bootstrap
procedure developed by Kilian (1998), to a one-standard deviation FRPU
shock. All spreads are estimated to increase in the short-run. The Aaa–GS10
spread follows a pattern similar to the Baa-Aaa, whereas the Baa–GS10 spread
and the GZ increase by almost 15 basis points. These results confirm that
uncertainty shocks may propagate—at least partially—through the financial
frictions channel. Further, the responses of the separated components of the
GZ suggest that the frictions related to the demand-side of credit markets
are more relevant than those related to the supply side for the transmission
of FRPU shocks. Indeed, the FRPU shock leads to a statistically significant
increase in default risk perceptions, but does not substantially affect the excess
bond premium.
Variance decomposition analysis How important are FRPU shocks for
business cycle fluctuations? Table 1.2 reports forecast error variance decompo-
sitions for different shocks and horizons. Compared to the other shocks in the
model, FRPU shocks account for a non-negligible share of the forecast error
variance of the Baa–Aaa spread, i.e., around 18% for all horizons considered
(right part of table 1.2). FRPU shocks are also quantitatively relevant for
movements in unemployment (≈25%), and in the federal funds rate (≈16%).
These findings are robust to the inclusion of additional variables to the vector
of observables, such as the S&P500, and the VIX indexes.
Table 1.3 further stresses the contribution of FRPU shocks for the dynamics
of credit spreads. It shows that FRPU shocks are responsible for important
shares of the forecast error variance of the alternative spread measures con-
sidered. For example, financial regulation policy uncertainty picks up about
10, 17 and 13 percent of the variation in the GZ spread, the Baa–GS10, and
the Aaa–GS10, respectively, at a 12 month horizon. In comparison, monetary
policy shocks account for much smaller fractions, i.e., exogenous variations in
the federal funds rate explain just 2, 4, 5 percent of the above spread indicators,
respectively, at the same forecast horizon.
8Given the availability of data, the models including the GZ spread and its components
are estimated over the 1985:1-2010:9 period, while the remaining estimations follow the
baseline sample period, i.e., 1985:1-2012:10.
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1.5 Sensitivity Analysis
I conduct a sensitivity analysis to verify the robustness of my results. In
particular, I estimate a few alternative linear VARs that condition the impact
of FRPU shocks to additional macroeconomic variables. I start by controlling
for broad economic conditions in financial markets. To do so, I add the S&P500
and the VIX indexes as the first two variables, respectively, to the VAR. The
inclusion of the S&P500 index enables me to control for the impact of first-
moment shocks, i.e., variations in uncertainty may confound variations in the
level of the stock market index (Bloom, 2009; Caggiano et al., 2014a).9 By
taking into account also the VIX, which is a proxy for volatility risk (Ang,
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006) containing important information about
economic uncertainty, I control for variations in the FRPU index not necessarily
related to financial regulation.
Another concern is that high levels of uncertainty, as proxied by increases in
the FRPU, may reflect agent’s perceptions of bad economic times rather than
an uncertain future. In such a case, FRPU innovations would simply reflect
confidence shocks. I address this issue by augmenting the baseline VAR with a
consumer confidence index placed first in the vector of observables. This index
is based on information collected via the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and
consists of an average of responses to different questions concerning the future
evolution of the business cycle.
Next, to corroborate the results presented in section 1.2—where I show that
the FRPU index contains relevant information relatively to other uncertainty
indicators—I estimate two VARs, one including the "NewsBank" EPU index,
and another including the EPU index. In both specifications, I purge the FRPU
shocks from systematic contemporaneous reactions to aggregate economic policy
uncertainty by placing the additional indexes first in the Cholesky ordering.
The final two robustness exercises I undertake involve the number of lags,
and the Cholesky ordering in the baseline model.10 My linear baseline VAR
features six lags to ensure that there is no serial correlation in the residuals.
9Following Bloom (2009), the log of the S&P500 index is HP detrended to capture its
cyclical component. However, my results are robust to using the S&P500 index in levels.
10In addition to the reported checks, I also performed a subsample analysis by excluding
the last part of the sample, i.e., 2008:7-2012:10. The results turned out to be sensitive to
including the Great Recession. This suggests that nonlinearities may play an important role
in the transmission of uncertainty shocks. To address this issue, I estimate a nonlinear VAR
in the next section.
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However, I control whether the results are robust to using two lags, as sug-
gested by commonly applied selection criteria (AIC and BIC), and twelve lags.
Additionally, to account for the potential criticism to the Cholesky approach,
I consider a VAR specification in which the FRPU index is placed last. This
alternative ordering allows examining the implications of uncertainty shocks
conditional on the information contained in the current level of credit spreads.
Figure 1.5 shows the results of these robustness checks. Overall, the esti-
mated impact of FRPU shocks is qualitatively similar to the baseline scenario,
although in most of the cases the effects are quantitatively lower. In particu-
lar, FRPU shocks that are orthogonal to the contemporaneous level of credit
spreads have a less adverse effect on the real economy. In line with the results of
Gilchrist et al. (2013), this suggests that financial distortions are an important
transmission mechanism of uncertainty shocks.
1.6 FRPU shocks during recessions
The macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks have been typically investi-
gated by employing linear VARs. However, some recent contributions point
to the possibility of non-linear effects of such shocks in different phases of the
business cycle. Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Groshenny (2014a) (hereafter CCG)
estimate a Smooth Transition VAR model to investigate the effects of uncer-
tainty shocks on unemployment dynamics in the post-WWII U.S. recessions.
They find the relevance of uncertainty shocks to be much larger during reces-
sions than in non-recessionary periods. Bonciani and van Roye (2013) provide
empirical evidence on the negative impact of uncertainty shocks by estimating
a Bayesian VAR (BVAR) model using euro area data. They then analyze
the transmission mechanism of the shock by using a DSGE model featuring
price rigidities and credit frictions, and find that frictions in the banking sector
considerably amplify the effects of uncertainty shocks on economic activity.
Interestingly, the magnitude of the responses of macroeconomic aggregates in
the data (BVAR model) indicates that uncertainty shocks have a stronger effect
in the euro area than predicted by their DSGE model. As Bonciani and van
Roye (2013) emphasize, this may be due to strong nonlinear effects associated
with the inclusion of the financial crisis of 2007-08 in the data sample. Indeed,
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they show that the impact of uncertainty shocks in a recession is potentially
much larger than in a "normal" macroeconomic environment.11
To shed light on the potential asymmetries of FRPU shocks during recessions,
I follow CCG and estimate a nonlinear Smooth Transition VAR (STVAR) model.
The STVAR framework conveniently allows the isolation of recessionary periods,
while retaining enough information to estimate a richly parametrized model.12
The STVAR is defined as follows:
X t = F (zt−1)ΠR(L)X t + [1− F (zt−1)]ΠNR(L)X t + εt (1.2)
εt ∼ N(0,Ωt) (1.3)
Ωt = F (zt−1)ΩR + [1− F (zt−1)]ΩNR (1.4)
F (zt) = exp(−γzt)/[1 + exp(−γzt)] (1.5)
where X t is the same vector of endogenous variables used in the linear model,
ΠR and ΠNR are the coefficient matrices capturing the dynamics of the system
during recessions and non-recessionary phases. The variance-covariance matrix
of reduced-form residuals, Ωt, varies with the state of the economy as given by
(1.3) and (1.4), and ΩR and ΩNR are the state-contingent covariance matrices
in recessions and non-recessions, respectively. In addition, F (zt) is the logistic
transition function, which is bounded between 0 and 1, and whose smoothness
parameter is γ. F (zt) can be interpreted as the probability of being in a recession
given observations on the transition indicator, zt. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012); Bachmann and Sims (2012) and Berger and Vavra (2014b) estimate
nonlinear VAR models with quarterly data, and use a moving average involving
seven realizations of GDP growth as the transition indicator. Following these
studies, I employ a standardized backward-looking moving average involving
twenty-one (monthly) realizations of the growth rate of industrial production.
As the mentioned studies, I calibrate γ to match the observed frequencies of
U.S. recessions, i.e. 11% in my sample, which implies γ = 2. A recession is then
11Bonciani and van Roye (2013) define a recession as a "distressed scenario" occurring when
their DSGE model economy is hit simultaneously by a negative two-standard deviations TFP
level shock, and a positive one-standard deviation uncertainty shock.
12Given the limited number of recessionary observations in my sample, the STVAR
methodology is preferred to alternative ways of modeling nonlinearities in the VAR context,
such as Threshold or Markov-Switching VAR models.
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defined as a period in which F (zt) is greater than 0.89, that is zt < −1.05%.13
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood, and given its high nonlinearity,
I employ Monte Carlo Markov-Chain simulations (Chernozhukov and Hong,
2003). The joint posterior distribution of the parameters is then used for
inference.14 Because of the limited number of observations for the highly
parameterized STVAR model, the lag length is set to four.
Figure 1.6 plots the regime-dependent impulse responses to a one-standard
deviation FRPU shock. As argued by Ehrmann, Ellison, and Valla (2003),
regime-dependent impulse responses are a valid analytical tool given the focus
on the short-run dynamics of the system. Moreover, a regime switch from a
recession to a non-recessionary phase following a positive uncertainty shock is
unlikely in the short-run (see CCG for a discussion). The economy’s responses
to the shock tend to be much larger during recessions, and for short horizons
differences are statistically significant at a 90% confidence level. Importantly,
the STVAR predicts that an exogenous increase in the FRPU index is followed
by a positive reaction of the Baa-Aaa spread three times larger during a recession
than otherwise. Unemployment increases significantly and persistently under
recessions, as in CCG. Notably, the short-run difference between the responses of
unemployment under recessions and non-recessionary phases is substantial. The
short-run reduction of industrial production is also stronger in recessions, but
the difference between regimes is not as marked as that for the unemployment
rate. Prices react asymmetrically depending on the business cycle phase, i.e.,
they decrease in recessions, as predicted by the linear VAR model, but slightly
increase during non-recessions, although the response in the last case is hardly
statistically significant. On the one hand, lower prices following an uncertainty
shock may be motivated by downward price adjustments due to a weaker
aggregate demand. On the other hand, Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2012) use
a DSGE model featuring price and wage rigidities and show that uncertainty
shocks can potentially lead to price increases. In their framework, workers
faced with higher uncertainty prefer to set higher current wages as an insurance
against the possibility of being "locked in" to a contractual agreement to supply
13The corresponding threshold value for the non-standardized moving average of the
industrial production growth rate is equal to -1.5%. The sample mean of the non-standardized
industrial production growth in moving average terms is equal to 2.11, while its standard
deviation is 3.43. Then, its corresponding threshold value is obtained by "inverting" the
formula I employed to standardize the transition indicator z, i.e., z¯nonstd = −1.05 ∗ 3.43 +
2.11 = −1.5.
14The estimation procedure of the STVAR is described in Appendix A.
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more labor when demand is high. Hence, firms prefer to set higher prices to
avoid a similar scenario. Such a mechanism is more likely to be at work during
non-recessionary phases, when upward price adjustments—in terms of losses in
aggregate demand—are probably less costly than during recessions.
Monetary policy usually plays an important role in offsetting the negative
effects of uncertainty shocks. Within their nonlinear framework, CCG show
that the federal funds rate is highly sensitive to uncertainty shocks during
recessions. Surprisingly, my results show a stronger decrease of the policy rate
under non-recessionary periods. This may be justified by the fact that most
of the recessionary observations in my sample come from the financial crisis
of 2007-08, a period during which the zero lower bound (ZLB) was binding.
This could potentially lead to biased estimates concerning the reaction of the
federal funds rate to FRPU shocks. To explore this hypothesis, I re-estimate
the STVAR model excluding from the sample the period when the federal funds
rate was close to zero, i.e., 2008:10 - 2012:10. I then compute the response of
the federal funds rate to a FRPU shock conditional on the sub-sample STVAR
estimates, which is reported in figure 1.7, along with the baseline responses.
This exercise shows that the difference between the two state-dependent impulse
response functions is remarkably smaller when excluding the ZLB.
Overall, the impulse responses estimated via the STVAR model support
the case for nonlinear dynamics following FRPU shocks. This finding is further
reinforced when forecast error variance decompositions within the two regimes
are considered (table 1.4).15 Under recessions, FRPU shocks account for large
shares of the variance of industrial production and inflation for all horizons
considered. FRPU shocks are more relevant for credit spread dynamics during
recessions when considering short horizons (less than six months), and for
unemployment dynamics when considering longer horizons (from six to twelve
months). Forecast error variances for the policy rate are greater during non-
recessionary phases, which is not surprising considering the estimated federal
funds rate’s reaction to the FRPU shock.
15Given the use of regime-dependent impulse responses, forecast error variance decomposi-
tions for the nonlinear model are computed for short-run horizons only.
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1.7 Conclusions
This Chapter has analyzed the linear and nonlinear macroeconomic effects
of financial regulation policy uncertainty in the U.S. economy. To shed light
on the financial frictions channel of uncertainty shocks, the investigation has
focused on the responses of corporate credit spreads. Financial regulation policy
uncertainty has been quantified with the news-based FRPU index recently
developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013). The results based on the linear
VAR model show that FRPU shocks trigger an increase in the cost of external
finance, documented by the widening in credit spreads. As for the real side of the
economy, the shock has a persistent negative impact on industrial production
and unemployment. Prices are estimated to fall. The monetary authority
reacts to these adverse economic developments by lowering the policy rate.
These findings support previous empirical evidence showing that uncertainty
shocks act as negative demand shocks. The estimation of a nonlinear (Smooth-
Transition) VAR, and the computation of state-dependent impulse response
functions, reveal that the impact of FRPU shocks is asymmetric over the
business cycle. In particular, the responses of credit spreads, unemployment
and industrial production are estimated to be substantially larger when the
FRPU shock occurs in a recession than during a non-recessionary phase. This
suggests that FRPU shocks can be particularly harmful during times of deep
economic downturn.
These findings highlight the importance of modeling financial frictions, and
accounting for nonlinearities, when incorporating uncertainty shocks into macro
models to analyze their propagation mechanism to the real economy. From a
policy perspective, the results suggest that policymakers should pay considerable
attention to the design of financial regulation, especially in terms of policy
management and credibility. A temporary lack of transparency in economic
policy design is very likely to harm the overall economy. As noted by Bloom
(2009), a potential trade-off between policy “correctness” and “decisiveness”
should be considered. It may be more desirable for governments to act decisively,
albeit occasionally incorrectly, than being deliberately ambiguous on policies
that many economic agents depend on for purposeful production and spending
decisions.
Chapter 2
Uncertainty and Monetary
Policy in Good and Bad Times
2.1 Introduction
Bloom’s (2009) seminal contribution on the impact of uncertainty shocks has
revamped the attention on the role that uncertainty plays for macroeconomic
fluctuations. Using a linear VAR, he provides empirical evidence that un-
certainty shocks in the U.S., proxied by large stock-market volatility jumps,
generate a quick "drop and rebound" in output and employment in the short-
run, followed by a temporary "overshoot" in the medium run. The effects of
uncertainty shocks are substantial, e.g., industrial production rapidly falls by
about 1% within four months. A variety of theoretical and empirical models
have further examined the role of uncertainty in affecting agents’ decisions and
triggering macroeconomic dynamics.1
This Chapter looks at nonlinearites, and investigates two questions: Are
the effects of uncertainty shocks different in good and bad times? Is the
stabilizing power of systematic monetary policy state-contingent? To answer
these questions a standard set of macroeconomic variables is modeled within a
Smooth Transition Vector AutoRegression (STVAR) framework. This nonlinear
1A non-exhaustive list includes the theoretical models by Basu and Bundick (2012); Bloom
et al. (2012); Leduc and Liu (2013); Johannsen (2013); Christiano et al. (2014) and the
empirical studies by Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009); Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana,
Rubio-Ramírez, and Uribe (2011); Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2012); Stock and Watson (2012);
Aastveit, Natvik, and Sola (2013); Baker et al. (2013); Gilchrist et al. (2013); Mumtaz and
Surico (2013); Caldara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and Zakrajšek (2014); Nodari (2014);
Pellegrino (2014); Jurado et al. (2015), and Furlanetto, Ravazzolo, and Sarferaz (2014).
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framework allows to capture the possibly asymmetric macroeconomic responses
to an uncertainty shock occurring in different phases of the business cycle. To
endogenously account for possible regime-switches due to an uncertainty shock,
Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) are then computed (Koop
et al., 1996). This is important to correctly address the questions indicated
above because i) uncertainty shocks occurring in expansions are likely to drive
the economy into a recessionary state, and ii) uncertainty shocks occurring in
recessions may lead the economy to a temporary expansion in the medium run
due to the "volatility effect" as in Bloom (2009).2
Our focus on nonlinearities is motivated by the following considerations.
First, uncertainty shocks are typically assumed to have symmetric effects over
the business cycle. However, some recent evidence points to the asymmetric
behavior across the business cycle displayed by a number of macroeconomic
indicators (e.g., Caggiano and Castelnuovo, 2011; Morley and Piger, 2012;
Abadir, Caggiano, and Talmain, 2013; Morley, Piger, and Tien, 2013). Moreover,
uncertainty appears to rise much sharply in bad than in good times. Micro-
and macro-evidence of countercyclical uncertainty, with abrupt increases in
recessions, is documented by Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2012), Jurado et al.
(2015), and Orlik and Veldkamp (2014).3 Different indicators of realized
volatility, often taken as a proxy for expected volatility in empirical analysis,
are documented to be higher and more volatile in recessions (Bloom, 2014). In
light of this evidence, it may very well be that uncertainty shocks have different
macroeconomic effects over the business cycle. If this is the case, stabilization
policies are most likely to be designed differently depending on whether an
uncertainty shock hits during an expansion or a downturn.
Our results provide clear-cut evidence of asymmetric effects of uncertainty
shocks over the business cycle. Industrial production and employment follow
2In Bloom’s (2009) model, the "volatility effect" is due to the fact that an uncertainty
shock translates in an increase in the realized volatility of business conditions. The latter
leads high productive firms to investing and hiring, and low productive ones to disinvesting
and firing. Given that the majority of firms is clustered around the hiring and investing
thresholds, a temporary increase in aggregate production and employment occurs. A detailed
discussion of the transmission mechanism of uncertainty shocks in Bloom’s (2009) model
and its relevance for the empirical analysis conducted in this chapter is provided in the next
section.
3 Spikes in uncertainty indicators may occur also in good times. For instance, the VXO
registered a substantial increment after the Black Monday (October 19, 1987), during a
period classified as expansionary by the NBER. In general, however, increases in uncertainty
during bad times are much more abrupt that those occurring in good times.
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a drop, rebound, and overshoot dynamic path when uncertainty rises during
recessions. Importantly, these business cycle fluctuations are quantitatively
more ample than those predicted by a linear VAR framework modeling the same
observables. Turning to expansions, the response of real activity is characterized
by a milder drop, a prolonged recovery, and no overshoot. From a theoretical
perspective, these results, on the one hand, support the predictions coming
from the model put forth by Bloom (2009), in which firms, subject to partial
adjustment costs in labor and capital, optimally implement a "wait-and-see"
strategy after a sudden increase in the level of uncertainty. Such a strategy gives
rise to the drop-rebound-overshoot pattern that we document in recessions.
On the other hand, a recent extension of Bloom’s (2009) model (Bloom et al.,
2012), which includes optimizing consumers, predicts the drop in production –
due to an uncertainty shock – to be followed by a gradual recovery, with no
overshoot. This is exactly what we observe in our estimates during expansions.
The absence of a drop-rebound-overshoot of real activity in Bloom et al. (2012)
is due to consumption smoothing taking place after the shock. We argue that,
during recessions, consumption smoothing may be impeded by harsh financial
conditions (Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, and Diba, 2011). Further, capital and
labor adjustment costs may be time-varying as well. If this is the case, our
evidence is consistent with both theoretical models mentioned above, and
suggests that partial adjustment costs and some form of financial constraints
are key elements to understand the effects of uncertainty shocks. Moving to the
reaction of nominal variables, uncertainty shocks are found to drive inflation
and interest rates down. The policy rate reacts to the shock in both states of
the cycle, however, its decrease is much more marked during recessions. This
result, combined with that on real activity, suggests that uncertainty shocks
behave as "demand" shocks, as advocated by Basu and Bundick (2012) and
Leduc and Liu (2013).
Turning to our second question on the role of monetary policy, we simulate
a number of counterfactual exercises in which systematic policy remains still in
spite of an uncertainty shock. Our results point to policy ineffectiveness in bad
times, i.e., the negative peak of real activity remains exactly the same. On the
contrary, monetary policy plays an important role during expansions, i.e., in
absence of an accommodative policy, the drop in output would have been almost
twice as the one observed in the unconstrained scenario. Clearly, monetary
policy is likely to work not only via the short-term interest rate, but also
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through the impact on long-term rates (e.g., Bernanke, 2013, and the literature
cited therein). We then re-estimate our STVAR model including a long-term
interest rate, and perform counterfactual simulations by alternatively switching
off the federal funds rate and the long-term interest rate. Our results, which
confirm those from the benchmark counterfactuals, suggest that both the short-
and the long-end of the term structure are important for the stabilization of
the U.S. business cycle in presence of uncertainty shocks. The ineffectiveness of
monetary policy under recessions is consistent, once again, with the predictions
of Bloom’s (2009) and Bloom et al’s (2012) models. In presence of labor
and capital adjustment costs, such models predict a weak impact of economic
policy owing to the magnified importance of "wait-and-see" effects in presence
of heightened uncertainty. Our result is also consistent with Vavra (2014),
whose model predicts a link between greater volatility and higher aggregate
price flexibility, with the latter harming the central bank’s ability to influence
aggregate demand. Further, this empirical finding is in line with the prediction
coming from Berger and Vavra (2014a), who build up frameworks featuring
microeconomic frictions which lead to a decline in the frequency of households’
durable adjustment during recessions, a fact implying a procyclical impulse
response of aggregate durable spending to macroeconomic shocks.
To the current state of art, the empirical fact established in this chapter,
i.e., the statistically relevant, qualitative and quantitative, difference in the
response of real variables to an uncertainty shock, is novel in this literature. This
result calls for normative studies to understand how macroeconomic policies
should optimally react to the state-contingent effects of uncertainty shocks.
Blanchard (2009) calls for policies designed to remove tail risks, channel funds
towards the private sector, and undo the "wait-and-see" attitudes by creating
incentives to spend. Bloom (2014) suggests that stimulus policies should be
more aggressive during periods of higher uncertainty. Baker et al. (2013) find
that policies that are unclear, hyperactive, or both, may raise uncertainty.
Bekaert, Hoerova, and Duca (2013) find that monetary policy shocks have short
and medium-term effects on risk aversion and uncertainty. Our results add to
this literature by suggesting that policymakers should evaluate the possibility
of implementing state-dependent optimal policy responses, possibly closer to
first-moment policies in expansions, but clearly different from them in recessions.
From a modeling standpoint, our evidence supports the development and use of
micro-founded nonlinear frameworks able to replicate both the contractionary
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effects and the different transmission mechanism of uncertainty shocks over
the business cycle (for a recent example, see Cacciatore and Ravenna, 2014).
Among the existing models, our results support frameworks pointing to i) the
recessionary effects of uncertainty shocks (see, among others, Bloom, 2009;
Bloom et al., 2012; Basu and Bundick, 2012; Johannsen, 2013; Leduc and Liu,
2013), ii) the role of "wait-and-see" effects (as in Bloom, 2009, and Bloom
et al., 2012), and iii) the (possibly state-dependent) role of financial frictions
(Canzoneri et al., 2011), which may offer a rationale to the different ability
of agents to smooth consumption over the business cycle and, therefore, to
different responses of real activity to uncertainty shocks (Bloom et al., 2012).
2.2 The impact of uncertainty shocks: empir-
ical model
We estimate the impact of uncertainty shocks on real economic outcomes via a
nonlinear version of the eight variable-VAR model proposed by Bloom (2009).
The vector of endogenous variables X t includes (from the top to the bottom
of the vector): the S&P500 stock market index, an uncertainty dummy based
on the VXO, the federal funds rate, a measure of average hourly earnings,
the consumer price index, hours, employment, and industrial production. All
variables are in logs, except the volatility indicator, the policy rate, and hours.4
As in Bloom (2009), the uncertainty dummy takes the value of 1 when the
HP-detrended VXO level rises 1.65 standard deviations above the mean, and
0 otherwise.5 Following Bloom (2009), this indicator function is employed
4Unlike Bloom (2009), we do not filter these variables with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
procedure. The reason for not detrending the data is twofold. First, as shown by Cogley and
Nason (1995), HP-filtering may induce spurious cyclical fluctuations, which may bias our
results. Second, the computation of the GIRFs requires the inclusion of the transition variable
zt, calculated as a moving average of the growth rate of (unfiltered) industrial production in
the STVAR. We notice, however, that the choice of not detrending the variables employed
in our analysis does not qualitatively affect our results. Some exercises conducted with
HP-detrended variables as in Bloom (2009) and based on conditionally linear IRFs computed
with our STVAR framework returned results qualitatively in line with those documented in
this paper. These results are available upon request and are consistent with the robustness
check in Bloom (2009), Fig. A3, p. 679.
5As recalled by Bloom (2014), Knight (1921) defined uncertainty as people’s inability to
form a probability distribution over future outcomes. Differently, he defined risk as people’s
inability to predict which outcome will be drawn from a known probability distribution.
Following most of the empirical literature, we do not distinguish between the two concepts,
and use the VXO-related dummy as a proxy for uncertainty, though we acknowledge it is a
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to ensure that identification comes from large, and likely to be exogenous,
uncertainty shocks and not from smaller, business-cycle related, fluctuations.6
To ease the comparison of our results with Bloom’s (2009), we use the same
data frequency and time span, i.e., monthly data from July 1962 to June 2008.
Figure 2.1 reports the VXO series used to construct the dummy variable as
in Bloom (2009) along with the NBER recessions dates. The sixteen episodes
which Bloom identifies as uncertainty shocks are equally split between recessions
and expansions. Noticeably, all recessions are associated with significant spikes
in the volatility series.
The vector of endogenous variablesX t is modeled with the following STVAR
(for a detailed presentation, see Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim, and Granger, 2010):
X t = F (zt−1)ΠR(L)X t + (1− F (zt−1))ΠE(L)X t + εt, (2.1)
εt ∼ N(0,Ωt), (2.2)
Ωt = F (zt−1)ΩR + (1− F (zt−1))ΩE, (2.3)
F (zt) = exp(−γzt)/(1 + exp(−γzt)), γ > 0, zt ∼ N(0, 1). (2.4)
In this model, F (zt−1) is a logistic transition function which captures
the probability of being in a recession, γ is the smoothness parameter, zt
is a transition indicator, ΠR and ΠE are the VAR coefficients capturing the
dynamics of the system in recessions and expansions respectively, εt is the vector
of reduced-form residuals with zero-mean and time-varying, state-contingent
variance-covariance matrix Ωt, where ΩR and ΩE are covariance matrices of the
reduced-form residuals computed during recessions and expansions, respectively.
Recent applications of the STVAR model to analyze the U.S. economy include
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Berger and
Vavra (2014b), and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Colombo, and Nodari (2015), who
employ it to study the effects of fiscal spending shocks in good and bad times,
and Caggiano et al. (2014a), who focus on the effects of uncertainty shocks on
unemployment in recessions.
mixture of both risk and uncertainty. For an analysis that disentangles the effects of risk
and uncertainty, see Bekaert et al. (2013).
6Jurado et al. (2015) construct a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty by estimating the
common volatility in the unforecastable component of a large number of economic indicators.
They document a correlation of about 0.5 the VXO index. For a comparison between these
two measures of volatility, see (Jurado et al., 2015, section 5.2).
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In short, the STVAR model assumes that the vector of endogenous variables
can be described as a combination of two linear VARs, i.e., one suited to
describe the economy during recessions and the other to be interpreted as
a vector modeling the expansionary phase. Conditional on the standardized
transition variable zt, the logistic function F (zt) indicates the probability of
being in a recessionary phase. The transition from a regime to another is
regulated by the smoothness parameter γ. Large values of γ imply abrupt
switches, whereas small values of γ enable the economic system to spend some
time in each regime before switching to the alternative one. The linear model
is a special case of the STVAR, where ΠR = ΠE = Π and ΩR = ΩE = Ω.
Following Bloom (2009), we orthogonalize the residuals of the dummy variable
with those of the rest of the system by imposing a Cholesky-decomposition
of the covariance matrix of the residuals. Hence, the ordering of the variables
admits an immediate response of industrial production and employment, as
well as the price index and the federal funds rate, to an uncertainty shock. The
inclusion of the SP500 index right before our uncertainty indicator is meant to
control for the impact of stock market levels on volatility. Our STVAR model
can then be interpreted as a generalization of Bloom’s (2009) linear approach,
which is included as a special case.
A key-role is played by the transition variable zt (see eq. (2.4)). Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Berger and Vavra
(2014b), Caggiano et al. (2014a), and Caggiano et al. (2015) construct their
transition indicator using a standardized moving-average of the quarterly real
GDP growth rate. Similarly, we employ a standardized backward-looking
moving average involving twelve realizations of the month-to-month growth
rate of industrial production.7 Another important feature of the STVAR
model is the choice of the smoothness parameter γ. Given that well-known
identification issues affect the estimation of this parameter (see the discussion in
Teräsvirta et al., 2010), we exploit the dating of recessionary phases produced
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and calibrate γ to
match the frequency and duration of the U.S. recessions, which amounts to
14% in our sample. Consistently, we define as "recession" a period in which
F (zt) > 0.86, and calibrate γ to obtain Pr(F (zt) > 0.86) ≈ 0.14.8 This metric
7Section 4 shows that our results are robust to the employment of the unemployment rate
as transition indicator.
8This choice is consistent with a threshold value zstd equal to −1.01%, which corresponds
to a threshold value for the non-standardized moving average of the growth rate of industrial
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implies γ = 1.8. Figure 2.2 plots the transition function for the U.S. post-WWII
sample and superimposes the NBER recessions dating. As one can see, our
transition probability tracks well the downturns of the U.S. economy.9
Since any smooth transition regression model is not identified if the true
data generating process is linear, we test for the null hypothesis of linearity
vs. the alternative of logistic STVAR for our vector of endogenous variables.
We employ two tests proposed by Teräsvirta and Yang (2014). The first is a
LM-type test, which compares the residual sum of squares of the linear model
with that of a third-order approximation of the STVAR framework. The second
is a rescaled version of the previous test, which accounts for size distortion in
small samples. Both test statistics lead to strongly reject the null hypothesis
of linearity at any conventional significance level. A detailed description of the
tests is provided in Appendix A.
We estimate both the linear VAR model and the nonlinear STVAR frame-
work with six lags, a choice supported by standard information criteria. Given
the high non-linearity of the model, we estimate it by employing the Markov-
Chain Monte Carlo simulation method proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003).10 The estimated model is then employed to compute GIRFs to an
uncertainty shock.11
production equal to to 0.13%. This last figure is obtained by considering the sample mean
of the non-standardized growth rate of industrial production (in moving average terms),
which is equal to 0.40, and its standard deviation, which reads 0.27. Then, its corresponding
threshold value is obtained by "inverting" the formula we employed to obtain the standardized
transition indicator z, i.e., znonstd = (zstdσz + z) = (−1.01× 0.27 + 0.40) ≈ 0.13%.
9The slight delay which with our transition probability peaks in occurrence of a recession
with respect to the NBER dating is due to the choice of using a backward-looking transition
indicator. Such choice enables us to compute the probability F (z) by appealing to realizations
of industrial production (as opposed to predicted values) due to uncertainty shocks. As
one can notice, the volatility of the F (z) function visibly drops when entering the Great
Moderation period, i.e., 1984-2008. This might suggest the need of re-optimizing the
calibration of our slope parameter to better account for differences in regime switches in the
1962-1983 vs. 1984-2008 periods. The calibrations for the two periods read, respectively,
1.62 and 1.72 (for capturing the 19.6% and 8% frequencies of NBER recessions in the two
subsamples). Such calibrations are quite close to the one we employ in our baseline exercise,
i.e., 1.8. Estimations conducted with these two alternative values of γ lead to virtually
unaltered results.
10In principle, one could estimate the STVAR model we deal with via maximum likelihood.
However, since the model is highly non-linear and has many parameters, using standard
optimization routines is problematic. Under standard conditions, the algorithm put forth by
Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) finds a global optimum in terms of fit as well as distributions
of parameter estimates.
11Following Koop et al. (1996), our GIRFs are computed as follows. First, we draw an
initial condition, i.e., starting values for the lags of our VARs as well as the transition
indicator z, which - given the logistic function (2.4) - gives us the value for F (z). Then, we
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We interpret our impulse responses as the reaction of economic variables to
an uncertainty shock. Bachmann and Bayer (2013) show that fluctuations in
uncertainty may be caused by first-moment shocks like, e.g., aggregate TFP
shocks, and are therefore endogenous to the economic system. Bachmann and
Moscarini (2012) work with a framework in which strategic price experimenta-
tion during recessions (due to first moment shocks) implies a higher dispersion
of firms’ profits. We check the exogeneity of our uncertainty shocks by run-
ning bivariate VARs modeling the vectors [sp500, V XO]′, [indpro, V XO]′, and
[empl, V XO]′, where sp500, V XO, indpro, and empl stand for (respectively)
the log of S&P500, the VXO index, the log of industrial production, and the
log of employment. All these bivariate VARs point to i) strong evidence (at
any conventional level) against the null hypothesis that the VXO does not
Granger-cause the other variables, and ii) no evidence (at any conventional
level) against the null hypothesis that each of the other variables does not
Granger-cause the VXO. These results, based on macroeconomic aggregates,
complement those by Bloom et al. (2012), who work with industry-level data
and find no significant impact of first-moments shocks on measures of TFP
dispersions. They are also consistent with those in Baker and Bloom (2013),
who exploit natural disasters and a panel approach to show that exogenous
variations in uncertainty are indeed important drivers of the business cycle.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Nonlinear effects of uncertainty shocks
Are the real effects of uncertainty shocks state-dependent? Figure 2.3 plots the
estimated dynamic responses of employment and industrial production to an
uncertainty shock obtained with the linear VAR as well as those conditional
simulate two scenarios, one with all the shocks identified with the Cholesky decomposition of
the VCV matrix (2.3), and another one with the same shocks plus a δ > 0 corresponding to
the first realization of the uncertainty shock. The difference between these two scenarios (each
of which accounts for the evolution of F (z) by keeping track of the evolution of industrial
production and, therefore, z) gives us the GIRFs to an uncertainty shock δ. Per each given
initial condition z, we compute 500 different stochastic realizations of our GIRFs, then store
the median realization. We repeat these steps until 500 initial conditions (drawn by allowing
for repetitions) associated to recessions (expansions) are considered. Then, we construct
the distribution of our GIRFs by considering these 500 median realizations. Appendix A
provides details on the algorithm we employed to compute the GIRFs.
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on recessions and expansions as described by the STVAR model.12 The linear
model replicates well the drop, rebound, and overshoot of industrial production
and employment documented by Bloom (2009). In particular, the peak short-
run response of industrial production is about −1.5%, while that of employment
reads −1%. Hence, a one-standard deviation shock in uncertainty triggers
quantitatively important real effects. Notably, the contractionary effects of
uncertainty shocks appear to be mainly driven by what happens in recessions.
The short-run responses of industrial production and employment conditional
on recessions are larger than what predicted by a linear VAR model. The
peak short-run response of industrial production is below −2%, while that of
employment is about −1.5% Interestingly, the rebound in industrial production
is quicker in recessions than what a linear model would suggest, and the volatility
overshoot is larger as well. Overall, a linear model provides a distorted picture
of the real effects of uncertainty shocks in terms of: i) the magnitude of the
impact over the business cycle, ii) the magnitude of the medium-run overshoot,
and iii) the timing of the overshoot.13
How relevant is this result from a statistical standpoint? Figure 2.4 contrasts
the responses of industrial production and employment obtained in recessions
and expansions using 68% (areas identified with dashed and dotted lines) and
95% (grey areas) confidence intervals. The abrupt drop-and-rebound reaction of
industrial production in recessions, followed by a persistent overshoot, turns out
to be clearly significant even at a 5% level. Quite differently, uncertainty shocks
in expansions trigger a hump-shaped, delayed reaction of industrial production,
with no evidence of overshoot. Very similar results hold for employment,
whose rebound and overshoot is estimated to be slower than that of industrial
production, but clearly significant in recessions looking at the 68% confidence
intervals. Again, expansions suggest a different conditional path for employment
characterized by a much slower return to its trend level and no overshoot.
12For comparability reasons, the size of the shock is normalized to one in all scenarios.
Nonlinear VAR impulse responses may depend on the size of the shock (as well as its sign
and initial conditions). We conducted a large set of simulations, and we found the role played
by the size of the shock per se in shaping our impulse responses to be negligible.
13Interestingly, the same holds for hours worked, suggesting that firms are likely to adjust
their demand for labor after an uncertainty shock both on the intensive and the extensive
margin.
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2.3.2 Interpreting asymmetries
Our GIRFs suggest a drop, rebound, and overshoot type of response of industrial
production and employment only in recessions. Differently, uncertainty shocks
occurring in good times induce a hump-shaped response of these variables, and
no medium term overshoot. How to interpret such different dynamic paths?
We speculate that the different extent to which agents in the economic system
may be able to smooth their consumption over the business cycle could be key
to understand our impulse responses functions. Bloom et al. (2012) extent
Bloom’s (2009) model and show that, in an economy in which firms face partial
adjustment costs in labor and capital and consumers optimally implement their
intertemporal consumption plans, the "wait-and-see" strategy implemented
after an uncertainty shock does not lead to a drop-rebound-overshoot in real
activities because of the inconsistency of this path of real activity with con-
sumption smoothing. Hence, the presence of consumers willing to smooth
their consumption implies that the volatility effect, which is responsible for
the temporary "overshoot" in Bloom (2009), is dominated by the consumption
smoothing effect. This is so because the overshoot in Bloom’s (2009) partial
equilibrium economy requires big variations in investment, which imply large
changes in consumption. According to Bloom et al.’s (2012) model, after a
drop in real activity, a gradual return to the steady state occurs. From a
qualitative standpoint, this prediction is clearly supported by our impulse
responses when an uncertainty shock hits in expansions. Once consumption
smoothing is allowed to play a role, the overshoot in real activity disappears.
However, consumption smoothing is intuitively possible if agents can easily
access financial markets, something which is likely to occur in expansions. But
credit conditions are typically tighter in recessions. Binding credit constraints
in recessions could very much prevent (at least to some extent) consumption
smoothing, therefore leading to a quick drop and rebound followed by a tem-
porary overshoot in real activity, as predicted by Bloom (2009) (or a version
of Bloom et al. (2012) in which consumption smoothing is impeded by some
frictions). Interestingly, at least from a qualitative standpoint, this is exactly
what our impulse responses predict.14
14In a different but related context, Canzoneri et al. (2011) show the importance of
countercyclical financial frictions in a DSGE model to explain the nonlinear dynamics of real
activity indicators after fiscal policy shocks.
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2.3.3 Robustness checks
Appendix A discusses at length a battery of robustness checks, which include:
i) the employment of an alternative uncertainty dummy, which is constructed
by considering just 10 out of 16 extreme realizations of uncertainty, i.e., those
which are associated to terror, war, or oil events as in Bloom (2009);15 ii)
different calibrations for the slope parameter γ ranging between 1.4 and 2.2,
which imply a frequency of recessionary periods in the sample equal to 10%
and 25%, respectively; iii) the use of unemployment as transition indicator z.
In particular, following some recent announcements by U.S. policymakers and
the modeling choice in Ramey and Zubairy (2014), we classify periods in which
the unemployment rate is over (under) 6.5% as recessionary (expansionary);16
iv) the inclusion in the vector of a measure of credit spread. Caldara et al.
(2014) provide empirical evidence in favor of larger real effects of uncertainty
shocks in periods of high financial stress. A way to control for the presence of
time-varying financial risk is to include a measure of credit spreads in the VAR.
We then model the spread between the Baa corporate bonds and the 10-year
Treasury yield (the Baa-GS10 spread) along with the baseline observables. The
Baa-GS10 spread is highly correlate with the measure of excess bond premium
proposed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012);17 v) house prices. The housing
market is particularly important for us in light of a recent paper by Furlanetto
et al. (2014), who show that uncertainty shocks may play a minor role if one
controls for housing shocks. We then add the real home price index computed
15The Terror shocks are: the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962), the Assassination
of JFK (November 1963), the 9/11 Terrorist Attack (September 2001). The War shocks
are: the Vietnam buildup (August 1966), the Cambodian and Kent State (May 1970), the
Afghanistan, Iran hostages (March 1980), the Gulf War I (October 1990), the Gulf War II
(February 2003). The Oil shocks are dated December 1973 and November 1978.
16On December 12, 2012, the Federal Open Market Committee decided to tie the target
range of the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and maintain it as such exceptionally low
levels "[...] at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation
between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above
the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue
to be well anchored."
17Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) propose a micro-founded measure of excess bond premium,
i.e., a measure of credit spread cleaned by the systematic movements in default risk on
individual firms. Such a measure has the attractive feature of isolating the cyclical changes
in the relationship between measured default risk and credit spreads. Unfortunately, it is
unavailable prior to 1973. Hence, its employment would considerably shorten the sample
size, and this would be particularly problematic for the estimation of a richly-parameterized
nonlinear VAR as the one modeled in this study. The correlation between the Baa-10-year
Treasury yield spread and the Gilchrist and Zakrajˆsek’s excess bond premium reads 0.67.
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by Robert Shiller to our baseline vector.18 We find asymmetric responses of
industrial production and employment (in terms of severity of the recession,
speed of the recovery, and overall dynamics) over the business cycle in all the
above mentioned robustness exercises.
2.4 Uncertainty shocks and monetary policy
2.4.1 Baseline responses
This section studies the dynamics of prices and the federal funds rate to an
uncertainty shock. Figure 2.5 focuses on the differences between recessions and
expansions, and plots 68% and 95% confidence bands around the estimated
generalized impulse responses. An uncertainty shock triggers a significant
negative reaction of prices only in recessions. Inflation goes down and then
gradually returns to its initial value. As both quantities and prices fall after
an uncertainty shock, and much more markedly in recessions, a central bank
following a Taylor-type rule would lower the interest rate. The GIRFs show
that, in line with a Taylor-type behavior, the interest rate goes down signifi-
cantly, both in recessions and expansions. However, in terms of dynamics and
quantitative responses, the difference is remarkable. When the uncertainty
shock hits the economy in good times, the interest rate goes down by about
0.5 percentage points at its peak, and the reaction is short-lived. When the
uncertainty shock hits in a recession, the policy rate goes down up to about two
percentage points, and remains statistically significant for a prolonged period of
time. These results support the view put forward by Basu and Bundick (2012)
and Leduc and Liu (2013) that uncertainty shocks act as demand shocks, and
show again that they have different effects over the business cycle.
The VAR estimates policy easings to occur even when uncertainty shocks
hit in expansions. A look at some events of recent U.S. economic history
suggests that high peaks of uncertainty in expansions did not necessarily lead
to recessions. An example is the "Black Monday" in October 1987, which is
associated to the highest increase of the volatility index in our sample. While
possibly being the responsible of the downturn in industrial production and
employment in the following months, this uncertainty shock did not drive
18The index is available here: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/Fig2-1.xls. This
index is quarterly. We moved to monthly frequencies via a cubic interpolation of the quarterly
series. Our VAR models the log of such interpolated index.
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the U.S. economy into a recession. However, this "missing recession" may be
due to the response of the Federal Reserve, which implemented open market
operations that pushed the federal funds rate down to around 7 percent on
Tuesday, October 20 from over 7.5 percent on Monday, October 19 (Carlson,
2007).
2.4.2 Counterfactual scenarios
This evidence shows that monetary authorities react to uncertainty shocks
in both phases of the business cycle. But what would have happened if the
Federal Reserve had not reacted to the macroeconomic fluctuations induced
by volatility shocks? Would the recessionary effects of uncertainty shocks have
been magnified? If so, to what extent? Answering these questions is key to
understand the role that can be played by conventional monetary policy, a
first-moment tool, in presence of second-moment shocks.
We employ our STVAR and run a counterfactual simulation designed to
answer these questions. This counterfactual assumes the central bank to stay
still after an uncertainty shock, i.e., we shut down the systematic response of
the federal funds rate to movements in the economic system due to uncertainty
shocks.19 Given that the federal funds rate is bound to stay fixed to its pre-
shock level, the responses obtained are informative as for the costs of "doing
nothing" by policymakers.
Figure 2.6 superimposes the dynamic reactions of real activity obtained
by muting the systematic policy response to uncertainty shocks (a scenario
identified by the label "muted systematic policy") to those obtained in the
baseline scenario. Remarkably, the short-run effects of this counterfactual
policy response are negligible in recessions. In other words, the recession
is estimated to be as severe as the one that realizes when policymakers are
allowed to lower the policy rate. The short-run recessionary effect is exactly
the same in the two scenarios, and a gap between the baseline responses and
those produced with our counterfactual experiment begins realizing only after
about one year. Notably, this difference mainly regards the speed with which
19As in Sims and Zha (2006), this counterfactual is performed by zeroing the coefficients
of the federal funds rate equation in our VAR. Alternatively, one could create fictitious
monetary policy shocks to keep the federal funds rate fixed to its pre-shock level. We follow
the former strategy to line up with counterfactuals typically played by macroeconomists who
work by perturbing the values of policy parameters directly. In this sense, we interpret our
federal funds rate equation as a "monetary policy equation".
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real activity recovers and overshoots before going back to the steady state. A
different picture emerges when our counterfactual monetary policy is run in
good times. As Figure 2.6 shows, when the policy rate is kept fixed, industrial
production goes down markedly (about −3% at its peak) and persistently,
remaining statistically below zero for a prolonged period of time (for all 20
quarters according to 68% confidence bands). The same holds when looking at
the response of employment, i.e., the gap between the baseline response and
the one associated to the counterfactual exercise is quantitatively substantial.20
Are the impulse responses reported in Figure 2.6 statistically different?
Figure 2.7 plots the distribution of the difference between the GIRFs obtained
under the "muted systematic policy" assumption and the baseline case. In line
with the previous discussion, such a difference is hardly significant in recessions
according to the 95% confidence bands, while it is significant in expansions
when the same confidence level is considered. The 68% confidence bands tell
a somewhat different story, and suggest that the short-run effect of different
systematic monetary policy may be at work also in recessions. However, it is so
for only a few periods, while in expansions such effect is present and significant
for a much prolonged period of time (more than four years after the shock).
2.4.3 Interpreting policy (in)effectiveness
How can one interpret the state-dependence of monetary policy effectiveness?
As suggested by Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2012), these results might
find a rationale in the real option value theory. When uncertainty is high,
firms’ inaction region expands (Bloom, 2009). Hence, "wait-and-see" behaviour
becomes the optimal strategy for a larger number of firms, compared to normal
times. These firms become quite insensitive to changes in the interest rate,
which explains why the peak recessionary effect is virtually identical regardless
of the reaction of monetary policy. When uncertainty starts to drop down,
the inaction region shrinks, firms become more willing to invest to face their
pent-up demand and hence become more sensitive to the cost of capital. If
20When only the systematic component related to uncertainty in the federal funds rate
equation is switched off, uncertainty shocks are found to trigger a response in real activity
very similar to the baseline one (result documented in Appendix A). Hence, uncertainty
shocks trigger significant monetary policy responses mainly via the effects they exert on the
macroeconomic indicators embedded in our vector. These findings point to a Taylor rule
not featuring uncertainty among the variables policymakers directly respond to as a possible
interpretative model of the U.S. monetary policy.
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monetary policy does not react, as in our counterfactual scenario, the higher
(with respect to the baseline) cost of borrowing starts playing a role. Hence,
firms re-start investing at a lower pace with respect to what happens in our
baseline scenario (which is characterized by a strong temporary drop in the
nominal interest rate). In equilibrium, firms invest less than in the baseline
case in the medium-run, and the overshoot just does not realize. A similar
reasoning can be done as for labor demand and, therefore, employment.
Quite differently, higher realizations of the interest rate (at least in the short-
run) are found to importantly concur to the downturn triggered by uncertainty
shocks in expansions. If the option value of waiting due to uncertainty is less
important in expansions, firms are more reactive to stimulus policy. Hence, in
presence of a higher nominal interest rate, firms are more likely to invest less
and demand a lower quantity of labor. Consequently, a stronger recessionary
effect realizes in absence of systematic monetary policy interventions.21
Vavra (2014) builds up a model in which monetary policy shocks are shown
to be less effective during periods of high volatility. In spite of the presence of
an inaction region due to price adjustment costs, in Vavra’s (2014) calibrated
model second moment shocks push firms, in equilibrium, to adjust their prices
more often. This increased price dispersion translates into higher aggregate
price flexibility, which dampens the real effects of monetary policy shocks.
Given the countercyclicality of price volatilty, monetary policy shocks turn out
to be less powerful in recessions. To the extent that uncertainty is higher in
recessions (as discussed in the Introduction), our results complement Vavra’s
(2014), in that they show that the systematic component of monetary policy is
less effective when uncertainty is high.
A different mechanism is present in Berger and Vavra (2014a). They
build up partial- and general-equilibrium models which focus on the response
of aggregate durable expenditures to a variety of macroeconomic shocks. In
particular, their model feature microeconomic frictions which lead to a decline in
the frequency of households’ durable adjustment during recessions. This decline
in the probability of adjusting during recessions, joint with the variation across
time in the distribution of households’durable holdings, implies a procyclical
21Given that uncertainty is countercyclical, our STVAR coefficients are conditional on two
different average levels of uncertainty in recessions and expansions. The average value of the
VXO in our sample is 24.69 in NBER recessions, and 18.28 in NBER expansions. Then, our
impulse responses can be interpreted as responses to shocks occurring in presence of two
different levels of uncertainty.
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impulse response of aggregate durabe spending to macroeconomic shocks, a
result also documented in Berger and Vavra (2014b). Hence, macroeconomic
policies are less effective in stabilizing the business cycle (at least, durable
spending) in recessions. Our results can be seen as consistent with those in
Berger and Vavra (2014a,b).
Our empirical findings, which highlight the role of the systematic component
of monetary policy, are also consistent with those by Aastveit et al. (2013),
Tenreyro and Thwaites (2013), Pellegrino (2014), and Mumtaz and Surico
(2014), who also find monetary policy to be less powerful in periods of high
uncertainty or, more generally, during recessions. In particular, Mumtaz and
Surico (2014) show that the reduced-form coefficients of the U.S. aggregate
demand schedule are state dependent: they find that, when real activity is
above its conditional average, the degree of forward-lookingness and the interest
rate semi-elasticity are significantly larger than the values estimated when real
activity is below average. This implies that, all else being equal, monetary
policy is more powerful in good than in bad times. Again, given the tight link
between the IS curve schedule and the structure and features of the financial
markets, we speculate that our results might be seen as consistent with the
different role played by financial frictions in economic booms and busts.
2.4.4 Short- vs. long-term interest rates
The differences documented in Figures 2.6 are attributed to different policies as
captured by different paths of the federal funds rate. As recalled by Bernanke
(2013), however, monetary policy is likely to work mainly through the term
structure, and in particular via long-term interest rates. Gurkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2005) argue that the Federal Reserve has increasingly relied
on communication strategies to affect agents’s expectations over future policy
moves to eventually influence long-term rates.22 Kulish (2007) shows that long-
22Such rates are a function of future expected monetary policy and term premia. An
overview of the analysis of the term structure of interest rates is provided by Gürkaynak and
Wright (2012). It would be of interest to pin down the role played by expectations over future
policy moves per se. Gertler and Karadi (2014) employ federal funds rate futures as measure
of expectations (as in Kuttner (2001)) to investigate the empirical relevance of forward
guidance by the Federal Reserve. Unfortunately, federal funds rate futures are available from
1989 only, which would imply a substantial loss in degrees of freedom if we used them in our
econometric analysis. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2007) find the predictive power of a
variety of financial instruments, including federal funds rate futures and short-term Treasury
maturity rates, to be very similar when horizons over six months are considered. Attempts
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rates may effectively help stabilizing inflation in the context of a new-Keynesian
framework featuring a term-structure of interest rate. Following Bagliano and
Favero (1998), we then enrich our VAR with the 10-year Treasury constant
maturity rate (ordered after the uncertainty dummy), and re-run our estimates.
We then compute impulse responses to an uncertainty shock coming from the
unconstrained model, as well as two sets of counterfactual responses. The first
counterfactual focuses on the response of real activity conditional on a fixed
federal funds rate. As before, we conduct this counterfactual to assess the
role of systematic monetary policy in this context. The second counterfactual
simulates the responses to an uncertainty shock conditional on a fixed long-term
interest rate. This exercise is conducted to capture the role that the 10-year
rate (again, a combination of expectations over future monetary policy moves
and the risk-premium) plays in transmitting the effects of uncertainty shocks.
Figure 2.8 plots the impulse responses. Three results stand out. First, the
presence of the long-term interest rate per se does not exert any appreciable
impact on the impulse responses, which are very similar to the ones obtained
with our baseline STVAR (shown in Figure 2.4). This holds true regardless of
whether the economy is in a recession or in an expansion.Second, a counter-
factually still monetary policy is confirmed to deliver a deeper recession than
that predicted by our baseline exercise even when controlling for the role of
expectations about future monetary policy. However, relative to the results
reported in Figure 2.6, the counterfactual recession in this case is milder. In
particular, after an uncertainty shock hitting the economy in bad times, real
activity goes back much more quickly to the pre-shock level relative to the
baseline case (about 12 versus 18 months for industrial production, and 15
versus 24 for employment). This happens because of the role played by the
long-term interest rate in this system (possibly, via changes in expectations
over future monetary policy moves), which substitutes in part the federal funds
rate in influencing the response of real activity. Finally, the third message of
this exercise is that shutting down the long-rate channel implies that uncer-
tainty shocks hitting in recessions trigger a slower and less marked medium-run
recovery (relative to the baseline model augmented with the long-term interest
rate). The effect is even more pronounced when uncertainty shocks hit in good
times.
to model short-term interest rates led us to experience multicollinearity-related problems
due to their very high correlation with the federal funds rate.
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This evidence suggests that the long-end of the term structure represents an
important bit to understand the effects of an unexpected increase in volatility
when the economy experiences booms. Interestingly, the two channels through
which monetary policy may dampen the recessionary effects of uncertainty
shocks seem to play a similar role, especially during recessions. Shutting down
the short-term interest rate, which captures systematic monetary policy, or the
long-term interest rate, which captures expectations about future monetary
policy stance as well as the risk-premium, appears to produce quite similar
dynamic responses during the first eighteen months when we look at industrial
production in recessions. Some differences, however, arise when looking at
the response of industrial production to uncertainty shocks in good times. In
such a case, the role of the long-term interest rate seems to be less important,
while the federal funds rate matters much more. The opposite holds as for
employment, which turns out to be mainly affected by the long-term interest
rate. Interestingly, the effects of these counterfactual policies are again larger,
above all as for expansions, in the medium run, but remain weak in the short
run, particularly during recessions.23
2.5 Conclusions
After the 2007 financial turmoil and the subsequent deep recession, policymakers
have often looked at heightened uncertainty as a major culprit of the slow
recovery. This Chapter shows that the state of the business cycle is a crucial
element in understanding the transmission of uncertainty shocks to the real
economy. Using a nonlinear VAR model, we show that after an uncertainty
shock, the drop in real activity is much larger during recessions than what a
linear model would predict. Given that uncertainty shocks hit the economy
more often during recessions, our findings imply that they may be substantially
more costly than what linear frameworks suggest. We also find an asymmetric
dynamic path followed by real activity. In bad times, uncertainty shocks trigger
a sharp drop, a quick rebound and a medium-term overshoot in economic
activity. Differently, the responses in expansions are much more gradual and
23Obviously, caution should be used in interpreting these results, which come from exercises
that are subject to the Lucas critique. Ideally, one should build up a model which meaningfully
features uncertainty shocks, financial frictions, short- and long-term interest rates, and
mechanisms inducing a nonlinear response of real aggregates to uncertainty shocks. We see
our results as supporting this research agenda.
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display no overshoot. Counterfactual simulations conducted to assess the role
of systematic monetary policy point to policy ineffectiveness in the short run,
especially when uncertainty shocks hit in bad times. Policy effectiveness is
found to increase in the medium run, especially in good times.
These findings are informative from a modeling standpoint. Bloom (2009)
shows that uncertainty shocks imply a drop, rebound, and overshoot of real
activity. This is due to nonconvex adjustment costs that imply the presence of
a region of inaction in the hiring and investment space. Our findings suggest
that adjustment costs may very well be countercyclical. Another possible
interpretation of our results point to state-dependent frictions in credit markets,
which may prevent consumption smoothing and, therefore, influence the exit
path from a downturn (Bloom et al., 2012). In general, our findings support a
research agenda aiming at identifying state-dependent relevant frictions able
to induce different dynamic responses to structural shocks in recessions and
expansions. From a policy perspective, high uncertainty is found to reduce the
sensitivity of output to stimulus policies, above all in recessions. Theoretical
models like the one developed by Vavra (2014) and Berger and Vavra (2014a),
and empirical investigations as those by Aastveit et al. (2013), Tenreyro and
Thwaites (2013), Mumtaz and Surico (2014), and Pellegrino (2014) also offer
support to this view as for monetary policy interventions. Our findings call
for the design of state-dependent optimal policy responses, possibly closer to
first-moment policies in expansions, but clearly different from them in recessions.
Blanchard (2009) and Bloom (2014) call for larger policy stimuli in bad times,
as well as "second moment policies" like stabilization packages designed to
reduce systemic risk. Baker et al.’s (2013) point to the role of clear policy
communication and steady policy implementation. Our results confirm that
these policy suggestions may be particularly suited to exit phases characterized
by particularly severe economics conditions.
Chapter 3
Estimating Fiscal Multipliers:
News From a Nonlinear World
3.1 Introduction
How large is the fiscal spending multiplier? Following the lead of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), several VAR models featuring fiscal aggregates have been
estimated to answer this question (for a survey, see Ramey, 2011a). However,
the quantification of fiscal multipliers with standard VARs is controversial for
two reasons. First, as stressed by Parker (2011), the effects of fiscal policy
shocks may very well be countercyclical. Fiscal multipliers may be larger in
periods of slack because of a milder crowding out of private consumption and
investment due to less responsive prices (see the textbook IS-LM-AD-AS model),
a constrained reaction of nominal interest rates due to the zero-lower bound
(Eggertsson, 2009; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011; Woodford, 2011;
Leeper, Traum, and Walker, 2011; Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-
Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez, 2012a), higher returns from public spending due
to countercyclical financial frictions and credit constraints (Canzoneri et al.,
2011), and lower crowding out of private employment due to a milder increase in
labor market tightness (Michaillat, 2014; Roulleau-Pasdeloup, 2014). Empirical
evidence in favor of state-dependent fiscal multipliers is provided by, among
others, Tagkalakis (2008), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a, 2013b),
Bachmann and Sims (2012), Batini, Callegari, and Melina (2012), Mittnik
and Semmler (2012), Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2012), Fazzari,
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Morley, and Panovska (2014).1 Second, anticipation effects are likely to be
of great relevance in the transmission of fiscal policy shocks, a phenomenon
often referred to as "fiscal foresight" (see, among others, Yang, 2005; Fisher
and Peters, 2010; Mertens and Ravn, 2011; Ramey, 2011b; Kriwoluzky, 2012;
Favero and Giavazzi, 2012; Leeper et al., 2013). Modeling a standard set of
U.S. variables with a medium-scale structural model that allows for foresight
up to eight quarters, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) find that about sixty
percent of the variance of government spending is due to anticipated shocks.
Unfortunately, in presence of fiscal foresight, standard VARs - which rely on
current and past shocks to interpret the dynamics of the modeled variables - are
typically "non-fundamental", in that they do not embed the information related
to "news shocks", i.e., future shocks anticipated by rational agents.2 Leeper
et al. (2013) work with a variety of fiscal models and show that the anticipation
of tax policy shocks severely affects VAR exercises aiming at identifying fiscal
shocks. Forni and Gambetti (2011) and Ramey (2011b) show that government
spending shocks estimated with standard fiscal VARs are predictable, i.e., they
are non-fundamental.
This Chapter estimates state-dependent fiscal multipliers by explicitly ad-
dressing the issue of fiscal foresight. We tackle the issue of non-fundamentalness
by jointly modeling a measure of anticipated ("news") fiscal spending shocks
along with a set of standard macro-fiscal variables. Such a measure of fiscal
news is the sum of revisions of expectations about future government spending
collected by the Survey of Professional Forecasters. As shown by Gambetti
(2012a, 2012b), this measure of fiscal shocks is particularly powerful to capture
the effects of fiscal spending shocks when the implementation lag of fiscal policy
is larger than one quarter, a very plausible assumption as for U.S. fiscal policy
decisions.3 We include this measure of fiscal news in a nonlinear Smooth Tran-
1Other forms of state-dependence have been identified in the literature. Corsetti, Meier,
and Müller (2012) investigate the sensitivity of government spending multipliers to different
economic scenarios. They find fiscal multipliers to be particularly high during times of
financial crisis. Rossi and Zubairy (2011) and Canova and Pappa (2011) show that fiscal
multipliers tend to be larger when positive spending shocks are accompanied by a decline
in the real interest rate. Perotti (1999) shows that fiscal multipliers may depend on the
debt-to-GDP ratio in place when fiscal shocks occur. For a DSGE-based quantification of
fiscal multipliers in presence of normal vs. abnormal debt-to-GDP ratios, see Cantore, Levine,
Melina, and Pearlman (2013).
2For a recent discussion on non-fundamentalness in the VAR context and a survey of the
main contributions in this area, see Beaudry and Portier (2013).
3Yang (2005) shows that the average implementation lag for major postwar U.S. income
tax legislation is about seven months. Mertens and Ravn (2011) find that the median
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sition Vector AutoRegressive (STVAR) model, which we use to discriminate
dynamic responses to fiscal shocks in bad and good times (i.e., recessions vs.
expansions). Following most of the literature, we measure fiscal multipliers
in two ways. One measure, which we term "peak", is calculated as the peak
response of output divided by the peak response of fiscal expenditure. The
second measure, which we term "sum", is the cumulative multiplier given by
the integral of the response of output divided by the integral of the response of
fiscal expenditure. To assess the effects of public spending shocks on output and
estimate fiscal multipliers in recessions and expansions, we compute General-
ized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs), which model the endogeneity of the
transition from a state to another after a fiscal shock. Importantly, as explained
by Koop et al. (1996), GIRFs allow us to scrutinize the role played by different
initial conditions. We then isolate "extreme" events, i.e., deep recessions and
strong expansions, with the aim of understanding if fiscal multipliers are larger
in very severe economic conditions. To our knowledge, this key policy-relevant
question has not been previously studied in the empirical literature on fiscal
multipliers.
Our results are the following: i) anticipated fiscal expenditure shocks trigger
a significant reaction of output; ii) such a reaction is not statistically different
across different phases (recessions/expansions) of the U.S. business cycle; iii) the
reaction becomes statistically different for extreme phases of the business cycle,
i.e., deep recessions vs. strong expansions; iv) fiscal multipliers in recessions are
statistically larger than one; v) spending shocks in recessions have a noticeable
stabilization effect and substantially reduce the probability that the economy
will remain slack. These results are robust to a wide battery of checks, including
i) the employment of a "purged" measure of fiscal news, which is constructed
using information available to survey respondents when they formulate their
expectations over future public spending, to account for potential identification
issues; ii) the use of the fiscal news constructed by Ramey (2011b), which allows
us to extend our sample back to 1947, to control for small-sample biases that
may affect our data-intensive estimator; iii) the role of debt, to account for the
role played by fiscal strains in computing multipliers; iv) several different VAR
specifications.
implementation lag is six quarters. Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012) calibrate tax foresight
and government spending foresight to range between two and eight quarters (the former)
and between three and four quarters (the latter).
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This analysis represents a novel contribution under several respects. First,
our VAR jointly accounts for two relevant issues for the quantification of fiscal
multipliers: fiscal foresight and state dependence. Second, we estimate the
response of economic aggregates to fiscal shocks via GIRFs, which allow us to
endogenize the possibly stabilizing effects of fiscal policy. Third, the use of
GIRFs allows us to address a previously unexplored issue, i.e., the role played
by business cycle conditions for the quantification of fiscal multipliers, which
we investigate by distinguishing between "extreme" and "moderate" business
cycle phases. As a result, we are able to establish some new stylized facts about
government spending multipliers in the U.S., in particular the fact that firm
evidence of state dependence arises only when looking at extreme phases of
the business cycle.
The closest papers to ours are Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a),
Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), and Ramey and Zubairy (2014). Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a) employ a STVAR model and find
evidence of countercyclical fiscal multipliers.4 There are substantial differences
between Auerbach and Gorodnichenko’s contributions and ours. First, they
investigate the role of unanticipated fiscal spending shocks. Differently, we focus
on anticipated changes in fiscal spending. Second, their impulse responses are
conditionally linear, i.e., expansionary fiscal spending shocks are, by construc-
tion, not allowed to drive the economy out of a recession. As pointed out by the
same authors, this assumption provides an "upper bound" for their estimates
of the fiscal multiplier in recessions, because it does not allow the returns from
fiscal spending to be decreasing as the economy exits a recession. Our approach
links the evolution of the variables in our STVAR to the probability of being
in a recession, which is then endogenously modeled. Third, our focus is on
"extreme events", i.e., realizations on the tails of the distribution of our business
cycle indicator (like the 2007-09 crisis). Our main result is that, while fiscal
multipliers may be acyclical when recessions and expansions are considered all
alike (i.e., they may be similar when considering the average effect in recessions
vs. expansions), they are likely to be large in presence of particularly severe
economic conditions. Owyang et al. (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014)
employ local-projection methods à la Jordà (2005) to investigate the nonlin-
earity of fiscal multipliers. They find no evidence of larger fiscal multipliers
4For a similar exercise focusing on the role of business confidence, see Bachmann and
Sims (2012).
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during downturns as for the United States. The comparability between our
exercises and theirs is not immediate due to a number of different modeling
choices (construction of the news shocks, length of the sample, construction of
the impulse responses, among others). We notice that our results are similar
to theirs in that we also do not find larger fiscal multipliers in recessions on
average. However, when it comes to deep recessions vs. strong expansions, we
find such larger multipliers to arise.
Other strands of the literature have dealt with fiscal foresight and anticipated
fiscal spending shocks in VARs. Mertens and Ravn (2010) recover the non-
fundamental responses to an anticipated fiscal policy shock via economic theory-
driven restrictions to gauge information about economic agents’ anticipation
rate. Such a rate is then used as an input in Blaschke matrices to flip the roots
that cause the non-invertibility of the VMA representation of fiscal spending
and output. Kriwoluzky (2012) recovers reduced-form innovations by estimating
a VARMA model using the Kalman filter. Then, he identifies anticipated fiscal
shocks via theoretically-supported sign restrictions. Ramey and Shapiro (1998)
follow a narrative approach to identify exogenous changes in military spending
related to wars. Ramey (2011b) constructs a measure of changes in the expected
present value of government spending. Fisher and Peters (2010) construct a
measure of excess returns of large U.S. military contractors which is shown to
anticipate future military spending shocks. Ben Zeev and Pappa (2014) identify
U.S. defense news shocks as the shocks that best explain future movements in
defense spending over a five year horizon and are orthogonal to current defense
spending. All these contributions show that, at least qualitatively, anticipated
positive fiscal shocks induce a significant increase in output.5 Perotti (2007,
2011), Ramey (2011b), Gambetti (2012a, 2012b), Blanchard and Leigh (2013),
Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2013), and Ricco (2014) work with expectations
revisions in different modeling frameworks. Our study complements these
5Another interesting approach to account for fiscal foresight rests on the use of municipal
bond spreads. This bond spread is well-known to have predictive power for tax changes and
can therefore be used to control for anticipated tax changes (see, among others, Poterba (1989),
Fortune (1996), and Kueng (2014)). Leeper et al. (2012) show that spreads with maturity
lengths of 1 and 5 years are very informative about future tax events. Our investigation
deals with anticipated fiscal spending shocks. We leave the analysis of anticipated tax shocks
to future research.
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contributions, in that it quantifies the effects of anticipated fiscal spending
shocks with a nonlinear model focusing on extreme events.6
3.2 Non-fundamentalness and expectations re-
visions
The role of expectations revisions. Standard fiscal VARs may return
severely biased impulse responses in presence of news shocks. Consider the
model
yt = δEtyt+1 + gt + ωt (3.1)
gt = εt−h + φ1εt−h−1 + . . .+ φq−h−1εt−(q−1) + φq−hεt−q = Φ(L)εt (3.2)
where |δ| < 1, φi > 0 ∀i, h ≥ 0, q ≥ h, and φ0 = 0. The forward-looking process
yt - say, output measured as log-deviations from its trend - is affected by the
exogenous stationary process gt - say, a fiscal shock - plus a random shock ωt,
which is assumed to capture non-fiscal spending shocks affecting output and
which is assumed to be i.i.d. with zero mean and unit variance. The process
(3.2) features q − h+ 1 moving average terms. If h = 0 and q > 0, the process
(3.2) features an unanticipated, εt, as well as anticipated shocks εt−q for q > 0.
For h > 0, the process (3.2) would feature only unanticipated shocks, where h
is the number of periods of foresights. The process gt is a news-rich process
if |φi| > 1 for at least one i > 0 (Beaudry and Portier, 2013). In all cases,
{εt−j}qj=h is said to be fundamental for gt if the roots of the polynomial Φ(L)
lie outside the unit circle (Hansen and Sargent, 1991). Importantly, if the gt
process is non-fundamental, its structural shock is not recoverable by employing
current and past realizations of gt only. Consequently, its impulse response to
an anticipated shock as well as the dynamic responses of other variables – in
6Admittedly, the theoretical papers modeling nonlinearities cited in this Introduction
mainly consider models in which government spending is implemented without lags. As for
the zero lower bound, however, Christiano et al. (2011) conduct an exercise in which they
model implementation lags in their framework featuring the zero lower bound. They find
that a key determinant of the size of the multiplier is indeed the state of the world in which
new government spending comes on line. Our conjecture is that such asymmetric effects
may be present also when anticipated fiscal shocks hit economic systems characterized by
state-dependent financial constraints and labor market downward rigidities.
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this example, yt – will not be correctly recovered by estimating a VAR in yt
and gt.
We assume that agents have rational expectations and observe news shocks
without noise.7 It can be shown that, if the period of foresight h > 1 is known,
the problem of non-fundamentalness in model (3.1)-(3.2) can be solved by
alternatively including: i) the h-step-ahead expectation, Etgt+h, if h = q; ii)
the h-step-ahead expectation revision, Etgt+h − Et−1gt+h, if h < q. However, if
h > 1 is unknown, expectation revisions are not of help. To solve this issue,
Gambetti (2012a) proposes to use a news variable defined as
ηg1J =
J∑
j=1
(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) =
 (1 + φ1 + ...+ φJ−h) εt if J < q(1 + φ1 + ...+ φq−h) εt if J > q , (3.3)
which correctly identifies the news shock if J > h.8 Appendix B provides
further discussions and derivations as regards this news variable.
The News13 variable. We will then consider a fiscal VAR augmented
with a measure of news constructed by summing up revisions of expectations
as follows:
ηg13 =
∑J
j=1(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) (3.4)
where Etgt+j is the forecast of the growth rate of real government spending
from period t+ j − 1 to period t+ j based on the information available at time
t. Hence, Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j represents the "news" that becomes available to
private agents between time t− 1 and t about the growth rate of government
spending j periods ahead. We use data coming from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF), which collects forecasts conditional on time t−1 of variables
7Forni, Gambetti, Lippi, and Sala (2013) investigate the case in which economic agents
deal with noisy news. Agents are assumed to receive signals regarding the future realization
of TFP shocks. Since such signals are noisy, agents react not only to genuinely informative
news, but also to noise shocks that are unrelated to economic fundamentals. They find
that such noise shocks explain about a third of the variance of output, consumption, and
investment. We leave the quantification of the role of noise shocks in the fiscal context to
future research.
8If J < h, the news variable would have no predictive content about fiscal shocks, and
would be equal to zero. In our sample, however, this never happens. This is consistent with
the evidence in Leeper et al. (2012), who report an average implementation lag of about
three quarters. In our example above, h should be interpreted as the minimum temporal gap
between the announcement of the implementation of future fiscal spending and the realization
of the spending itself (which may take more than one quarter), rather than the mean value.
Hence, also the effects of the announcement of future spending whose full implementation
would take more than J quarters would be captured by our news, as long as the minimum
lag h is less than J .
44 Estimating Fiscal Multipliers: News From a Nonlinear World
up to time t+3. This is the reason why our baseline analysis will be conducted
by considering the variable ηg13.9
Information content of expectations revisions. To assess the statis-
tical relevance of our news variable for the dynamics of public expenditure,
we regress public spending on a constant and three lags of the dependent
variable, public receipts, real GDP, and one lag of the measure of news ηg13 (a
detailed description of the data is provided in the next Section). This regression
augments the public spending equation of a trivariate VAR system modeling
the "usual suspects" (public spending, tax receipts, output) with our news
variable lagged one period.10 Public spending shocks are often identified with a
Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals. Hence,
the (orthogonalized) residuals of the public spending equation are interpreted as
public spending shocks. As shown in table 2.1 - which collects the p-values for
our ηg13 variable in the equation described above - news shocks are found to carry
significant information about the future evolution of public spending. This
implies that the trivariate fiscal VAR without news is non-fundamental. Digging
deeper, we find that all the three components (forecast revisions) included in
ηg13 have some predictive power. Overall, this empirical exercise highlights the
significant contribution of news revisions regarding future realizations of public
expenditure. Differently, revisions of expectations based on nowcasting, i.e.,
Etgt−Et−1gt, turn out to be insignificant at the 90% confidence level (see Table
2.1, last column). In line with Ricco (2014), this result suggests that revisions
based on "nowcasts" (revision of expectations at time t of contemporaneous
public expenditures) are possibly of help in identifying truly unanticipated fiscal
shocks, rather than anticipated, news shocks.11
Overall, our results i) show that, from a statistical standpoint, residuals
typically employed in a standard trivariate fiscal VAR cannot be interpreted
as fiscal shocks; ii) suggest that the components of the variable ηg13, which we
interpret as a measure of anticipated fiscal shocks, can augment the information
9SPF data are affected by frequent changes in the base years. Forecast errors on the
growth rates are not affected by these changes. Hence, they are preferable to forecast errors
computed with SPF levels. About this point, see also Perotti (2011).
10The regression includes variables in (log-)levels and the news ηg13 variable in cumulated
sums to preserve the same order of integration. This is consistent with the modeling choices
of our baseline VAR analysis (specified in the next Section).
11These results are conditional on news variables constructed as revisions of the mean
predicted values of the levels of future government spending as collected by the Survey of
Professional Forecasters. Similar results were obtained by employing median values of such
forecasts, as well as variables expressed in growth rates.
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content of our VAR system. These results are consistent with the outcome of
the Granger-causality tests conducted by Gambetti (2012b), who shows that
ηg13 Granger-causes fiscal spending at different horizons.12
Extreme realizations of the news spending variable: An interpre-
tation. Figure 3.1 plots our news variable (an updated version of Gambetti’s
2012b). The standardized variable ηg13 conveys useful information about fiscal
policy shocks in the United States. To see this, we isolate the seven realizations
which exceed two in absolute value, and provide an interpretation based on
the recent U.S. fiscal history. The 1983Q1 positive realization is associated to
Ronald Reagan’s "Evil Empire" and "Star Wars" speeches, with which the U.S.
President announced a forthcoming increase in military spending. The 1986Q1
negative spike reflects the speech given in January 1986 by Mikhail Gorbachev,
who proposed decommissioning all nuclear weapons by 2000 in the early stage
of the "Perestrojka" period. The 1987Q1 positive forecast revisions might be
due to the mid-term Senate elections won by the Democrats in November 1986
plus the questioned constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced-
Budget Act. The 1987Q4 forecast revisions are due to announcements about
spending cuts for the Pentagon. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 is
behind the negative spike in 1989Q4. The war in Afghanistan rationalizes the
positive peak in 2001Q4. Finally, the upward spike in 2009Q1 can be associated
to Obama’s stimulus package.
Comparison with Ramey’s (2011b) news variable. Figure 3.1 also
plots the military spending news variable constructed by Ramey (2011b), and
extended up to 2010Q4 by Owyang et al. (2013).13 It appears that the ηg13
variable anticipates changes in Ramey’s, or at least it is not anticipated by the
latter. To corroborate this statement, we run Granger-causality tests based
on an estimated bivariate VAR with one lag involving the military spending
news proposed by Ramey (2011b) (as well as its updated version by Owyang,
12In a recent paper, Perotti (2011) questions the use of the SPF forecast errors employed
by Ramey (2011) to isolate fiscal spending anticipated shocks. In particular, he shows
that the one-step-ahead predictive power of the forecast revisions as for federal spending is
quite modest, since such revisions are shown to be noisy. Our results are fully consistent
with Perotti’s (2011) analysis, in that we also reject the relevance of very short-term SPF
forecast revisions on future fiscal spending. This evidence suggests the need of searching
for anticipation effects beyond one-quarter relative to the moment in which predictions are
formulated, and supports the employment of a variable like ηg13.
13Ramey (2011b) employs Business Week and other newspaper sources to construct an
estimate of changes in the expected present value of goverment spending (nominal spending
divided by nominal GDP one period before).
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Ramey, and Zubairy, 2013) and the ηg13 variable. Table 2.2 collects the outcome
(p-values associated to testing the null hypothesis that the column variable
does not Granger-cause the alternative news measure) of this exercise for our
benchmark sample and a shorter sample to account for the fact that, for the first
five years in the benchmark sample, Ramey’s (2011b) variable is equal to zero.
While the contribution of our news shock variable finds large statistical support,
Granger-causality running from Ramey’s shock to ours is clearly rejected by
the data. The same evidence emerges when employing the news variable by
Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), which includes observations related to
the 2007-2009 recession. Again, these results are in line with those reported
in Gambetti (2012b), who also finds Ramey’s news shock to be predicted by
forecast revisions over one quarter.
3.3 Econometric approach: A STVAR macro-
fiscal model
Modeling choices. We assess the state-dependence of fiscal spending multi-
pliers to news shocks by estimating a Smooth-Transition VAR model (for an
extensive presentation, see Teräsvirta et al., 2010). Our STVAR framework
reads as follows:
X t = F (zt−1)ΠR(L)X t + (1− F (zt−1))ΠE(L)X t + εt, (3.5)
εt ∼ N(0,Ωt), (3.6)
Ωt = F (zt−1)ΩR + (1− F (zt−1))ΩE, (3.7)
F (zt) = exp(−γzt)/(1 + exp(−γzt)), γ > 0, zt ∼ N(0, 1). (3.8)
where X t is a set of endogenous variables which we aim to model, F (zt−1)
is a transition function which captures the probability of being in a recession,
γ regulates the smoothness of the transition between states, zt is a transition
indicator, ΠR and ΠE are the VAR coefficients capturing the dynamics of
the system during recessions and expansions (respectively), εt is the vector
of reduced-form residuals having zero-mean and whose time-varying, state-
contingent variance-covariance matrix is Ωt, and ΩR and ΩE stand for the
covariance structure of the residuals in recessions and expansions, respectively.
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The modeling assumption is that the variables can be described with a combi-
nation of two linear VARs, one suited to describe the economy during recessions
and the other during expansions. The transition from a state to another is
regulated by the standardized transition variable zt. The smoothness parameter
γ affects the probability of being in a recession F (zt), i.e., the larger the value
of γ, the faster the transition from a state to another. Notably, the model
(3.5)-(3.8) allows for nonlinearities to arise from both the contemporaneous and
the dynamic relationships of the economic system.
Our baseline analysis refers to the vector X t = [Gt, Tt, Yt, ηg13,t]′, where G is
the log of real government (federal, state, and local) purchases (consumption and
investment), T is the log of real government receipts of direct and indirect taxes
net of transfers to business and individuals, and Y is the log of real GDP.14
The construction of G and T closely follows Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013a).15 The variable ηg13 is the public expenditure news variable (3.4). The
variables are expressed in levels because of possible cointegration relationships.
Consistently, the variable ηg13 is considered in cumulated sums to preserve the
same order of integration as the other variables included in the vector. Our
sample of U.S. data spans the period 1981Q3-2013Q1, 1981Q3 being the first
available quarter to construct the news variable.16
The choice of the transition variable zt and the calibration of the smoothing
parameter γ are justified as follows. As in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012),
Bachmann and Sims (2012), Caggiano et al. (2014a), and Berger and Vavra
(2014b), we employ a standardized moving average of the real GDP quarter-on-
quarter percentage growth rate.17 We calibrate the smoothness parameter γ to
match the observed frequencies of the U.S. recessions as identified by the NBER
14Our fiscal aggregates are constructed using the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ NIPA
Table 3.1. Current tax receipts are constructed as the difference between current receipts
and government social benefits. Fiscal expenditure is the sum of consumption expenditure
and gross government investment from which we subtract the consumption of fixed capital.
Data on real GDP and the implicit GDP deflator (which we use to deflate all nominal series)
are provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
15Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a) check and verify the robustness of the results in
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) to the employment of a different definition of the net
tax series that avoids the double-counting of mandatory Social Security contributions.
16Our interpretation of the news variable here is that of an instrument to gauge the
real effects of anticipated changes in fiscal spending. We recall that different identification
approaches may very well lead to the construction of different, but in principle equally valid,
instruments. For an elaboration of this point, see Favero and Giavazzi (2012).
17The transition variable zt is standardized to render our calibration of γ comparable to
those employed in the literature. We employ a backward-looking moving average involving
four realizations of the real GDP growth rate.
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business cycle dates, i.e. 15% in our sample. Then, we define as "recession" a
period in which F (zt) > 0.85, and calibrate γ to obtain Pr(F (zt) > 0.85) ≈ 15%.
This metric implies a calibration γ = 2.3. The choice is consistent with the
threshold value z = −0.75% discriminating recessions and expansions, i.e.,
realizations of the standardized transition variable z lower (higher) than the
threshold will be associated to recessions (expansions).18 Figure 3.2 plots
the transition function F (zt). Clearly, high realizations of F (zt) tend to be
associated with NBER recessions. Importantly, our results are robust to the
employment of alternative calibrations of the slope parameter γ that imply a
number of recessions in our sample ranging from 10% to 20%, where the lower
bound is determined by the minimum amount of observations each regime
should contain according to Hansen (1999).
Identification of the anticipated fiscal shock. Following Fisher and
Peters (2010), we order the news variable ηg13 last in our vector and orthogo-
nalize the reduced-form residuals of the VAR via a Cholesky-decomposition
of the variance-covariance matrix. We analyze the implications of this versus
alternative strategies to identify fiscal news shocks in Section 3.6.
Statistical evidence in favor of nonlinearity. For our vector of en-
dogenous variables Xt, we test and clearly reject the null hypothesis of linearity
in favor of the (Logistic) Smooth Transition Vector AutoRegression via the
multivariate test proposed by Teräsvirta and Yang (2013) in presence of a single
transition variable. Details on this test and its implementation are presented
in Appendix A.
Model estimation. Given the high nonlinearity of the model, we estimate
it via the Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain algorithm developed by Chernozhukov
and Hong (2003). The (linear/nonlinear) VARs include three lags. This choice
is based on the Akaike criterion applied to a linear model estimated on the
full-sample 1981Q3-2013Q1.
18The corresponding threshold value for the non-standardized moving average real GDP
growth rate is equal to 0.34%. The sample mean of the non-standardized real GDP growth
rate in moving average terms is equal to 0.71, while its standard deviation is 0.50. Then, its
corresponding threshold value is obtained by "inverting" the formula we employed to obtain
the standardized transition indicator z, i.e., znonstd = −0.75× 0.50 + 0.71 = 0.34.
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3.4 Generalized impulse responses and fiscal
multipliers
This Section reports the estimated impulse responses to an anticipated fiscal
spending shock. Following Koop et al. (1996), we compute generalized impulse
responses to take into account the interaction between the evolution of the
variables in the vector Xt and the transition variable, the latter being directly
influenced by the evolution of output. In other words, we model the feedback
from the evolution of output in the vector Xt to the transition indicator zt
and, consequently, the probability F (zt−1). Hence, in computing our GIRFs,
the probability F (z) is endogenized.19 Koop et al. (1996) and Ehrmann et al.
(2003) show that initial conditions affect the computation of the GIRFs. In
our benchmark exercise, we randomize over all possible histories within each
state, so to control for the role of initial conditions.20 We compute the GIRFs
by normalizing the news shocks to one.21
GIRFs. Figure 3.3 reports the impact of a government spending news shock
computed with our linear and nonlinear VARs. The responses obtained with our
linear model point to a delayed short-run increase in government expenditure
and output, and a decrease in government receipts. Public spending reaches its
peak value after about three years. Differently, output increases for the first
19Recall that our transition indicator zt ≡ 14 (∆Yt + ∆Yt−1 + ∆Yt−2 + ∆Yt−3), i.e., the
relationship between zt and ∆Yt−i, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 features no stochastic elements. Hence,
stochastic singularity prevents us from estimating our model jointly with the evolution of zt.
Following Koop et al. (1996), our GIRFs are based on simulations that take into account the
link between Xt and zt after the estimation of our econometric framework.
20Following Koop et al. (1996), our GIRFs are computed as follows. First, we draw an initial
condition, i.e., starting values for the lags of our VARs as well as the transition indicator z,
which - given the logistic function (3.8) - gives us the value for F (z). Then, we simulate two
scenarios, one with all the shocks identified with the Cholesky decomposition of the VCV
matrix (3.7), and another one with the same shocks plus a δ > 0 corresponding to the first
realization of the news shock. The difference between these two scenarios (each of which
accounts for the evolution of F (z) by keeping track of the evolution of output and, therefore,
z) gives us the GIRFs to a fiscal news shock δ. Per each given initial condition z, we compute
500 different stochastic realizations of our GIRFs, then store the median realization. We
repeat these steps until 500 initial conditions (drawn by allowing for repetitions) associated
to recessions (expansions) are considered. Then, we construct the distribution of our GIRFs
by considering these 500 median realizations. Appendix B provides details on the algorithm
we employed to compute the GIRFs.
21The standard deviation of the news variable employed in the sample is 0.19 according
to our linear model, 0.21 conditional on our framework under recessions, and 0.18 under
expansions. While being theoretically size-dependent, we verified that the sensitivity of our
impulse responses to reasonable changes in the size of the shock is negligible.
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three quarters after the shock, then gradually goes back to zero, and crosses
the zero line about 10 quarters after the shock.
Next, we look at the evidence coming from the nonlinear VAR. Interestingly,
the estimated response of output is persistently stronger under recessions.
Output increases in expansions in the short-run, but the increase is much
milder compared to recessions, and vanishes after about four quarters. Another
difference between the two states is the reaction of government spending
itself, which is always positive but stronger in recessions. Tax receipts react
asymmetrically in the short run, then their patterns become more similar.
Are the reactions of output in recessions and expansions different from a
statistical standpoint? Figure 3.4 plots the GIRFs and the associated 90%
confidence intervals estimated for both states. Focusing on output, we see
that the confidence bands overlap substantially. This result suggests that the
reaction of output to a fiscal shock is not necessarily stronger if the economy
is slack. This finding is in line with some recent results put forth by Valerie
Ramey and coauthors (see Ramey, 2011b; Owyang et al., 2013; Ramey and
Zubairy, 2014), which are obtained with a different identification strategy (fiscal
spending news shocks constructed following Ramey’s (2011b) approach) and
methodology (local projections à la Jordà, 2005). At a first glance, the evidence
seems to be at odds with the impulse response analysis proposed by Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a), who find a statistically significant difference
between the response of output conditional on different states. However, a subtle
difference in the construction of the dynamic responses must be considered.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a) assume the economy hit by the
fiscal shock to start and remain in a recession/expansion for twenty quarters.
Differently, here we allow the economic system to switch from a state to another
according to the endogenous evolution of the transition indicator. Moreover,
the GIRFs plotted in Figure 3.4 are constructed by integrating over all histories
belonging to a given state (recessions, expansions). We elaborate on the role
played by initial conditions in the next Section.
Quantifying the multipliers. We now turn to the key issue of computing
the multipliers and the associated 90% confidence intervals. Following most of
the literature, we measure fiscal multipliers in two ways. One measure, which
we term "peak", is calculated as the peak response of output divided by the
peak response of fiscal expenditure over the first H horizons, i.e., it is equal to
maxh=1,...,H{Yh}
maxh=1,...,H{Gh} , where Yh and Gh represent the impulse responses of output and
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public spending respectively h-horizon after the shock. Percent changes are then
converted into dollars by rescaling such a ratio by the sample mean ratio of the
levels of output over public spending.22 This strategy, popularized by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), has been widely adopted in recent investigations on fiscal
multipliers. The second measure, which we term "sum", is the cumulative
multiplier computed as the integral of the response of output divided by the
integral of the response of fiscal expenditure, i.e., ∑Hh=1 Yh/∑Hh=1Gh, again
rescaled for the sample mean ratio of the levels of Y over G. This latter measure
is designed to account for the persistence of fiscal shocks (Woodford, 2011).
Our results are reported in Table 2.3, where multipliers have been computed
considering horizons from one to five years. The evidence clearly speaks in
favor of larger (short-run) fiscal spending multipliers in recessions, with values
between 3.32 after 8 quarters and 2.58 after 20 quarters when we look at the
"peak" measure, and between 3.05 after 8 quarters and 1.00 after 20 quarters
according to the "sum" measure. The point-estimates of our multipliers in
expansions are substantially lower (from 1.24 to 1.09, and from 0.33 to -2.27
after 8 and 20 quarters, respectively, calculated according to the two measures).
The multipliers under recession are statistically larger than one at all horizons
according to the "peak" measure. This result is confirmed, conditional on the
short run (i.e., for the first four quarters), by the "sum" measure.
Are multipliers statistically bigger in recessions? We answer this question
by constructing a test based on the difference between the multiplier estimated
under recessions and expansions. Such a test is constructed to account for the
correlation between the estimated state-dependent multipliers.23 Figure 3.5
plots the distribution of the difference for both measures of multipliers (peak,
sum) and for a range of horizons of our impulse responses along with 90%
confidence bands. Evidence in favor of state-dependent multipliers would be
22Ramey and Zubairy (2014) warn against this practice by noticing that, in a long U.S.
data sample spanning the 1889-2011 period, the output-over-public spending ratio varies
from 2 to 24 with a mean of 8. Hence, the choice of a constant value for such ratio may
importantly bias the estimation of the multipliers. In our sample, the mean value of such a
ratio is 6, and it varies from 5.39 to 6.76. Hence, the commonly adopted ex-post conversion
from the estimated elasticities to dollar increases does not appear to be an issue for our
exercise. The average value of the output-public spending ratio in our sample in 5.81 in
NBER recessions, and 6.02 in NBER expansions. Our results are robust to the employment
of state-dependent output-public spending ratios.
23In short, we compute differences of our multipliers in recessions vs. expansions conditional
on the same set of draws of the stochastic elements of our model as well as the same realizations
of the coefficients of the vector. The empirical density of the difference between our multipliers
is based on 500 realizations of such differences for each horizon of interest.
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gained if zero were not included in the confidence bands. In all cases, although
marginally, the difference turns out to be not different from a statistical
standpoint.24
The stabilizing effects of anticipated fiscal shocks. Our STVAR
allows also to estimate the impact of government spending shocks on the
probability of being in a recession for each given horizon of interest after the
shock. Figure 3.6 plots the estimated transition function implied by our model,
F̂ (z), along with the 90% confidence bands. The Figure gives interesting
information about the estimated impact of a positive government spending
shock on the likelihood of remaining in the same phase of the business cycle.
Looking at the behavior of the F̂ (z) under recession, we notice that the
fiscal shock leads to a clear drop in the probability of remaining in recession.
Given the large uncertainty surrounding the response of output to a fiscal
shock, different paths of F̂ (z) are admittedly possible. However, the median
indication clearly suggests a quick fall of such a probability under the threshold
value F = 0.85 just after five quarters, which is exactly the average duration
of a NBER recession in the sample. In terms of the econometric methodology
employed to estimate the state-dependent effect of government spending shocks
on output, this evidence shows the importance of allowing for the possibility
of switching from one phase of the business cycle to another. Unsurprisingly,
given its expansionary effect, the probability of falling into a recession after the
news shock when starting from an expansions is basically zero, though such a
probability is quite imprecisely estimated.
3.5 Fiscal multipliers in presence of "extreme"
events
Extreme events analysis. So far, our analysis has focused on the possible
state-dependence of output reactions to fiscal news shocks and fiscal multipliers,
finding weak evidence in favor of countercyclical spending multipliers. The
24Importantly, our results are not driven by the systematic component of our STVAR
per se. In other words, in absence of fiscal interventions, our model economy does not
deliver large negative accumulated multipliers at longer forecast horizons when starting in
expansions. This was verified by simulating a deterministic version of the STVAR, in which
only initial conditions are responsible for the different evolution of the variables in recessions
and expansions. Our simulations confirm that our cumulated multipliers are indeed driven
by the interaction between fiscal shocks and the systematic component of our STVARs.
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next question we address is whether evidence of nonlinearities might arise
when recessions and expansions are "extreme" events. We then re-compute the
GIRFs by randomizing over different subsets of histories associated to recessions
and expansions. We label "deep" recessions/"strong" expansions the histories
associated to realizations of the transition variable which are below/above two
standard deviations. Given that our transition variable is standardized, this
amounts to saying that all historical realizations of z above two are associated
to a strong expansion, while all realizations below minus two are associated
to a deep recession. This criterion leads us to isolate four realizations in deep
recessions corresponding to the recent great recession (2008Q4-2009Q3) and
three realizations which belong to the "strong" expansions category (1983Q4-
1984Q2). In a complementary fashion, mild recessions/weak expansions are
associated to histories consistent with realizations of the transition variable
below/above the threshold value z = −0.75 but within the range [−2, 2]. We
then re-compute the GIRFs by randomizing over histories within each of these
four sub-categories.
Figure 3.7 shows the GIRFs obtained by distinguishing between "deep" and
"mild" recessions and "strong" and "weak" expansions. The estimated GIRFs
show that the response of output is roughly proportional to the strength of the
recession (expansion). Although in the short-run the response of output in the
case of a "mild" recession is very similar to the response of output in a "deep"
recession, the response of output is much more persistent at longer horizons
when conditioning on the latter case. This, however, cannot be immediately
turned into evidence about multipliers, since the persistence in output response
might be driven by the persistence of government spending.
Table 2.4 reports the fiscal multipliers estimated in the four different cases
under scrutiny. Interestingly, multipliers are still larger in recessions relative
to expansions, regardless of the strength of the recession (expansion). When
the economy is in a deep recession, we find 4-year horizon multipliers around
2.3 and 1.6 according to the peak and the sum measure, respectively. Similar
figures can be gauged for mild recessions, where government spending is found
to be expansionary after up to four years. In strong expansions, short-run
(one-year) multipliers are slightly above one, but they take values lower than one
(and negative according to the "sum" measure) at longer horizons. Interestingly,
while the difference between mild recessions and weak expansions might seem
minimal, the impact of fiscal policy in these two states is much more dramatic.
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Such a difference may be interpreted in light of the different response of fiscal
revenues in the two states (at least in the short-run). In good times, government
receipts are found to increase after the shock, while in bad times they are found
to decrease. In other words, our VAR suggests that recessions are associated to
deficit-financed increases in public spending, while expansions are associated
to increases in fiscal spending which are readily financed via an increase in
revenues. Hence, recessions are associated with a higher net present value of the
fiscal deficit relative to expansions. This can justify the large and positive real
effects of fiscal news on the output multiplier if, during recessions, the Ricardian
equivalence does not hold because of, say, binding liquidity constraints during
recessions, of rule-of-thumb consumers. It can also offer a rationale for the
negative multipliers in strong expansions, which is a state associated with a
clearly positive response of revenues to fiscal spending shocks.25
Turning to multipliers in expansions, while our point estimates suggest
values above one in the short-run, 90% confidence bands imply that we cannot
reject values lower than unity. A possible interpretation of large short-run
multipliers in expansions relates to the zero lower bound, which has been in
place even after the end of the 2007-09 recession, hence in a period classified as
("weak") expansion in our sample. As shown by Leeper et al. (2011), multipliers
may be larger than one when an active fiscal policy is accompanied by a passive
monetary policy.26
When we turn to statistical difference, a comparison between the multipliers
in the case of "deep" recessions and those conditional on "strong" expansions
suggests that the confidence bands do not overlap, and point to a strong
evidence in terms of nonlinear responses of the economy to an expansionary
fiscal shock. Our results are confirmed also by looking at the distribution of
the difference between the estimated state-dependent multipliers. As shown in
Figure 3.8, the countercyclicality of fiscal multipliers conditional on extreme
realizations of the business cycle is supported regardless of the way in which
we calculate the multipliers and regardless of the horizon.
25See Barro and Redlick (2011) for a discussion of deficit-financed versus balanced-budget
fiscal multipliers.
26In our sample, the number of quarters associated to expansions by the NBER in which
the zero lower bound is in place is 15, i.e., some 14% of all the quarters in expansions
according to the NBER, which is a non-negligible share. For an analysis pointing to lower
fiscal spending multipliers in a liquidity trap caused by a self-fulfilling state of low confidence
in a model with nominal rigidies and a Taylor-type interest rate rule, see Mertens and Ravn
(2014).
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In our context, it might be more appropriate to test for the null hypothesis
of equal multipliers versus the one-sided alternative of multipliers larger in
recessions relative to expansions. Table 2.5 collects the fraction of multipliers
that are larger in recessions for both "Normal" (recessions/expansions) and
"Extreme" (deep recessions/strong expansions) phases of the business cycle. As
before, these numbers are estimated by referring to different initial conditions,
all else being equal. Hence, any entry greater than or equal to 90 might be
interpreted as evidence in favor of larger multipliers in recessions at a 90%
confidence level in the context of a one-sided test. The figures corresponding
to the exercises conducted so far refer to the "Baseline" scenario. Under the
"Normal" (i.e. all recessions vs. all expansions) case, evidence in favor of
countercyclical multipliers is borderline, and it depends on how the multiplier is
calculated. Differently, the analysis of extreme events robustly points towards
larger multipliers during recessions. We postpone the analysis of the robustness
of this result to a number of perturbations of the baseline framework to the
next Section.
How does the economic system evolve after a fiscal shock hitting during
an extreme phase of the business cycle? Figure 3.9 plots the estimated value
of the F̂ (z) conditional on the four scenarios. For deep recessions, a sizeable
decrease of the probability of remaining in such a state occurs as a consequence
of the government spending shock: after about five quarters, the value of F̂ (z)
decreases from 1 (the economy is in a recession with probability one) to about
0.5 (the economy is unlikely to be in a recession). This drop is quicker and
more substantial than the one estimated in presence of mild recessions, and it
is also more precisely estimated. Importantly, this suggests that government
spending can be effective in lifting the U.S. economy from a deep recession to
an expansionary path. The probability of moving away from a strong expansion
is low, and more precisely estimated than the one of drifting away from a weak
expansion. However, none of the two suggests a high likelihood of falling into a
recession.
Estimated multipliers: Comparison with the literature. Our evi-
dence points to larger multipliers in recessions (around 2.3 and 1.6 for the
4-year horizon, according to the peak and sum measures respectively), and
smaller ones, but still somewhat high in the short-run (slightly larger than 1
after one year), in expansions. Are these multipliers in line with what suggested
by the literature? A close look at some recent contributions suggests a positive
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answer. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a) deal with unexpected
fiscal shocks in a nonlinear VAR framework and find multipliers in recessions
of about 2.5. Bachmann and Sims (2012) control for the effects of business
confidence and find the sum and peak multipliers in recessions to be 2.7 and
3.3, respectively. Corsetti et al. (2012) work with a flexible panel of OECD
countries that allow them to study the effects of fiscal spending shocks under
different scenarios. Conditional on periods of financial strains, they find fiscal
spending multipliers to be 2.3 on impact, 2.9 at the peak, and larger than 2 in
the medium run.27 Christiano et al. (2011) work with a medium-scale DSGE
model and find a multiplier of 2.3 conditional on the zero-lower bound being
in place for one year. Evidence of large multipliers can be found also in linear
frameworks which deal with the issue of fiscal foresight. Using Bayesian prior
predictive analysis for a battery of closed- and open-economy DSGE models
featuring different frictions and policy conducts, Leeper et al. (2011) rationalize
fiscal spending multipliers of two or larger. Ben Zeev and Pappa (2014) find a
peak multiplier larger than 4. Fisher and Peters (2010), using their measure of
excess returns of large U.S. military contractors, find a multiplier of 1.5. The
same figure is found by Ricco (2014), who employes a measure of news which
accounts for the changes in the composition of the pool of forecasters compiling
the SPF questionnaires. Depending on the set of restrictions imposed in their
sign restriction-VAR analysis, Canova and Pappa (2011) find the U.S. fiscal
multipliers to range between 2 and 4.
Our findings qualify those by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a),
who suggest that recessions are associated with larger fiscal spending multipliers.
As already pointed out, their general conclusion might be driven by the implicit
assumption that all recessions are treated like "extreme events" when conducting
their impulse response analysis. Our analysis suggests that this may very well
be the case. This finding has important implications from a policy perspective
too, given that a fiscal stimulus may be needed exactly in correspondence to
deep recessions.
Overall, our analysis based on "disaggregated" recessions and expansions
shows that nonlinearities are likely to arise when we look within each of the
two states typically investigated in a business cycle context, i.e., recessions and
27As reported in the minutes of the Economic Policy Panel Discussion, Giancarlo Corsetti
pointed out that financial crises, in their study, are not meant to represent recessions.
However, he also added that the multipliers are even larger when one uses macro crisis
episodes alone in their panel approach. See Economic Policy, 2012, 27(72), p. 562.
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expansions. In particular, we find support in favor of a larger fiscal multiplier
when deep recessions are considered.
3.6 Further investigations
Our baseline analysis suggests that evidence in favor of countercyclical fiscal
multipliers is borderline when we condition upon recessions vs. expansions,
while it becomes much clearer and solid when conditioning upon extreme
events. This Section discusses the solidity of our results to the employment of
i) alternative identification strategies; ii) a longer sample; iii) debt; iv) several
different VAR specifications.
3.6.1 Identification
Exogeneity of the change in government spending expectations. Our
baseline analysis rests on revisions of government spending expectations. Such
revisions may in principle be due to shocks other than merely fiscal ones.
Suppose that gt = δzt + ξt, where zt is a vector of m indicators of the business
cycle (say, output, unemployment, inflation, interest rates), δ is the vector
of loadings relating zt to gt, and ξt = εt + φ1εt−1 + φ2εt−2 + ... + φnεt−n is
a moving average process modeling the unexpected fiscal shock εt as well as
the expected ones εt−j, j = 1, ..., n. Then, ηg13 =
∑3
j=1(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) =
δ
∑3
j=1(Etzt+j−Et−1zt+j)+ η˜g13, where η˜g13 =
∑3
j=1 φjεt−j . In words, systematic
revisions of fiscal spending forecasts might be due not only to anticipated fiscal
shocks, but also to revisions of other variables’ forecasts possibly due to other
shocks (technology, financial). We deal with this issue by regressing our
measure of fiscal news ηg13 on a number of macroeconomic indicators available
to professional forecasters when they are asked to form expectations about G:
(the sums of forecasts revisions of) real GDP growth, unemployment, GDP
deflator inflation, the 3-month Treasury bill rate, and the 10-year Treasury
bond rate.28 Figure 3.10 displays the raw and purged versions of the news
28Forecasts of the debt-to-GDP ratio are not included in the SPF survey. We run further
regressions by adding lagged realizations of debt-to-GDP ratio to the regression described
in the text. Such measures turn out to be insignificant. The choice of not including the
contemporaneous realizations of the debt-to-GDP ratio on the right-hand side of the regression
is due to the timing of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The questionnaire of such
survey is sent to the pool of respondents after the advance report of the national income and
product accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is released to the public. Hence,
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variable, denoted by ηg13 and η˜g13 respectively. Two considerations are in order.
First, the correlation between these two variables is quite high (0.95). Second,
the most extreme realizations, documented in Figure 3.1 and reproposed here,
are clearly captured by both variables. Hence, most of the information content
of the (unpurged version of the) ηg13 variable is likely to come from its genuinely
exogenous component. To corroborate this statement, we replace the ηg13
variable with its purged version η˜g13 in our VAR, and re-run our estimations
and simulations. Table 2.6 ("η˜g13 last") collects the results of this exercise for
our extreme events analysis.29 These results, as well as those in Table 2.5 on
the difference of the multipliers in extreme business cycle phases, confirm our
baseline findings
Contemporaneous effects of fiscal spending shocks. Another issue
affecting our baseline analysis regards the timing of the impact of the news
shocks. The baseline vector features a recursive identification scheme in which
the news variable is ordered last. This choice aims at purging the movements of
the ηg13 fiscal variable by accounting for its systematic response to government
spending, tax revenues, and output. However, such a choice has an obvious
limitation, i.e., output is not allowed to move immediately after the realization
of the news shock. We then perform a robustness check by focusing on the
four-variate VAR X η˜
g
t = [η˜g13,t, Gt, Tt, Yt]′, which enables fiscal news shocks
to affect output on impact.30 We run this exercise with our purged measure
of anticipated fiscal shocks to control for the systematic movements of fiscal
news due to news hitting other macroeconomic indicators, as explained above.
Table 2.6 ("η˜g13 first") documents slightly different, but statistically equivalent,
multipliers relative to the baseline. Most importantly, as also documented by
Table 2.5, we find again larger multipliers in deep recessions than in strong
expansions.
the questionnaire contains the first estimate of GDP and its components for the previous
quarter. Thus, in formulating and submitting their projections, the information sets of the
SPF panelists include the data reported in the advance report and related to quarter t−1 but
not data regarding quarter t. For information on the variables included in the survey and
the information set possessed by respondents, see http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-
and-data/real-time-center/survey .
29Multipliers computed by considering a four-year time span. Similar results are obtained
when considering a two-year time span.
30An alternative, not pursued here, would be to work with sign restrictions. For an analysis
of sign restrictions in fiscal VARs and their implications for the implied fiscal elasticities, see
Caldara and Kamps (2012).
3.6 Further investigations 59
3.6.2 Longer sample
The nonlinear estimator we employ is data intensive. Because of limited data
availability for the SPF forecast revisions, our baseline analysis rests on a
relatively short sample, i.e., 1981Q3-2013Q1. Hence, small-sample issues may
lead to distortions of our estimated coefficients, which could then lead us to
obtain biased multipliers. We then conduct a robustness check by employing a
much longer sample, i.e., 1947Q1-2013Q1. To do so, we use an updated version
of Ramey’s (2011b) widely known fiscal news variable (available at Valerie
Ramey’s website), and put it first in a VAR including fiscal spending, fiscal
revenues, and output. Following Ramey (2011b), we estimate a VAR with
four lags and a quadratic trend. Table 2.6 ("Long sample, Ramey’s news")
collects the outcome of our estimations. Reassuringly, this exercise produces
multipliers very much in line with our baseline ones, and it offers support to
the importance of looking at extreme events to find nonlinearities in the fiscal
multipliers even in long samples.
3.6.3 The role of debt
Our baseline VAR does not feature debt. However, controlling for debt fluctua-
tions in our regressions is important to better understand the drivers of our
countercyclical multipliers. The reason is simple. Recent panel-data studies
have shown that countries with "high" levels of debt have smaller multipliers
than countries with lower levels of debt (see, e.g., Corsetti et al., 2012; Ilzetzki,
Mendoza, and Végh, 2013). Hence, it could in principle be possible that the
nonlinearities we have found are driven by different levels of debt rather than
different phases of the business cycle. It is then of interest to check if the
relevant initial conditions could be related to different degrees of fiscal distress.
To this aim, we modify our baseline vector along two dimensions. First, we
include the debt/GDP ratio in our VAR. Following a common modeling choice
in the literature (see, among others, Leeper et al., 2011, 2012; Corsetti et al.,
2012; Leeper et al., 2013), we assume the debt/GDP ratio to affect the fiscal
instruments with a lag, and put it last in the vector. Second, we employ our
debt/GDP ratio as the variable which dictates the switch from a regime to
another. This second modification is exactly aimed at capturing the idea of
different "debt-contingent" regimes. To discriminate between "high" vs. "low"
realizations of debt, we focus on the cyclical component of the debt/GDP
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ratio, which is extracted from the raw series (in log) by applying a standard
Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing weight equal to 1,600. Realizations of
the debt/GDP ratio one standard deviation above (below) the HP-trend are
interpreted as phases of "high" ("low") debt. Positive (negative) realizations
within one standard deviation are classified as "moderately high" ("moderately
low"). A possible interpretation of this series is that of a "debt/GDP gap" com-
puted by considering a time-varying debt/GDP target, which may be consistent
with the clear upward-trending behavior displayed by this ratio in our sample.
Table 2.6 ("Debt/GDP ratio") collects the multipliers produced by this
exercise. We distinguish between extreme phases of "high" and "low" fiscal
distress, as well as intermediate ones, i.e. "moderately high" and "moderately
low", which we indicate with "Mod.+ debt" and "Mod.− debt", respectively. Our
results point to fairly similar fiscal multipliers when computed conditional on
"high" vs. "low" debt levels. Hence, countercyclical fiscal multipliers do not
seem to be guided by the "fiscal cycle".31 Our results echo those by Favero
and Giavazzi (2012), who also find no major empirical differences in a fiscal
model for the U.S. when adding debt. It is important to stress, however, that
this conclusion is not inconsistent with cross-country studies which point to
relevant nonlinearities of fiscal policy effects due to different levels of debt, in
particular for developing countries.
3.6.4 Further robustness checks
Our results are robust to a variety of further perturbations of our baseline model,
which include: i) a "FAST-VAR" (Factor Augmented Smooth Transition-VAR)
version of our VAR model, which we estimate to further control for nonfun-
damentalness as suggested by Forni and Gambetti (2014); ii) the estimation
of a five-variate VAR featuring the sum of forecast revisions regarding future
real GDP as first variable in the vector, again to control for revisions of real
GDP forecasts; iii) the employment of revisions over total spending forecasts
(as opposed to Federal spending only); iv) a measure of news which accounts
for the changes in the composition of the pool of forecasters compiling the
SPF questionnaires as in Ricco (2014). The solidity of our baseline results is
31An analysis conducted by adding the debt-to-GDP ratio to our otherwise baseline
framework while keeping the moving average of real GDP as our transition indicator returned
multipliers very similar to our baseline ones.
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confirmed also by this battery of robustness checks, which is available upon
request.
3.7 Conclusions
This Chapter quantifies the fiscal spending multiplier in the U.S. and tests
the theoretical prediction of a larger reaction of output to fiscal shocks in
economic downturns. Following Gambetti (2012a,b), we tackle the issue of non-
fundamentalness due to fiscal foresight by identifying anticipated government
spending shocks via sums of forecasts revisions collected by the Survey of
Professional Forecasters. We show that such a measure of fiscal spending news
carries relevant information to predict the future evolution of fiscal expenditures
and Granger-causes other measures of fiscal news recently proposed in the
literature. Then, we augment a macro-fiscal nonlinear VAR with this measure
of fiscal news and estimate the size of fiscal spending multipliers across different
phases of the business cycle.
Our empirical investigation points to fiscal multipliers larger than one
in recessionary periods. However, conditional on a standard "recession vs.
expansion" classification of the phases of the U.S. business cycle, our results do
not support the idea of a countercyclical fiscal multiplier. Differently, when we
condition the estimates of the fiscal multipliers on the strength of the business
cycle (namely, when we distinguish between deep and mild recessions, and weak
and strong expansions), we find that fiscal multipliers are statistically larger in
deep recessions relative to strong expansionary periods.
The results of our analysis highlight the relevance of the different initial
economic conditions within each of the two states typically considered for
classifying the U.S. business cycle. Fiscal multipliers may very well be larger
when a fiscal shock occurs in presence of a deep recession like that of 2007-09
than when it occurs in presence of milder economic downturns. Our results
imply that a correct measurement of the fiscal multipliers can be performed
just if flexible-enough econometric models are put at work.

Chapter 4
Credit Supply Shocks in U.S.
Bond Markets: Are There
Nonlinearities?
4.1 Introduction
Credit crunches have not been rare events during the last decades. However, the
severity of the 2007-08 crisis, which saw a sharp reduction in the availability of
credit, have renewed interest in understanding to what extent credit constraints
shape the business cycle. This Chapter investigates this question by studying
the asymmetric propagation of U.S. credit supply shocks across the business
cycle. Credit supply shocks may very well be asymmetric due to intensified
financial frictions during downturns. Although this conjecture is a very natural
one, few empirical studies take into account nonlinearities. My results show
that credit supply shocks originating in bond markets induce a drop-rebound-
overshoot pattern for real activity when hitting the economy in recessions.
Differently, a long-lasting, hump-shaped reaction is found in upward phases
of the business cycle. The nonlinear transmission of financial shocks has key
implications for policymakers and academic researchers. On the policy side, it
favors the introduction of nonlinear macroprudential rules to deal with financial
instability, which possibly take into account the persistent effects of credit
shocks during expansions. On the research side, the evidence of significant
asymmetric effects of credit supply shocks i) complements empirical studies,
within a linear context, that document an independent role of credit (in addition
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to real factors) in driving the path of the economy, ii) supports the development
of structural macro models featuring a role for financial intermediation that
goes beyond that of a merely conduit, and iii) favors the theoretical modeling
of nonlinearities.
In this Chapter, I adopt an empirical perspective and estimates linear and
nonlinear local projection models (Jordà, 2005) to study the real effects of
credit supply shocks in the U.S., where the latter is proxied by the excess bond
premium (EBP) developed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) (GZ hereafter).
The choice of using the EBP as a proxy of credit shocks originating from the
supply side of bond markets can be firstly motivated by the way in which this
indicator is developed (details are presented in section 4.3). In short, the EBP
is a measure of marketwide corporate bond spreads net of expected default
losses. Thus, by construction, the EBP is orthogonal to variations in expected
default risk of borrowers. Secondly, GZ offer extensive evidence showing that
EBP movements are strictly linked to balance sheet conditions of key financial
intermediaries that operate in corporate bond markets. They estimate a linear
VAR and show that an adverse shock to the returns on assets of primary dealers,
major banks, and securities broker-dealers, leads to a sustained increase in the
EBP.1 They also document a comovement between the EBP and changes in
credit standards on commercial and industrial (C&I) loans at U.S. commercial
banks.2 To measure real activity, I then consider standard macro indicators,
i.e., industrial production, employment, and the unemployment rate. Due to
the availability of the EBP, I work with a sample from 1973:1 to 2012:12. To
identify the states of the business cycle, I simply use the U.S. business cycle
dates, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which
is less controversial than relying on single indicators of economic activity.
The local projection estimates enable me to compute two sets of impulse
response functions to an EBP shock: one conditional on a linear view of the
world, and the other allowing (but not forcing) the economy to react differently
in recessions vs. normal times. The linear estimates provide evidence that
the financial sector may very well be an originator, other than propagator, of
1Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) also examine the macroeconomic consequences of shocks
to the EBP within a VAR model, showing that they are a potential source of recessions.
However, their analysis is confined to a linear framework.
2 López-Salido, Stein, and Zakrajšek (2015) define the EBP as "credit market sentiment",
i.e., an economic indicator that forecasts future returns to bearing credit risk. This definition
is not necessarily in contrast with the view that the EBP measures credit supply conditions.
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shocks. All indicators of economic activity are shown to negatively react to
the shock, e.g., a 1% increase in the EBP is associated to a 4% fall in output.
When economic activity is allowed to respond asymmetrically to the EBP
shock, evidence of nonlinearities across the business cycle robustly emerges.
Specifically, adverse effects materialize much faster in recessions, and die out
within a 1 year horizon. A mild overshoot in real activity also emerges in the
medium run. Contrarily, when the shock hits in normal times/upward phases of
the cycle, its effects are far more persistent, with no signs of economic recovery
in the subsequent 2 years.
I subject the above results to a few robustness checks. In particular, given
that my results echo recent findings in the business cycle literature as for
uncertainty shocks, which tend to generate the same pattern of real activity
across the two states of the economy (Bloom, 2009; Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and
Nodari, 2014b), I estimate impulse response functions to an uncertainty shock
à la Jurado et al. (2015) conditional on the same nonlinear local projection
model used for the EBP shock, and compare the results of the two shocks. I
also re-estimate the effects of the EBP shock by taking into account the level
of uncertainty in the economy. This check is a very relevant one: as stressed
by Stock and Watson (2012), and Caldara et al. (2014), increases in financial
stress are frequently associated with heightened uncertainty, making it hard to
distinguish between the two. Additional robustness checks aim at controlling
that the results are not driven by the Great Recession or by volatility in stock
markets. All these checks deliver the same kind of asymmetric responses across
states.
Finally, I provide an interpretation of my results based on Dow, Gorton,
and Krishnamurthy (2005) and Philippon (2006), who develop theoretical
models augmented with corporate governance frictions, in which empire-building
managers overinvest when the economy is booming, leading to amplification and
persistence of otherwise i.i.d. shocks during upward economic phases. Linking
the predictions of their models with insights from real option theory, I argue
that increased manager misbehavior and increased value of growth options
during expansions, may lead firms to overinvest in irreversible investment
projects, which may explain the sluggish recovery observed after the credit
supply shock during this state of the economy.
This Chapter contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First,
I focus on nonlinearities relating to business cycle phases, whereas most of
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the previous research has dealt with financial shocks within a linear context
(see, among others, Abildgren, 2012; Adrian, Moench, and Shin, 2010; Barnett
and Thomas, 2014; Caldara et al., 2014; Favara and Imbs, 2015; Gilchrist
and Zakrajšek, 2012) or relating nonlinearities to credit market conditions
rather than recessions and expansions (e.g., Calza and Sousa, 2006; Hubrich
and Tetlow, 2012; Hubrich, D’Agostino, Červená, Ciccarelli, Guarda, Haavio,
Jeanfils, Mendicino, Ortega, Valderrama, and Valentinyiné Endrész, 2013).
Second, my study differs substantially in terms of methodology from existing
nonlinear investigations of financial shocks. Almost all empirical studies dealing
with nonlinearities use Vector Autoregression (VAR) models, whereas I compute
the effects of credit supply shocks using local projection methods, which, in
contrast to VARs, do not impose restrictions on the relationship between
aggregates. Third, I focus on credit shocks originating in bond markets, as
opposed to the majority of previous studies which investigate "broad" financial
shocks. Opening the "financial black-box" to look at different market segments
may be useful to provide guidance to the ongoing macroprudential regulation
debate.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 I
summarize the main theoretical studies considering financial shocks within
macro-models, and discuss the related empirical literature. I present the
econometric approach and briefly describe the data in section 4.3. Section 4.4
summarizes the results and offers an interpretation of the main findings. A
number of robustness checks are presented in section 4.5. Conclusions appear
in section 4.6.
4.2 Related literature
The literature exploring how financial frictions influence the aggregate response
of economic activity to non-financial shocks is large and well established.
Leading theoretical research on this topic includes Bernanke and Gertler (1989);
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); Kyiotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Despite the heterogeneity of micro-foundations
giving rise to frictions (e.g., agency costs, collateral constraints), these models
explain the persistence and amplitude of small, temporary shocks through
the financial accelerator mechanism: exogenous shocks that reduce the net
worth of borrowers lead to adverse feedback loops between the external finance
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premium and financial conditions. These contributions abstract from financial
shocks as such, focusing mostly on frictions affecting end borrowers. However,
the most recent U.S. recession has cast doubt on the traditional sources of
business cycles, pointing to financial shocks as potential drivers of economic
fluctuations.3 The lack of analytical frameworks to investigate events such as the
Great Recession induced many researchers to consider model economies where
financial intermediaries play a non-trivial role.4 Building on DSGE models
incorporating a financial sector subject to frictions, recent theoretical studies
suggest that credit shocks are harmful for economic activity. Gerali, Neri, Sessa,
and Signoretti (2010); Gertler and Karadi (2011); Jermann and Quadrini (2012),
among others, show that exogenous disturbances that reduce intermediaries’
capital cause a contraction in credit supply, decreasing in turn output and
investment.5 Importantly, these disturbances are quantitatively relevant for
business cycle dynamics. Iacoviello (2015) estimates that financial shocks
accounted for two-thirds of the output collapse during the Great Recession.
Notably, a few recent theoretical contributions account for nonlinearities in
the attempt to better capture the role of the financial sector for macro dynamics.
He and Krishnamurthy (2013) study intermediary asset pricing, and model
financial frictions as a constraint on intermediaries’ ability to raise outside equity
financing. During constrained states of their model economy, sudden reductions
in intermediaries’ capital cause large increases in risk premia. Conversely, under
unconstrained states risk premia are not affected by changes in intermediaries’
equity ownership. Their model does not address the implications of financial
shocks for economic activity. However, to the extent that risk premia influence
investment, one can expect shocks to the balance sheet of intermediaries to
propagate asymmetrically to the real economy. Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2014) offer another example of nonlinear interactions between financial frictions
and the macroeconomy. Their model underlines a sharp distinction between
crisis and normal times as for the system’s reaction to shocks that affect agents’
balance sheets. In normal times, agents absorb shocks to their net worth easily
by adjusting payouts. During crisis episodes, macro shocks induce fire sales of
3Another strand of business cycle research also emphasizes news, noise and confidence
shocks as potential drivers of economic activity fluctuations, (e.g., among others, Barsky and
Sims, 2011; Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni, 2013; Beaudry and Portier, 2006).
4For a comprehensive survey on the interaction between macroeconomics and financial
frictions, see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012).
5The literature remains elusive on the effects of financial shocks on labor demand,
consumption and prices, whose responses seem to be "financial frictions-type" dependent.
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capital, which leads to highly nonlinear amplification effects caused by leverage
and feedback effects from asset prices.
On the empirical side, early attempts to address nonlinearities relating fi-
nancial frictions to the macroeconomy include, among others, McCallum (1991);
Galbraith (1996); Balke (2000); Atanasova (2003) and Calza and Sousa (2006).
While all these studies share the same dimension along with nonlinearities are
investigated, i.e., credit cycles, only Calza and Sousa (2006) explicitly analyze
credit shocks.6 They use a Threshold VAR (TVAR) model and investigate
how Euro area macro variables respond to aggregate loan shocks. Allowing for
regime-switching after the shock, they find the reactions of output and inflation
to be significant only when the economy is in a low credit growth state. More
recently, Gambetti and Musso (2012) investigate the effects of loan supply
shocks in the Euro Area, the U.K. and the U.S. using a time-varying VAR model.
Shock identification is achieved via sign-restrictions. Their impulse response
functions, and historical decompositions, show that these shocks have been par-
ticularly important during recessions. Hubrich, D’Agostino, Červená, Ciccarelli,
Guarda, Haavio, Jeanfils, Mendicino, Ortega, Valderrama, and Valentinyiné
Endrész (2013) investigate the effects of financial shocks in the Euro area using
a Markov-Switching (MS-VAR) model. They identify (broad) financial shocks
by relying on the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) introduced by
Holló, Kremer, and Lo Duca (2012) Their results show that shocks to the level
of financial stress have much more pronounced effects for the macroeconomy
in high stress episodes than in normal times. Hubrich and Tetlow (2012) also
use an aggregate index of financial stress within a MS-VAR model and draw
similar conclusions for the U.S. economy.
I depart from the above literature along several dimensions. First, I focus
on nonlinearities relating to business cycle phases rather than credit market
conditions. Second, I compute the effects of credit supply shocks using local
projections (Jordà, 2005), which, in contrast to nonlinear VARs, do not impose
restrictions on the relationship between aggregates.7 Third, I focus on credit
shocks originating in bond markets, whereas most of the mentioned studies
either investigate bank loan shocks or simply do not try to identify any specific
type of financial shock. Opening the "financial black-box", by evaluating shocks
6The other studies are mainly concerned with monetary policy shocks.
7A detailed description of local projection methods, and relative advantages compared to
VARs, is provided in section 4.3.
4.3 The empirical approach 69
to different financial market segments, may be a very useful exercise that
can help addressing issues in the macroprudential regulation debate. Fourth,
I appeal to a well defined measure of credit supply shocks, i.e., the excess
bond premium developed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), which relieves
me from imposing identification restrictions that could mask the correlations
present in the data. My study shares some similarities with Avdjiev (2014),
who also investigate how credit shock effects differ along the U.S. business
cycle. I differ from them in terms of i) methodology, as they use a TVAR
model; ii) classification of states: they use GDP growth as an indicator of
business cycles, whereas I adopt a less controversial approach by relying on
official (NBER) recession dates;8 iii) shock identification: they analyze credit
quantity and credit spread shocks, while I focus on excess bond premium shocks;
iv) data and sample: they use quarterly data and consider only GDP as a
measure of economic activity, whereas I use different indicators at a higher
frequency (monthly), which is relevant when studying such a dynamic sector
as the financial system.
4.3 The empirical approach
4.3.1 Credit supply shocks and the excess bond pre-
mium
My analysis uses the excess bond premium (EBP) developed by GZ as a proxy
for credit supply shocks in U.S. bond markets, which is plotted in Figure 4.1.9
The EBP displays substantial time-series variation, with the highest positive
spike occurring in correspondence of the Great Recession. Sizeable increases
occur also during normal times, possibly indicating that credit supply shocks
are not exclusively associated with recessions. The correlations of the EBP
with industrial production growth and the unemployment rate are equal to,
respectively, −0.37 and 0.13 over the full sample, i.e., 1973-2012. Further, I
estimate the half-life of an EBP innovation, based on a univariate AR(1) model,
8It has to be noticed, however, that their approach enables them to study 3 regimes:
subpar, moderate, and high growth. In this Chapter I focus only on recessions and normal
times.
9The excess bond premium data is available on Gilchrist’s website:
http://people.bu.edu/sgilchri/research/research.htm
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to be approximately 9 months. Such persistence suggests that the EBP might
contribute to explain business cycle fluctuations.
To derive the EBP, GZ first construct a corporate bond credit spread index
based on micro-level data. They collect data on secondary market prices of
outstanding bonds of a panel of U.S. nonfinancial firms. For each corporate
bond, they then construct a corresponding synthetic risk-free security that
mimics exactly the same cash flows (and whose price is based on the U.S.
Treasury yield curve). The micro level credit spread is calculated as the yield
difference between the risk free and the corporate bond security. Their dataset
is fairly large, comprising 1,112 U.S. nonfinancial issuers, and 5,982 bond issues.
To obtain a macro credit spread index (the GZ spread), the authors simply
calculate the cross-sectional average of all individual credit spreads. Next,
they regress the GZ spread on the components of Merton’s (1974) distance-to-
default model. The residuals of this regression are then classified as the average
price of bearing exposure to U.S. corporate credit risk, above and beyond the
compensation for expected defaults, i.e., the excess bond premium. Thus, the
EBP represents effective “risk-bearing capacity” of the financial intermediary
sector.
4.3.2 Local projections: linear specification
The macroeconomic effects of credit supply shocks are estimated by means of
impulse response functions, computed using the Local Projections (LP) method
advocated by Jordà (2005). This methodology consists of a single-equation
approach, which simply requires the estimation of separated regressions for
each horizon, h, of interest. The linear specification is the following:
yt+h = αh + βh(L)xt−1 + φhεt + ut+h (4.1)
where yt is the time series of interest, xt is a vector of control variables, βh(L)
is a polynomial in the lag operator, and εt is the structural shock whose effects
one wants to estimate. The vector of controls, xt, helps ensuring that the shock
εt is exogenous. In addition to the control variables, equation (4.1) includes
lags of yt to control for serial correlation. The coefficient φh gives the response
of y at time t+h to the shock ε at time t. Thus, the dynamics of yt, conditional
on the shock, are constructed as the sequence of the φh’s estimated in a series
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of h single regressions. The standard error estimates of φh are then used to
display error bands around the impulse responses.10
4.3.3 Local projections and nonlinearities
Local projections can conveniently accommodate nonlinearities in the response
function of the variable under scrutiny. To examine whether the effects of credit
supply shocks differ over business cycle phases, one can consider a dummy
variable, It, which takes the value of 1 if the economy is, say, in recession, and
0 otherwise. The state-dependent specification of equation (4.1) is then:
yt+h = It−1[αRh + βRh (L)xt−1 + φRh εt]
+ (1− It−1)[αEh + βEh (L)xt−1 + φEh εt] + ut+h
(4.2)
Based on equation (4.2), the dynamics of yt following a shock εt, conditional
on recessions, is given by the sequence of the φRh ’s, whereas under normal
times/expansions, the responses are the sequence of the φEh ’s, both estimated
in a series of h single regressions, where h denotes the forecast horizon.
In contrast to the predominant SVAR method for empirically studying
the effects of macro structural shocks, local projections do not impose any
pattern for the impulse response functions; asymmetries can be addressed in a
simple, and linear way; and the estimation of equations for dependent variables
other than the variable of interest is unneeded. Thus, local projections are less
sensitive to misspecification, allow to specify a more parsimonious model, and
have relatively a higher number of degrees of freedom.11
10The successive leading of the dependent variable leads to serial correlation in the error
terms, ut+h. Thus, standard error estimates are produced using the Newey-West variance
estimator (Newey and West, 1987).
11Along these benefits come some disadvantages of local projections. As discussed in
Ramey and Zubairy (2014), local projections i) do not impose any restrictions that link
the impulse responses at h and h+ 1, so the estimates can show irregular patterns; ii) as
h increases, one loses observations from the end of the sample; iii) the impulse responses
may display large oscillations at long horizons (Ramey (2012) compares impulse responses
estimated using Jordà’s method to those derived from a standard VAR, and show that results
are qualitatively similar up to h = 16, where the horizon is expressed in quarters). This study
focuses on short-run dynamics, and therefore reliability of long horizons is not a concern.
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4.3.4 Data and estimation
In light of the theoretical literature discussed in section 4.2, I compute impulse
response functions to an EBP shock for the following U.S. indicators of real
activity: log industrial production in manufacturing, log employment (total
nonfarm payroll), and the civilian unemployment rate.12 The regimes in
equation (4.2) are defined according to the U.S. business cycle dates, as identified
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Thus, the dummy It
equals 1 when the corresponding month is a NBER recession. The baseline
vector of controls includes: all the three macro aggregates mentioned above;
average hours in manufacturing, and log average hourly earnings for production
workers (manufacturing), to control for labor market dynamics; the log of
the consumer price index (all urban consumers), the (effective) federal funds
rate to control for the stance of monetary policy, and the log of the S&P500
stock-market index. Including the S&P500 index is important to control for
general trends in stock markets, and for news about future firm’s aggregate cash
flows. Therefore, xt = [ipt, empt, unratet, hourst, wagest, cpit, ffrt, spt]. The
data is considered at a monthly frequency, and spans the period 1973:1–2012:12,
whose choice is dictated by the availability of the excess bond premium. For all
regressions I consider a lag polynomial, i.e., βh(L), βRh (L), βEh (L), of order 6,
whose length is intended to be large enough to control for exogeneity concerns
related to the shock. The estimates for industrial production and employment
also include a linear trend.
4.4 Results
Figure 4.2 plots the estimated effects of a 1% increase in the excess bond
premium under the assumption of a linear world. The figure reports the
responses of each variable up to 2 years after the shock—a forecast horizon
typically associated with business cycle fluctuations—along with the ± one
standard error confidence bands. All measures of economic activity are shown
to decrease substantially after the shock. Output reaches a negative peak of
about 4% after 12 months, whereas the fall in employment is estimated to be
more contained, i.e., about -1.5% within the same horizon. It is worth noting
12The source of the data, which is seasonally adjusted, is the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis’ database.
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that these results line up with previous studies. For example, Caldara et al.
(2014) show that a one-standard deviation shock to the EBP (about 25 basis
points) leads to a 1% reduction of industrial production, and a 0.4% fall in
employment. My estimates are quantitatively very similar to theirs, since I
compute responses to a shock which is four times bigger. The negative impact of
an increase in the EBP is also confirmed by the response of the unemployment
rate, which is shown to increase by 1% within the first 15 months. Another
remark on these linear estimates concerns the persistent effects of the shock.
The economy shows no signs of recovery within the short-run, with all variables
below their normal trends even at a 2 years horizon after the shock.
Nonlinear estimates. How different are the effects of credit supply shocks
if the economy is experiencing a phase of downturn? Figure 4.3 displays the
responses of the same macroeconomic time series to a 1% increase in the EBP,
distinguishing between a shock that realizes during a recession and one (of the
same magnitude) that occurs during normal times or upward phases of the
cycle. The estimated differences are striking if one considers the timing with
which the shock propagates to the real economy. During recessions, the negative
impact of increases in the EBP materializes much faster than in normal times,
and the peak response of unemployment is much larger. However, the economy
recovers quickly from the shock, i.e., within a 12 months horizon. Interestingly,
all the three measures of real activity display a somewhat overshoot in the
medium term.13 Differently, a long-lasting, hump-shaped reaction is found in
normal times. In terms of magnitude, the peak fall in industrial production is
very similar between the two states, whereas the fall in employment is twice
the one that occurs in recessions.
4.4.1 Interpreting asymmetries
How one can explain the long-lasting effects of credit supply shocks during
expansionary phases of the business cycle? At a first glance, this evidence may
seem counterintuitive if we think that in good times the economy, in aggregate,
13The same drop-rebound-overshoot pattern for real activity is found by Bloom (2009),
and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Nodari (2015) in response to uncertainty shocks. This
might suggest some similarities between financial and uncertainty shocks. I account for the
potential role of uncertainty by running some robustness checks, which are presented in the
next section.
74 Credit Supply Shocks in U.S. Bond Markets: Are There Nonlinearities?
is more resilient to shocks. Disentangling the transmission mechanism of EBP
shocks would require a structural model of the economy. Here, I provide an
interpretation of my results by discussing theoretical models that can potentially
explain the asymmetries found in the data. In particular, I discuss the models
by Dow et al. (2005) and Philippon (2006), which provide a complementary
view to the financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke et al., 1999), with the
main difference that shocks here are amplified and propagated during booms
rather than in recessions.
Dow et al. (2005) develop a dynamic equilibrium model featuring a financial
friction in the form of imperfect corporate control, and study its implications
for investment and asset pricing. In the model, the separation of ownership
and control allows managers to use their discretion over free cash flow. Because
managers are empire-building, they always invest as much as they can, implying
that they may choose projects that do not maximize firm value. This means that
when free cash flow is high, as in a cyclical peak, investment may be higher than
shareholders would optimally prefer. Dow et al. show then that the variation
in the corporate control problem over the business cycle has implications for
interest rates and risk premia. But most importantly, they show that this type
of friction generates amplification and persistence of otherwise i.i.d. shocks
through large firms and during boom phases. Similarly, Philippon (2006)
presents a model with corporate governance conflicts in which firms overinvest
because of managerial tendencies to build empires. What matters for aggregate
dynamics in his model is whether these deviations from profit maximization are
more likely to happen in booms or in recessions. Because the relative costs and
benefits of monitoring firms’ decisions change with the state of the economy,
shareholders leave more discretion to managers in good times, when the costs
of missing a profit opportunity (due to time consuming monitoring) are higher.
Therefore, also his models predicts that corporate governance conflicts amplify
aggregate fluctuations, especially during upward phases of the business cycle.
To interpret the evidence provided here on the effects of credit supply shocks,
with the predictions coming from the above models, I make the following
additional considerations: insights from the real option theory and irreversible
investment suggest that the value of exercising a growth option is high during
booms; to the extent that managerial misbehavior is also more likely in this
state of the economy, one can expect a higher number of irreversible investment
projects to be undertaken in upward phases of the cycle. When the shock hits
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in normal times/expansions, the relatively high share of irreversible projects
may make it difficult for firms to recover quickly from the funding shortage,
explaining thus the slower recovery period compared to recessions. As for the
delayed initial drop in economic activity, it may be explained by the fact that
during normal times, firms may have a liquidity buffer since the economy is
functioning well. And therefore they may initially be able to counteract the
adverse effects of the shock.
4.5 Robustness checks
In this section I conduct a sensitivity analysis to verify the robustness of my
results. I start by focusing on the potential interaction between changes in
the excess bond premium and movements in uncertainty. A few recent papers
have raised concerns about the distinction between financial and uncertainty
shocks. Stock and Watson (2012), and Caldara et al. (2014) emphasize the
high positive correlation between indicators of financial stress and commonly
used proxies for economic uncertainty. I tackle this issue in three different
ways. First, I compute impulse response functions to an uncertainty shock for
the macro variables considered in my analysis, conditional on the very same
scenario as my baseline estimates. Thus, the only element that differs is the
shock: I substitute the EBP with an uncertainty measure recently proposed
by Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015) (JLN uncertainty hereafter). The JLN
uncertainty is computed as the common component of the volatility of the
one-step-ahead forecast errors of a large number of economic indicators.14 This
measure of macro uncertainty features big spikes only in correspondence of
the 1973-74, the 1981-82, and the 2007-09 recessions, while being much more
stable in the rest of the sample. This makes the identification of the shock
complicated during normal times. For this reason, I present the results only
for recessions. Figure 4.4 plots the estimated responses to the JLN uncertainty
shock, along with those to the EBP shock computed in the baseline model.15
Uncertainty shocks seem to have larger quantitative effects in recessions than
14Jurado et al. (2015) develop uncertainty measures for different forecast horizons. Here I
focus on the one based on one-step-ahead forecast errors. Exercises conduct with alternative
measures, i.e., three- and twelve-step-ahead uncertainty, did not change my results.
15To easy comparison, I have rescaled all the responses by the standard deviation of the
shocks, which are 0.10 for the JLN uncertainty, and 0.51 for the EBP. This is because the
two indicators are expressed in different unit measures.
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EBP shocks do. However, the drop-rebound-overshoot pattern found after an
EBP shock is not replicated by the uncertainty shock. This is clearly evident
for employment. The economy reacts differently to the two shocks, all else
being equal. Secondly, in addition to the above exercise, I also re-estimate the
effects of EBP shocks including the JLN uncertainty indicator in the vector
of controls. The baseline results continue to hold, i.e., conditional on this
specification, real activity displays a even larger overshoot in the medium term.
The impulse responses of this check are reported in Figure 4.5 ("uncertainty").
Figure 4.5 shows also the other two robustness checks I undertake. One consists
of replacing the S&P500 index with the VXO in the vector of controls. The
purpose of this check is twofold: further controlling for uncertainty, given that
the VXO is a commonly used proxy for economic uncertainty; and accounting
for second-moment developments in stock markets (the VXO is an index of
percentage implied volatility on a hypothetical at the money S&P100 option
30 days to expiration).16 Finally, I also re-compute the effects of the EBP
shock excluding the Great Recession. I find asymmetric responses of industrial
production, employment and unemployment over the business cycle in all the
above mentioned robustness exercises.
4.6 Conclusions
The recent turmoil in global financial markets, together with the severity of the
2008-2009 crisis and subsequent slow recovery, led researchers and policymakers
alike to search for alternative drivers of business cycle fluctuations, shifting
their attention to financial shocks. This Chapter empirically investigates the
effects of credit supply shocks originating in bond markets, and shows that the
state of the business cycle is a key element to understand the transmission of
these shocks to the real economy. Using nonlinear local projections, I show
that aggregate indicators of economic activity react asymmetrically to credit
supply shocks in recessions and normal times. My findings evidence that in bad
times, credit supply shocks induce a drop-rebound-overshoot pattern in output,
employment, and unemployment. Differently, a long-lasting, hump-shaped
reaction is found in normal times. This result echoes recent findings in the
business cycle literature as for uncertainty shocks, which tend to generate the
16The results for the VXO check are conditional on regressions featuring 3 lags. Impulse
response functions conditional on 6 lags, as the baseline model, displayed excessive oscillation.
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same pattern of real activity across the two states of the economy. I show that
my findings are robust to considering macroeconomic uncertainty within the
empirical model, in addition to other few robustness checks.
From a modeling standing point, the evidence of asymmetries highlights
the importance of accounting for nonlinearities when incorporating a financial
sector into macro models. From a policy perspective, the results suggest the
implementation of nonlinear macroprudential rules to properly deal with the
asymmetric response of the economy to financial instability. One question that
this Chapter does not address is whether credit supply shocks are ultimately
supply or demand shocks, which is key to determine the optimal response of
monetary policy to disturbances affecting the financial system. I leave this
question for future research.

Tables
Table 1.1: Granger causality tests
FRPU NewsBank EPU EPU VIX
FRPU – 0.42 0.17 0.47
NewsBank EPU 0.01 – 0.01 0.11
EPU 0.20 0.01 – 0.08
VIX 0.00 0.12 0.19 –
Notes: The table reports the p-values of Granger causality tests based on bivariate VARs(6)
estimated over the period 1985:1 - 2012:10. Null hypothesis: Row variable does not Granger
cause column variable.
Table 1.2: FEVD: macro aggregates - linear VAR
Horizon shock: ε
frpu Baa-Aaa spread
∆y π u i εfrpu ε∆y επ εu εi εs
6 7.96 7.21 19.64 16.14 17.99 6.15 2.32 0.87 0.13 72.54
12 8.26 7.21 26.88 17.11 17.82 7.05 5.25 1.04 2.43 66.40
36 8.53 7.25 29.57 18.37 18.29 7.24 7.54 0.99 6.35 59.59
60 9.08 7.55 29.70 17.79 18.51 7.61 7.52 1.26 6.63 58.46
Notes: The left part shows the percentages of the total forecast error variance of the variables
due to FRPU shocks, calculated within the linear VAR. The right part displays the total
forecast error variance decomposition of the spread, i.e., the percentage explained by each
shock within the baseline VAR.
Table 1.3: FEVD: credit spreads - linear VAR
Horizon GZ spread Baa–GS10 spread Aaa–GS10 spread
εfrpu εi εfrpu εi εfrpu εi
6 14.46 1.89 20.49 0.43 15.42 1.60
12 9.76 1.72 17.08 3.89 13.15 4.75
36 11.52 4.59 14.00 11.94 9.97 9.51
60 14.96 3.79 14.01 12.26 9.66 10.06
Notes: The table shows the percentages of the total forecast error variance of alternative
credit spread measures due to FRPU shocks, εfrpu, and monetary policy shocks, εi. Estimates
are based on the linear specification of the VAR.
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Table 1.4: FEVD: macro aggregates - nonlinear (STVAR) model
Horizon Non-recessions Recessions∆y π u i s ∆y π u i s
1 2.15 3.54 15.10 9.08 1.79 2.64 7.29 2.83 4.63 9.02
4 2.28 3.51 15.21 14.30 6.19 13.14 9.20 13.39 7.06 16.11
6 2.38 3.49 13.89 17.53 12.40 12.45 7.62 16.99 6.53 12.85
12 2.88 3.67 11.79 19.65 16.03 12.78 7.86 16.75 5.27 10.87
Notes: The table shows the percentages of the total forecast error variance – of the variables
of interest – explained by FRPU shocks, calculated using the nonlinear (Smooth Transition)
VAR model.
Table 2.1: Anticipated fiscal spending shocks: statistical relevance
News (1, 3) (1, 1) (2, 2) (3, 3) (0, 0)
p− value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Notes: P-values related to the exclusion Wald-test of one period-lagged News variables
entering (one at a time) a regression involving government spending (dependent variable), a
constant, three lags of government spending, three lags of fiscal receipts, and three lags of
real GDP. Figures in bold are associated to a predictive power of news found to be significant
at a 10 percent confidence level. News are expressed in cumulated terms to have an order of
integration comparable to that of the other variables. Estimation conducted by considering
Newey-West standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Table 2.2: News à la Ramey vs. forecast revisions: Granger-causality tests
Sample Ramey ηg13 ORZ η
g
13
1981:III-2008:IV 0.44 0.06
1986:IV-2008:IV 0.28 0.02
1981:III-2010:IV 0.71 0.06
1986:IV-2010:IV 0.59 0.02
Notes: ’Ramey’ stands for the news variable employed by Ramey (2011), ’ORZ’ stands for its
updated version employed by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013). P-values related to the
exclusion Wald-test of one period-lagged covariate of interest. Figures in bold are associated
to a predictive power of news found to be significant at a 10 percent confidence level. Results
based on a bivariate VAR with one lag. Null hypothesis: Column variable does not Granger
cause the alternative news measure.
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Table 2.3: Fiscal spending multipliers
Peak Sum
Horizon/State Expansion Recession Expansion Recession
4 1.68
[1.12,3.49]
3.38
[1.77,4.70]
1.73
[0.52,3.50]
3.15
[1.71,4.27]
8 1.24
[0.80,3.19]
3.32
[1.55,4.91]
0.33
[−1.05,2.77]
3.05
[0.68,4.70]
12 1.11
[0.74,2.69]
2.77
[1.40,4.28]
−0.57
[−2.24,1.54]
2.13
[0.13,3.82]
16 1.09
[0.71,2.43]
2.60
[1.38,3.96]
−1.41
[−3.96,0.74]
1.54
[−0.42,2.95]
20 1.09
[0.71,2.41]
2.58
[1.38,3.90]
−2.27
[−6.23,−0.01]
1.00
[−0.94,2.47]
Notes: Figures conditional on the baseline VAR analysis. Log-values of the impulse response
of output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels)
to convert percent changes in dollars.
Table 2.4: Fiscal spending multipliers: extreme events
Peak
Hor./State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
4 1.24
[0.78,1.88]
3.57
[2.14,4.73]
1.68
[1.15,3.44]
3.23
[1.74,4.69]
8 0.86
[0.53,1.25]
3.58
[1.94,4.75]
1.24
[0.82,3.16]
3.24
[1.56,4.72]
12 0.79
[0.48,1.10]
2.39
[1.48,3.30]
1.11
[0.75,2.56]
2.88
[1.32,4.20]
16 0.79
[0.45,1.09]
2.27
[1.45,2.93]
1.09
[0.72,2.31]
2.72
[1.32,3.96]
20 0.79
[0.43,1.08]
2.24
[1.44,2.90]
1.09
[0.72,2.29]
2.71
[1.31,3.94]
Sum
Hor./State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
4 1.03
[−0.51,2.03]
3.42
[2.05,4.35]
1.69
[0.64,3.40]
3.09
[1.71,4.14]
8 −0.26
[−2.01,0.84]
3.42
[1.22,5.14]
0.30
[−0.87,2.83]
2.94
[0.56,4.46]
12 −1.32
[−3.68,−0.03]
2.21
[0.61,3.54]
−0.62
[−2.15,1.48]
2.06
[0.03,3.78]
16 −2.26
[−5.63,−0.78]
1.60
[0.18,2.63]
−1.40
[−3.91,0.65]
1.38
[−0.48,3.02]
20 −3.28
[−7.00,−1.56]
1.09
[−0.31,2.07]
−2.37
[−6.08,0.01]
0.83
[−0.97,2.54]
Notes: Figures conditional on the VAR analysis with GIRFs conditional on four different sets
of initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample
mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in
dollars.
82 Tables
Table 2.5: Shares of fiscal multipliers larger in recessions
Peak
Scenario/Horizon Cycle h=4 h=8 h=12 h=16 h=20
Baseline Normal 87.8 90.8 90.0 90.6 90.2
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
η˜g13 last Normal 84.0 87.0 87.8 88.8 89.2
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
η˜g13 first Normal 69.0 76.2 76.8 79.8 80.6
Extreme 86.4 96.4 96.2 96.0 96.0
Long sample (Ramey’s news) Normal 96.8 98.2 98.0 98.0 98.0
Extreme 99.0 100 100 100 100
Sum
Scenario/Horizon Cycle h=4 h=8 h=12 h=16 h=20
Baseline Normal 84.8 91.6 93.6 95.4 96.6
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
η˜g13 last Normal 78.2 86.4 89.4 90.6 92.6
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
η˜g13 first Normal 58.2 76.2 82.2 89.8 92.0
Extreme 71.6 93.0 97.8 98.8 99.2
Long sample (Ramey’s news) Normal 82.8 89.6 87.6 86.4 86.6
Extreme 90.2 92.8 92.8 93.0 93.6
Notes: Normal scenarios: fraction of multipliers which are larger in recessions than expansions
out of 500 draws from their empirical distributions. Extreme scenarios: fraction of multipliers
which are larger in deep recessions than strong expansions out of 500 draws from their
empirical distributions. ’h’ identifies the number of quarters after the shock.
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Table 2.6: Fiscal spending multipliers: extreme events - different scenarios
Peak
Scenario/State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
Baseline 0.79
[0.45,1.09]
2.27
[1.45,2.93]
1.09
[0.72,2.31]
2.72
[1.32,3.96]
η˜g13 last 0.43[0.19,0.61] 2.55[1.66,3.34] 0.97[0.45,3.01] 2.88[1.44,3.72]
η˜g13 first 1.14[0.24,1.82] 2.74[1.65,4.48] 1.91[0.85,3.72] 3.23[1.51,5.14]
Long sample (Ramey’s news) 0.49
[0.20,0.81]
2.61
[1.55,4.62]
0.77
[0.28,1.50]
2.51
[1.21,5.31]
High debt Mod.+ debt Mod.− debt Low debt
Debt/GDP ratio 1.35
[1.15,1.54]
1.22
[0.58,1.81]
1.56
[1.31,2.00]
1.66
[1.24,2.55]
Sum
Scenario/State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
Baseline −2.26
[−5.63,−0.78]
1.60
[0.18,2.63]
−1.40
[−3.91,0.65]
1.38
[−0.48,3.02]
η˜g13 last −1.57
[−2.92,−0.91]
2.28
[1.23,3.10]
−0.44
[−1.97,2.29]
2.16
[0.22,3.00]
η˜g13 first −0.70
[−2.50,0.43]
2.36
[0.99,4.29]
0.66
[−1.04,2.90]
2.50
[0.59,4.39]
Long sample (Ramey’s news) 0.15
[−0.24,0.53]
1.74
[0.08,3.92]
0.07
[−1.23,0.96]
1.52
[0.60,4.62]
High debt Mod.+ debt Mod.− debt Low debt
Debt/GDP ratio 0.68
[0.15,1.37]
0.74
[−1.02,1.15]
1.33
[0.95,1.66]
1.33
[0.81,1.97]
Notes: Four-year integral multipliers. Figures conditional on the VAR analysis with GIRFs
conditional on four different sets of initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of
output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
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Figure 1.2: U.S. Uncertainty measures
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Figure 1.3: Macroeconomic effects of FRPU shocks: linear model
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation shock to the FRPU index, calculated
with the baseline (linear) VAR. The responses of industrial production growth and the
inflation rate have been cumulated. Gray areas: 90% confidence bands, calculated with the
bootstrap-after-bootstrap procedure by Kilian (1998).
Figure 1.4: Credit spreads and FRPU shocks
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Notes: Impulse responses of credit spreads to a one standard shock to the FRPU index,
calculated with the baseline (linear) VAR. Gray areas: 90% confidence bands.
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Figure 1.5: Robustness checks of FRPU shocks
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Notes: Macroeconomic effects of a one-standard deviation FRPU shock. The responses of
industrial production growth and the inflation rate have been cumulated. Gray areas: 90%
bootstrapped confidence intervals in the baseline model.
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Figure 1.6: Macroeconomic effects of FRPU shocks: nonlinear model
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation shock to the FRPU index, calculated
with the nonlinear (Smooth-Transition) VAR. The responses of industrial production growth
and the inflation rate have been cumulated. Gray areas: 90% confidence bands.
Figure 1.7: Interest rate’s reaction to FRPU shocks
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
months
Sub−sample
 
 
Non−recessions
Recessions
10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Baseline
months
Notes: The left panel plots the reaction of the federal funds rate to a one standard deviation
FRPU shock, computed with the nonlinear STVAR model, estimated over the full sample,
i.e. 1985:1–2012:10. The right panel shows the same responses calculated with the STVAR
model estimated over a subsample period, i.e., 1985:1–2008:9, to exclude the potential effects
of the Zero Lower Bound.
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Figure 2.2: Probability of being in a recessionary phase
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Figure 2: Probability of being in a recessionary phase. Blue line: Transition
function F(z). Shaded columns: NBER recessions. Transition function computed by
employing the standardized moving average (12 terms) of the month-on-month growth
rate of industrial production.
26
Notes: Blue line: Transition function F (z). Shaded columns: NBER recessions. Transition
function computed by employing the standardized moving average (12 terms) of the month-
on-month growth rate of industrial production.
Figure 2.3: Real effects of uncertainty shocks: nonlinearities
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Notes: Impulse responses (median values) to a one-standard deviation uncertainty shock
identified as described in Chapter 2. Solid black lines: Responses computed with the
linear VAR. Red dashed (blue dashed-circled) lines: Responses computed with the Smooth-
Transition VAR and conditional on recessions (expansions).
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Figure 2.4: Real effects of uncertainty shocks: good and bad times
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Notes: Impulse responses (median values and confidence bands) to a one-standard deviation
uncertainty shock identified as described in Chapter 2. Red dashed (blue dashed-circled)
lines: Responses computed with the Smooth-Transition VAR and conditional on recessions
(expansions). Dashed-dotted lines: 68% confidence bands. Gray areas: 95% confidence
bands.
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Figure 2.5: Nominal effects of uncertainty shocks: good and bad times
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Notes: Impulse responses (median values and confidence bands) to a one-standard deviation
uncertainty shock identified as described in Chapter 2. Red dashed (blue dashed-circled)
lines: Responses computed with the Smooth-Transition VAR and conditional on recessions
(expansions). Dashed-dotted lines: 68% confidence bands. Gray areas: 95% confidence
bands.
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Figure 2.6: Uncertainty shocks and systematic monetary policy
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Figure 6: Real E§ects of Uncertainty Shocks: Role of Systematic Monetary
Policy. Median impulse responses to a one-standard deviation uncertainty in scenar-
ios with unconstrained/constrained monetary policy. Red dashed-dotted (blue dashed)
lines: Responses computed with the Smooth-Transition VAR and conditional on reces-
sions (non-recessionary phases). Counterfactual responses computed conditional on a
muted systematic policy (Öxed federal funds rate) in green-circled lines. Markov-Chain
Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the VAR coe¢cient based on 10,000 draws.
30
Notes: Median impulse responses to a one-standar deviation uncert inty in scenarios
with unconstrained/constrained mone ary policy. Red dashed (blue dash d-circled) lines:
Responses computed with the Smooth-Transition VAR and conditional on recessions (non-
recessionary phases). Counterfactual responses computed conditional on a muted systematic
policy (fixed federal funds rate) in green-circled li es.
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Figure 2.7: Role of monetary policy: statistical difference
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Notes: Difference between "baseline" minus "muted monetary policy" impulse responses to a
one-standard deviation uncertainty shock identified as described in Chapter 2. Responses
computed with the Smooth-Transition VAR and conditional on recessions (non-recessionary
phases). Green circled-lines: Median of the distribution of the differences. Solid green lines:
68% bands of the distribution of the differences. Gray areas: 95% bands of the distribution
of the differences.
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Figure 2.8: Uncertainty shocks and short- vs. long-term interest rates
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Notes: Median impulse responses to a one-standard deviation uncertainty in scenarios
with unconstrained/constrained monetary policy. Red dashed (blue dashed-circled) lines:
Responses computed with the estimated nine-variate STVAR with the 10 year Treasury yield
(unrestricted model). Counterfactual responses computed conditional on a muted systematic
policy (fixed federal funds rate) in green-circled lines. Counterfactual responses computed
conditional on a muted response of the 10 year Treasury yield in orange-diamonded lines.
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Figure 3.1: News13 vs. Ramey’s news
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Figure 1: News13 (this paper) vs. Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairyís (2013)
news variable. Blue, solid line: News variable constructed by considering the sum of
Survey of Professional Forecastersí forecast revisions regarding future public spending
from one-to-three quarter-ahead. Extreme values, interpretation: (a) 1983Q1: Reaganís
"Evil Empire" and "Star Wars" speeches; (b) 1986Q1: Perestrojka; (c) 1987Q1: Senate
elections won by the Democrats a quarter before; (d) 1987Q4: Spending cuts as for
the Pentagon; (e) 1989Q4: Berlin wall; (f) 2001Q4: War in Afghanistan; (g) 2009Q1:
Obamaís stimulus package. Red, dashed line: News variable constructed by Owyang,
Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), who extended Rameyís (2011) news variable up to 2010Q4.
Rameyís (2011) variable is constructed by considering the present discounted value of
expected changes in defense spending (nominal spending divided by nominal GDP one
period before). Both news measures in this Figure are standardized.
33
Notes: Blue, solid line: News variable constructed by considering the sum of Survey of
Professional Forecasters’ forecast revisions regarding future public spending from one-to-three
quarter-ahead. Extreme values, interpretation: (a) 1983Q1: Reagan’s "Evil Empire" and "Star
Wars" speeches; (b) 1986Q1: Perestrojka; (c) 1987Q1: Senate elections won by the Democrats
a quarter before; (d) 1987Q4: Spending cuts as for the Pentagon; (e) 1989Q4: Berlin wall;
(f) 2001Q4: War in Afghanistan; (g) 2009Q1: Obama’s stimulus package. Red, dashed line:
News variable constructed by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), who extended Ramey’s
(2011) news variable up to 2010Q4. Ramey’s (2011) variable is constructed by considering the
present discounted value of expected changes in defense spending (nominal spending divided
by nominal GDP one period before). Both news measures in this Figure are standardized.
98 Figures
Figure 3.2: Transition function
Notes: Transition variable: standardized backward-looking moving average constructed
with four realizations of the quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rate. Value of the slope
parameter: 2.3.
Figure 3.3: Impulse responses to a fiscal news shock: linear vs. nonlinear
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Figure 3: Generalized impulse responses to a Öscal news (anticipated) spend-
ing shock: Linear model, recessions, expansions. Median responses to a Öscal
news shock normalized to one. News variable constructed as the sum of the revisions
of the one, two, and three step-ahead expectation values over future Öscal spending
growth. News variable expressed in cumulated terms to have the same order of inte-
gration as the one of the log-real variables in the vector. Log-values of the impulse
response of output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both
taken in levels) to convert percent changes in dollars.
35
Notes: Median responses to a fiscal news shock normalized to one. News variable constructed
as the sum of the revisions of th one, two, and three step-ahead expectatio values over
future fiscal spending growth. N ws variable expressed in cumulated terms to have the same
order of integ ation as the one of the log-real variables in the vector. Log-values of the
impulse r sponse of output rescale by the sample mean of output over public spending
(both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in dollars.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse responses to a fiscal news shock: recessions vs. expansions
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Figure 4: Generalized impulse responses to a Öscal news (anticipated) spend-
ing shock: Recessions vs. expansions. Median responses to a Öscal news shock
normalized to one. 90 percent conÖdence intervals identiÖed with gray areas (reces-
sions) and circled lines (expansions). Red dashed lines: Recessions. Dotted blue lines:
Expansions. News variable constructed as the sum of the revisions of the one, two, and
three step-ahead expectation values over future Öscal spending growth. News variable
expressed in cumulated terms to have the same order of integration as the one of the
log-real variables in the vector. Sample 1981Q3-2013Q1. VAR models estimated with
a constant and three lags. Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled by the
sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent
changes in dollars.
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Notes: Median responses to a fiscal news shock normalized to one. 90 percent confidence
intervals identified with gray areas (recessions) and circled lines (expansions). Red dashed
lines: Recessions. Dotted blue lines: Expansions. News variable constructed as the sum
of the revisions of the one, two, and three step-ahead expectation values over future fiscal
spending growth. News variable expressed in cumulated terms to have the same order of
integration as the one of the log-real variables in the vector. Sample 1981Q3-2013Q1. VAR
model estimated with a constant and ree lags. Log-values of the impulse response of
ou put rescaled by the sample mean of o put over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in d llars.
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Figure 3.5: Difference in multipliers between recessions and expansions
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Figure 5: Di§erence in multipliers between recessions and expansions: All
histories. Empirical densities of the di§erences computed as multipliers in recessions
minus multipliers in expansions. Densities constructed by considering all recessions and
expansions (initial conditions) present in the sample. Multipliers conditional on the
same set of draws of the stochastic elements of our STVAR model as well as the same
realizations of the coe¢cients of the vector. Densities based on 500 realizations of such
di§erences per each horizon of interest. íhí identiÖes the number of quarters after the
shock.
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Notes: Empirical densities of the differences computed as multipliers in recessions minus
multipliers in expansions. Densities constructed by considering all recessions and expansions
(initial conditions) present in the sample. Multipliers conditional on the same set of draws
of the stochastic elements of our STVAR model as well as the same realizations of the
coefficients of the vector. Densities based on 500 realizations of such differences per each
horizon of interest. ’h’ identifies the number of quarters after the shock.
Figure 3.6: Evolution of the probability of being in a recession
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Notes: Solid lines: Median reactions. Blue dotted/red dashed lines: 90 percent confidence
intervals. Black dashed horizontal line: Threshold value to switch from a regime to another.
Probability computed according to the logistic function presented in the text and the evolution
of output conditional on a fiscal news shock. Transition variable: Standardized backward-
looking moving average constructed with four realizations of the quarter-on-quarter real
GDP growth rate. Value of the slope parameter: 2.3.
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Figure 3.7: Impulse responses to a fiscal news shock: extreme events
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Figure 7: Generalized impulse responses to a Öscal news (anticipated) spend-
ing shock: Linear model, deep vs. mild recessions, strong vs. weak ex-
pansions. Deep recessions/strong expansions associated to histories consistent with
realizations of our transition variable which are below/above two standard deviations.
Mild recessions/weak expansions associated to histories consistent with realizations of
our transition variable below/above -0.75 but within the range [-2,2]. Median responses
to a Öscal news shock normalized to one. News variable constructed as the sum of the
revisions of the one, two, and three step-ahead expectation values over future Öscal
spending growth. News variable expressed in cumulated terms to have the same order
of integration as the one of the log-real variables in the vector. VAR models estimated
with a constant and three lags. Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled
by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert
percent changes in dollars.
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Notes: Deep recessions/strong expansions associated to histories consistent with realizations of
our transition variable which are below/above two standard deviations. Mild recessions/weak
expansions associated to histories consistent with realizations of our transition variable
below/above -0.75 but within the range [-2,2]. Median responses to a fiscal news shock
n rmalized to on . News variable constructed as the sum of the evisi of the one, two,
and three step-ahead expectation values over future fiscal spending growth. News variable
expressed in cumulated terms to have the same order of integration as the one of the l g-real
variables in the vector. VAR models estimated with a constant and three lags. Log-values of
the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending
(both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in dollars.
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Figure 3.8: Difference in multipliers: extreme events
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Figure 8: Di§erence in multipliers between recessions and expansions: Ex-
treme events. Empirical densities of the di§erences computed as multipliers in reces-
sions minus multipliers in expansions. Densities constructed by considering just extreme
realizations of recessions and expansions (initial conditions) present in the sample. Mul-
tipliers conditional on the same set of draws of the stochastic elements of our STVAR
model as well as the same realizations of the coe¢cients of the vector. Densities based
on 500 realizations of such di§erences per each horizon of interest. íhí identiÖes the
number of quarters after the shock.
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Notes: Empirical densities of the differences computed as multipliers in recessions minus
multipliers in expansions. Densities constructed by considering just extreme realizations of
recessions and expansions (initial conditions) present in the sample. Multipliers conditional
on the same set of draws of the stochastic elements of our STVAR model as well as the
same realizations of the coefficients of the vector. Densities based on 500 realizations of such
differences per each horizon of interest. ’h’ identifies the number of quarters after the shock.
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Figure 3.9: Probability of being in a recession: extreme events
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Figure 9: Evolution of the probability of being in a recessionary phase F(z)
consistent with our GIRFs: Extreme events. Median reactions and 90 percent
conÖdence intervals. Black dashed horizontal line: Threshold value to switch from a
regime to another. Deep recessions/strong expansions associated to histories consis-
tent with realizations of our transition variable which are below/above two standard
deviations. Mild recessions/weak expansions associated to histories consistent with
realizations of our transition variable below/above -0.75 but within the range [-2,2].
Probability computed according to the logistic function presented in the text and the
evolution of output conditional on a Öscal news shock. Transition variable: Stan-
dardized backward-looking moving average constructed with four realizations of the
quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rate. Value of the slope parameter: 2.3.
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Notes: Median reactions and 90 percent confidence intervals. Black dashed horizontal line:
Threshold value to switch from a regime to another. Deep recessions/strong expansions
associated to histories consistent with realizations of our transition variable which are
below/above two standard deviations. Mild recessions/weak expansions associated to histories
co siste t with realizations of our transition variable below/above -0.75 but within the range
[-2,2]. Pr bability comput d according to the logistic function presented in the text and the
evolution of output c ndi ional on a fisc l n ws shock. Transition variable: Standardized
backward-looking movi g average constructed with four realizations of the quarter-on-quarter
real GDP growth rate. Value of the slope parameter: 2.3.
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Figure 3.10: News13 vs. News13 purged
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Figure 10: News13 vs. News13 purged. Blue, solid line: News variable constructed
by considering the sum of Survey of Professional Forecastersí forecast revisions regarding
future public spending from one to three period-ahead. Red, dashed line: News vari-
able constructed by regressing News13 over a constant and the sums of the forecasts
revisions of real GDP growth, unemployment, GDP deáator ináation, the three-month
Treasury bill rate, and the 10-year Treasury bond rate. Extreme values, interpreta-
tion: (a) 1983Q1: Reaganís "Evil Empire" and "Star Wars" speeches; (b) 1986Q1:
Perestrojka; (c) 1987Q1: Senate elections won by the Democrats a quarter before; (d)
1987Q4: Spending cuts as for the Pentagon; (e) 1989Q4: Berlin wall; (f) 2001Q4: War
in Afghanistan; (g) 2009Q1: Obamaís stimulus package. Both news measures in this
Figure are standardized.
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Notes: Blue, solid line: News variable constructed by considering the sum of Survey of
Professional Forecasters’ forecast revisions regarding future public spending from one to
three period-ahead. Red, dashed line: News variable constructed by regressing News13
over a constant and the sums of the forecasts revisions of real GDP growth, unemployment,
GDP deflator inflation, the three-month Treasury bill rate, and the 10-year Treasury bond
rate. Extreme values, interpretation: (a) 1983Q1: Reagan’s "Evil Empire" and "Star Wars"
speeches; (b) 1986Q1: Perestrojka; (c) 1987Q1: Senate elections won by the Democrats a
quarter before; (d) 1987Q4: Spending cuts as for the Pentagon; (e) 1989Q4: Berlin wall; (f)
2001Q4: War in Afghanistan; (g) 2009Q1: Obama’s stimulus package. Both news measures
in this Figure are standardized.
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Figure 4.1: Excess bond premium
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Notes: The figure plots the monthly excess bond premium developed by Gilchrist and
Zakrajšek (2012), from 1973:1 to 2012:12. Shaded areas denote NBER recession dates.
Figure 4.2: Baseline results: linear model
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one-percent increase in the excess bond premium, calculated
with linear local projection methods à la Jordà (2005). Gray areas: ± one standard error
confidence bands.
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Figure 4.3: Baseline results: nonlinear model
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one-percent increase in the excess bond premium, calculated
with nonlinear local projection methods à la Jordà (2005). Gray areas, and blue lines
represent ± one standard error confidence bands in recessions and normal times, respectively.
Figure 4.4: Financial vs. Uncertainty shocks
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Notes: Red lines: impulse responses to a one-standard deviation increase in the excess bond
premium, calculated with nonlinear local projection methods. Blue-dashed lines: impulse
responses to a one-standard deviation increase in the uncertainty indicator developed by
Jurado et al. (2015), calculated with nonlinear local projection methods
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Figure 4.5: Robustness checks
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one-percent increase in the excess bond premium, calculated
with nonlinear local projection methods. Subsample: estimates calculated over the sample
1973:1-2007:12. VXO: estimates calculated by substituting the S&P500 index with the
VXO in the baseline vector of controls. Uncertainty: estimates calculated by adding the
uncertainty indicator by Jurado et al. (2015) to the baseline vector of controls.

Appendix A
This Appendix refers to Chapter 2. First, it documents statistical evidence in
favor of a nonlinear relationship between the endogenous variables included
in the STVAR used to analyze uncertainty shocks. Next, it offers details on
the estimation procedure of non-linear VARs. It then reports details on the
computation of the GIRFs. Finally, it documents our robustness checks.
Statistical evidence in favor of non-linearities
To detect non-linear dynamics at a multivariate level, we apply the test proposed
by Teräsvirta and Yang (2014). Their framework is particularly well suited for
our analysis since it amounts to test the null hypothesis of linearity versus a
specified nonlinear alternative, that of a (Vector Logistic) Smooth Transition
Vector AutoRegression with a single transition variable.
Consider the following p−dimensional 2-regime approximate logistic STVAR
model:
Xt = Θ′0Yt +
n∑
i=1
Θ′iYtzit + εt (A.1)
where Xt is the (p× 1) vector of endogenous variables, Yt = [Xt−1| . . . |Xt−k|α]
is the ((k × p+ q)× 1) vector of exogenous variables (including endogenous
variables lagged k times and a column vector of constants α), zt is the transition
variable, and Θ0 and Θi are matrices of parameters. In our case, the number
of endogenous variables is p = 8, the number of exogenous variables is q = 1,
and the number of lags is k = 6. Under the null hypothesis of linearity, Θi = 0
∀i.
The Teräsvirta-Yang test for linearity versus the STVAR model can be
performed as follows:
1. Estimate the restricted model (Θi = 0,∀i) by regressingXt onYt. Collect
the residuals E˜ and the matrix residual sum of squares RSS0 = E˜′E˜.
110 Appendix A
2. Run an auxiliary regression of E˜ on (Yt,Zn) where Zn ≡ [Z1|Z2| . . . |Zn] =
[Y′tzt|Y′tz2t | . . . |Y′tznt ]. Collect the residuals Ξ˜ and compute the matrix
residual sum of squares RSS1 = Ξ˜′Ξ˜.
3. Compute the test-statistic
LM = Ttr
{
RSS−10 (RSS0 −RSS1)
}
= T
(
p− tr
{
RSS−10 RSS1
})
Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is distributed as a χ2 with
p (kp+ q) degrees of freedom For our model, we get a value of LM = 1992
with a corresponding p-value equal to zero. The LM statistic has been
computed by fixing the value of the order of the Taylor expansion n equal
to three, as suggested by Luukkonen, Saikkonen, and Teräsvirta (1988).
It should be noticed, however, that the null of linearity can be rejected
also for n = 2.
4. As pointed out by Teräsvirta and Yang (2014), however, in small samples
the LM-type test might suffer from positive size distortion, i.e., the
empirical size of the test exceeds the true asymptotic size. We then
employ also the following rescaled LM test statistic:
F = (pT − k)
G× pT LM,
where G is the number of restrictions. The rescaled test statistic follows
an F (G, pT − k) distribution. In our case, we get F = 13.54, with p-value
approximately equal to zero.
Estimation of the non-linear VARs
Our model (2.1)-(2.4) is estimated via maximum likelihood.17 Its log-likelihood
reads as follows:
logL = const+ 12
∑T
t=1 log |Ωt| −
1
2
∑T
t=1 u
′
tΩ−1t ut (A.2)
17This Section heavily draws on Auerbach and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) "Appendix: Esti-
mation Procedure".
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where the vector of residuals ut =X t− (1−F (zt−1)ΠEX t−1−F (zt−1)ΠRX t−1.
Our goal is to estimate the parametersΨ = {γ,ΩR,ΩE,ΠR(L),ΠE(L)}, where
Πj(L) =
[
Πj,1 ... Πj,p
]
, j ∈ {R,E} . The high-non linearity of the model
and its many parameters make its estimation with standard optimization
routines problematic. Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), we
employ the procedure described below.
Conditional on {γ,ΩR,ΩE}, the model is linear in {ΠR(L),ΠE(L)}. Then,
for a given guess on {γ,ΩR,ΩE}, the coefficients {ΠR(L),ΠE(L)} can be
estimated by minimizing 12
∑T
t=1 u
′
tΩ−1t ut. This can be seen by re-writing the
regressors as follows:
W t =
[
F (zt−1)X t−1 (1− F (zt−1))X t−1 ... F (zt−1)X t−p 1− F (zt−1))X t−p
]
be the extended vector of regressors, and Π =
[
ΠR(L) ΠE(L)
]
. Then, we
can write ut =X t −ΠW ′t. Consequently, the objective function becomes
1
2
∑T
t=1(X t −ΠW
′
t)′Ω−1t (X t −ΠW ′t).
It can be shown that the first order condition with respect to Π is
vecΠ′ =
(∑T
t=1
[
Ω−1t ⊗W ′tW t
])−1
vec
(∑T
t=1W
′
tX tΩ−1t
)
. (A.3)
This procedure iterates over different sets of values for {γ,ΩR,ΩE}. For
each set of values, Π is obtained and the logL (A.2) computed.
Given that the model is highly non-linear in its parameters, several local
optima might be present. Hence, it is recommended to try different starting
values for {γ,ΩR,ΩE}. To ensure positive definiteness of the matrices ΩR and
ΩE, we focus on the alternative vector of parameters:
Ψ = {γ, chol(ΩR), chol(ΩE),ΠR(L),ΠE(L)}
where chol implements a Cholesky decomposition. The construction of con-
fidence intervals for the parameter estimates is complicated by, once again,
the non-linear structure of the problem. We compute them by appealing to a
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm developed by Chernozhukov
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and Hong (2003) (CH hereafter). This method delivers both a global optimum
and densities for the parameter estimates.
CH estimation is implemented via a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Given
a starting value Ψ(0), the procedure constructs chains of length N of the
parameters of our model following these steps:
Step 1. Draw a candidate vector of parameter values Θ(n) = Ψ(n) +ψ(n)
for the chain’s n+ 1 state, where Ψ(n) is the current state and ψ(n) is a vector
of i.i.d. shocks drawn from N(0,ΩΨ), and ΩΨ is a diagonal matrix.
Step 2. Set the n + 1 state of the chain Ψ(n+1) = Θ(n) with probability
min
{
1, L(Θ(n))/L(Ψ(n))
}
, where L(Θ(n)) is the value of the likelihood function
conditional on the candidate vector of parameter values, and L(Ψ(n)) the value of
the likelihood function conditional on the current state of the chain. Otherwise,
set Ψ(n+1) = Ψ(n).
The starting value Θ(0) is computed by working with a second-order Taylor
approximation of the model (2.1)-(2.4), so that the model can be written as
regressingX t on lags ofX t,X tzt, andX tz2t . The residuals from this regression
are employed to fit the expression for the reduced-form time-varying variance-
covariance matrix of the VAR (see our paper) using maximum likelihood to
estimate ΩR and ΩE. Conditional on these estimates and given a calibration
for γ, we can construct Ωt. Conditional on Ωt, we can get starting values for
ΠR(L) and ΠE(L) via equation (A.3).
The initial (diagonal matrix)ΩΨ is calibrated to one percent of the parameter
values. It is then adjusted "on the fly" for the first 3,000 draws to generate an
acceptance rate close to 0.3. We employ N = 10, 000 draws for our estimates,
retaining 70% for inference.
As shown by CH, Ψ = 1
N
∑N
n=1Ψ(n) is a consistent estimate of Ψ under
standard regularity assumptions on maximum likelihood estimators. Moreover,
the covariance matrix of Ψ is given by V = 1
N
∑N
n=1(Ψ(n) −Ψ)2 = var(Ψ(n)),
that is the variance of the estimates in the generated chain.
Generalized Impulse Response Functions
We compute the Generalized Impulse Response Functions from our STVAR
model by following the approach proposed by Koop et al. (1996). The algorithm
features the following steps.
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1. Consider the entire available observations, with sample size t = 1962M7,
. . . , 2008M6, with T = 552, and construct the set of all possible histories
Λ of length p = 13:18 {λi ∈ Λ}. Λ will contain T − p+ 1 histories λi.
2. Separate the set of all recessionary histories from that of all expansionary
histories. For each λi calculate the transition variable zλi . If zλi ≤
z = −1.01%, then λi ∈ ΛR, where ΛR is the set of all recessionary
histories; if zλi > −z = −1.01%, then λi ∈ ΛE, where ΛE is the set of all
expansionary histories.
3. Select at random one history λi from the set ΛR. For the selected history
λi, take Ω̂λi obtained as:
Ω̂λi = F (zλi) Ω̂R + (1− F (zλi)) Ω̂E, (A.4)
where Ω̂R and Ω̂E are obtained from the generated MCMC chain of
parameter values during the estimation phase.19 zλi is the transition
variable calculated for the selected history λi.
4. Cholesky-decompose the estimated variance-covariance matrix Ω̂λi :
Ω̂λi = ĈλiĈ′λi (A.5)
and orthogonalize the estimated residuals to get the structural shocks:
e(j)λi = Ĉ
−1
λi
ε̂. (A.6)
5. From eλi draw with replacement h eight-dimensional shocks and get the
vector of bootstrapped shocks
e(j)∗λi =
{
e∗λi,t, e
∗
λi,t+1, . . . , e
∗
λi,t+h
}
, (A.7)
where h is the horizon for the IRFs we are interested in.
18The choice p = 13 is due to the number of moving average terms (twelve) of our transition
variable zt and to the fact that such transition variable enters our ST-VAR model via the
transition probability F (zt−1) with one lag.
19We consider the distribution of parameters rather than their mean values to allow for
parameter uncertainty, as suggested by Koop et al. (1996).
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6. Form another set of bootstrapped shocks which will be equal to (A.7)
except for the kth shock in e(j)∗λi,t which is the shock we want to perturbate
by an amount equal to δ. Denote the vector of bootstrapped perturbated
shocks by e(j)δλi .
7. Transform back e(j)∗λi and e
(j)δ
λi
as follows:
ε̂
(j)∗
λi
= Ĉλie
(j)∗
λi
(A.8)
and
ε̂
(j)δ
λi
= Ĉλie
(j)δ
λi
. (A.9)
8. Use (A.8) and (A.9) to simulate the evolution of X(j)∗λi and X
(j)δ
λi
and
construct the GIRF (j) (h, δ, λi) as X(j)∗λi −X(j)δλi .
9. Conditional on history λi, repeat for j = 1, ..., B vectors of bootstrapped
residuals and getGIRF (1) (h, δ, λi), GIRF (2) (h, δ, λi), ..., GIRF (B) (h, δ, λi).
Set B = 500.
10. Calculate the GIRF conditional on history λi as
ĜIRF
(i)
(h, δ, λi) = B−1
B∑
j=1
GIRF (i,j) (h, δ, λi) . (A.10)
11. Repeat all previous steps for i = 1, ..., 500 histories belonging to the
set of recessionary histories, λi ∈ ΛR, and get ĜIRF
(1,R)
(h, δ, λ1,R),
ĜIRF
(2,R)
(h, δ, λ2,R) , . . . , ĜIRF
(500,R)
(h, δ, λ500,R), where now the sub-
script R denotes explicitly that we are conditioning upon recessionary
histories.
12. Take the average and get ĜIRF
(R) (
h, δ,ΛR
)
, which is the average GIRF
under recessions.
13. Repeat all previous steps - 3 to 12 - for 500 histories belonging to the set
of all expansions and get ĜIRF
(E) (
h, δ,ΛE
)
.
14. The computation of the 95% confidence bands for our impulse responses
is undertaken by picking up, per each horizon of each state, the 2.5th
and 97.5th percentile of the densities ĜIRF
([1:500],R)
and ĜIRF
([1:500],E)
.
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Robustness analysis
Exogenous uncertainty shocks. Following Bloom (2009), our baseline
analysis is conducted by working with 16 extreme realizations of uncertainty,
identified as all the spikes which are 1.65 standard deviations above the mean of
the HP-detrended VXO. Some of them, however, might be related to changes in
the business cycle, e.g., the 1987 black Monday, or the 1982 economic recession.
Hence, endogeneity may be at work and affect our impulse responses. To
control for this possible endogeneity, we define an alternative volatility dummy
by focusing on just 10 out of 16 extreme realizations of uncertainty, i.e., those
which are associated to terror, war, or oil events as in Bloom (2009).20 Figure
A.1 reports the estimated GIRFs for industrial production and employment to
this possibly more "exogenous" shock, along with the 68% and 95% confidence
bands. As in the baseline case, our results show that the drop, rebound and
overshoot path is present only when uncertainty shocks hits during recessions
(though it is only marginally significant for employment).
Different calibration of the slope parameter. One potential drawback
of our empirical exercise is that the slope parameter γ of the logistic function
of our STVAR, which drives the smoothness with which the economy switches
from one regime to another, is calibrated. Our baseline estimation uses a value
of γ = 1.8, selected so that the economy spends 14% of the time in recessions,
which is the frequency observed in our sample according to the NBER definition
of recessions. To check the robustness of the baseline results to different values
of γ, we have re-estimated the model using values of γ between 1.4 and 2.2,
which imply a frequency of recessionary periods in the sample equal to 10%
and 25%, respectively. Following Hansen (1999), we set to 10% the frequency
corresponding to the minimum amount of observations each regime should
contain to be identified. Our results are reported in Figure A.2, which plots
our baseline GIRFs along with the GIRFs obtained with alternative calibrated
values for γ. This robustness check clearly confirms our baseline results.
Unemployment as transition indicator. In our baseline exercise, the
transition indicator z, which regulates the probability of being in a recession, is a
20The Terror shocks are: the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962), the Assassination
of JFK (November 1963), the 9/11 Terrorist Attack (September 2001). The War shocks
are: the Vietnam buildup (August 1966), the Cambodian and Kent State (May 1970), the
Afghanistan, Iran hostages (March 1980), the Gulf War I (October 1990), the Gulf War II
(February 2003). The Oil shocks are dated December 1973 and November 1978.
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twelve-term moving average of the month-by-month growth rate of the industrial
production index. An alternative indicator of the business cycle often considered
by policymakers and academics is the unemployment rate. We then estimate a
version of our STVAR model in which our baseline vector is augmented with
the unemployment rate (ordered after the uncertainty dummy). Following some
recent announcements by U.S. policymakers and the modeling choice in Ramey
and Zubairy (2014), we classify periods in which the unemployment rate is
over (under) 6.5% as recessionary (expansionary).21 Figure A.3 documents
our GIRFs, which deliver the same stylized facts as in our baseline analysis,
i.e., a marked drop followed by a quick rebound and a temporary overshoot
in industrial production and employment when uncertainty shocks occur in
recessions, and a hump-shaped response of real activity in good times.
Uncertainty and financial risk. Stock and Watson (2012) point out that
financial strains lead to higher uncertainty, which in turn increases financial
risk. An implication of this relationship for our analysis is that the transmission
of uncertainty shocks to the real economy might not be due to uncertainty
per se but it might rather be driven by the level of financial stress in the
economy. Caldara et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence in favor of larger
real effects of uncertainty shocks in periods of high financial stress. A way to
control for the presence of time-varying financial risk is to include a measure
of credit spread in our VAR. Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) propose a micro-
founded measure of excess bond premium, i.e., a measure of credit spread
cleaned by the systematic movements in default risk on individual firms. Such
a measure has the attractive feature of isolating the cyclical changes in the
relationship between measured default risk and credit spreads. Unfortunately,
it is unavailable prior to 1973. Hence, its employment would considerably
shorten our sample size, and this would be particularly problematic for the
estimation of a richly-parameterized nonlinear VAR like ours. To circumvent
this issue, we consider a large set of credit spread measures available for our full
sample, as in Stock and Watson (2012), and choose the one which correlates
the most with Gilchrist and Zakrajsek’s measure of excess bond premium in the
21On December 12, 2012, the Federal Open Market Committee decided to tie the target
range of the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and maintain it as such exceptionally low
levels "[...] at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation
between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above
the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue
to be well anchored."
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sample 1973-2008. The selected credit spread measure is the difference between
the Baa corporate bonds and the 10-year Treasury yield, whose correlation
with Gilchrist and Zakrajsek’s excess bond premium reads 0.67. We then add
the Baa-10yr spread to our 8-variate VAR. Figure A.4 reports the response of
industrial production and employment to an uncertainty shock in recessions
and expansion for a nine-variate STVAR embedding the selected credit spread.
Two alternative orderings are considered. In one, the credit spread is ordered
before uncertainty, implying that uncertainty responds contemporaneously to
credit spread but not viceversa. In the other one, credit spread is ordered after
uncertainty, so to admit a contemporaneous reaction of credit spread to changes
in uncertainty. Our results broadly confirm those of our baseline scenario, i.e.,
uncertainty shocks occurring in recessions generate a drop and rebound in
real activity in the short-run, followed by a medium-run, temporary overshoot
(which is less clearly evident for employment, though). These results are
consistent with the findings by Bekaert et al. (2013), who show that uncertainty
shocks induce business cycle fluctuations even when controlling for indicators
of time-varying risk aversion. Our results are also consistent with those in
Caldara et al. (2014), who show that uncertainty shocks working via credit
frictions may lead to a persistent decline in real and financial variables.
Uncertainty and housing. Since Iacoviello (2005),, there has been a
revamped attention toward the relationship between housing market dynamics
and the business cycle, attention which has intensified after the 2007-09 financial
and real crisis. The housing market is particularly important for us in light of a
recent paper by Furlanetto et al. (2014), who show that uncertainty shocks may
play a minor role if one controls for housing shocks. We then add the real home
price index computed by Robert Shiller to our baseline vector.22 As before,
two alternative orderings are considered, one in which the house price index is
ordered just before uncertainty, and the other one in which such index is ordered
after uncertainty. Figure A.5 depicts our median responses. Quite interestingly,
the presence of house prices does not appear to quantitatively affect the drop
and rebound part of the response of industrial production and employment in
bad times. However, it clearly dampens the overshoot of the former variable,
and it implies no overshoot as for the latter. As for the response of these
22The index is available here: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/Fig2-1.xls. This
index is quarterly. We moved to monthly frequencies via a cubic interpolation of the quarterly
series. Our VAR models the log of such interpolated index.
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variables in expansions, house prices do appear to moderate the response of
real activity also in the short-run. These results are consistent with those in
with Furlanetto et al. (2014), who show that part of the effects often attributed
to uncertainty shocks may be an artifact due to the omission of house prices
from VAR analysis. However, even when controlling for house prices, we find
asymmetric responses of industrial production and employment (in terms of
severity of the recession, speed of the recovery, and overall dynamics) over the
business cycle.
We propose an extra Figure to complement those presented in Chapter 2.
Figure A.6 shows that a muted systematic policy response to our uncertainty
dummy per se (via switching off only the systematic component related to
uncertainty in the federal funds rate equation) would have a negligible impact
on our baseline results obtained by allowing for an unconstrained response of
the federal funds rate to an uncertainty shock.
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Figure A.1: Effects of uncertainty shocks: exogenous dummy
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Notes: Uncertainty dummy constructed by considering extreme realizations of the VXO index
related to terror, war, and oil events only. Impulse responses (median values and confidence
bands) to a one-standard deviation uncertainty shock identified as described in the paper.
Red dashed (blue dashed-circled) lines: Responses computed with the Smooth-Transition
VAR and conditional on recessions (expansions). Dashed-dotted lines: 68% confidence bands.
Gray areas: 95% confidence bands.
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Figure A.2: Effects of uncertainty shocks: different calibrations
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Notes: Impulse responses (median values) to a one-standard deviation uncertainty shock
identified as described in the paper. Red dashed/blue dashed-circled lines: GIRFs conditional
on γ = 1.8. Green lines: GIRFs conditional on γ = 1.4. Black lines: GIRFs conditional on
γ = 2.2.
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Figure A.3: Effects of uncertainty shocks: unemployment as transition variable
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Notes: Unemployment added to our baseline model and employed and transition indicator.
Realizations of unemployment above (below) 6.5% are associated to recessions (expansions).
Impulse responses (median values and confidence bands) to a one-standard deviation un-
certainty shock identified as described in the paper. Red dashed (blue dashed-circled)
lines: Responses computed with the Smooth-Transition VAR and conditional on recessions
(expansions). Dashed-dotted lines: 68% confidence bands. Gray areas: 95% confidence
bands.
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Figure A.4: Effects of uncertainty shocks: role of credit spreads
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Notes: Median impulse responses to a one-standard deviation uncertainty in scenarios
without/with credit spreads. Red dashed-dotted (blue dashed) lines: Responses computed
with the Smooth-Transition VAR and conditional on recessions (non-recessionary phases).
Responses of the models estimated with credit spreads are in green (when the spread is
ordered after uncertainty) and orange (when the spread is ordered before uncertainty).
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Figure A.5: Effects of uncertainty shocks: role of house prices
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Notes: Median impulse responses to a one-standard deviation uncertainty in scenarios
without/with real house price index. Red dashed-dotted (blue dashed) lines: Responses
computed with the Smooth-Transition VAR and conditional on recessions (non-recessionary
phases). Responses of the models estimated with the real house price index in green (when
the index spread is ordered after uncertainty) and orange (when the index is ordered before
uncertainty).
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Figure A.6: Effects of uncertainty shocks: systematic monetary policy
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Notes: Median impulse responses to a one-standard deviation uncertainty in scenarios
with unconstrained/constrained monetary policy. Red dashed-dotted (blue dashed) lines:
Responses computed with the Smooth-Transition VAR and conditional on recessions (non-
recessionary phases). Counterfactual responses computed conditional on a muted systematic
policy (fixed federal funds rate) in green-circled lines. Counterfactual responses computed
conditional on a systematic policy not responding to the uncertainty indicator in orange-
diamonded lines.
Appendix B
This Appendix refers to Chapter 3. It reports details on non-fundamentalness
in fiscal SVARs and the role of expectations revisions. A number of robustness
checks is also presented, in addition to those reported in the main text (Chapter
3, Section 3.6). Details on the computation of the factors employed in one of
our robustness checks are provided as well. For the estimation of our nonlinear
VARs, and the computation of the Generalized Impulse Responses, the reader
is referred to Appendix A.
Non-fundamentalness and the role of expectations revi-
sions
Structural VARs have been extensively employed to recover the impulse re-
sponses of key macroeconomic variables to fiscal shocks. The implicit assump-
tion when working with SVARs is that their VMA representations are invertible
in the past, or in other words that they are fundamental Wold representations
of the vector of interest. When such conditions are met, the econometrician has
the same information set as the economic agents and can recover the structural
shocks by conditioning the VAR estimates on past and current observables.
Fiscal foresight and non-fundamentalness. It is well known, however,
that in presence of fiscal foresight (and news shocks in general), this assumption
may not hold and fundamental shocks to fiscal policy cannot be recovered
from past and current observations. The non-fundamentalness is due to the
different discount patterns employed by agents and the econometrician: while
the agents attach a larger weight to realizations of the shock occurring in
the past, the econometrician discounts in the usual way, and attach lower
weights to past observations compared to more recent ones, the reason being
that the econometrician’s information set lags that of the agents (Leeper et al.
(2013)). Hence, in presence of a non-fundamental process, an econometrician
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not endowed with a large enough information set will not be able to correctly
recover the impulse response function of a variable of interest to the structural
shock.
How severe is the non-fundamentalness problem? As pointed out by Sims
(2012) and Beaudry and Portier (2013), the answer to this question depends
on the very same process(es) one wants to model. In terms of fiscal shocks,
Leeper et al. (2013) convincingly show that when non-fundamentalness holds
the magnitude of the error is quite severe. They employ two DSGE models of
the business cycle - a calibrated RBC model and an estimated DSGE model
with a number of nominal and real frictions à la Smets and Wouters (2007) -
to quantify the mistake an econometrician makes when failing to model fiscal
foresight. They show that fiscal multipliers may turn out to be off by hundreds
of percent, and can even get the wrong sign.23 Moreover, Forni and Gambetti
(2011) and Ramey (2011b) show that government spending shocks estimated
with standard fiscal VARs can be predicted, evidence supporting the case for
non-fundamentalness.
VAR analysis in presence of anticipated shocks. In this section, we
propose a framework to fix ideas about the relationship between fiscal foresight
and non-fundamentalness and to discuss how the problem can be tackled. To
this aim, consider the model
yt = δEtyt+1 + gt + ωt (B.1)
gt = εt−h + φ1εt−h−1 + . . .+ φq−hεt−q = Φ(L)εt (B.2)
where |δ| < 1, φi > 0 ∀i, h ≥ 0, q ≥ h. The forward-looking process yt - say,
output measured as log-deviations from its trend - is affected by the exogenous
stationary process gt - say, a fiscal shock - plus a random shock ωt, which
is assumed to capture non-fiscal spending shocks affecting output and which
is assumed to be i.i.d. with zero mean and unit variance. The process (B.2)
features an unanticipated contemporaneous shock εt as well as anticipated
shocks εt−h for h > 0, where h is the number of foresight periods. The latter
are known in advance by rational agents, i.e., agents foresee fiscal moves
23Leeper et al. (2013) model fiscal foresight associated to tax policies. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2012) find government spending shocks anticipated up to eight quarters to be
responsible of about 60% of the overall variability of government spending.
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occurring h-periods ahead. The process gt is a news-rich process if |φi| > 1
for at least one i > 0 (Beaudry and Portier (2013)). In all cases, {εt−j}qj=h is
said to be fundamental for gt if the roots of the polynomial Φ(L) lie outside
the unit circle (Hansen and Sargent (1991)). Importantly, if the gt process is
non-fundamental, its structural shock is not recoverable by employing current
and past realizations of gt only. Consequently, its impulse response to an
anticipated shock as well as the dynamic responses of other variables – in this
example, yt – will not be correctly recovered by estimating a VAR in yt and gt.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, consider the case in which
the unanticipated component is zero, i.e., h > 0. We assume that agents have
rational expectations and observe news shocks without noise.24 To begin with,
consider the case h = q = 1, so that25
gt = εt−1
Under rational expectations, the solution for the process yt reads
yt = δεt + εt−1 + ωt (B.3)
The VMA representation of the vector (yt, gt) is: yt
gt
 =
 δ 1
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
 εt
ωt
+
 1 0
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
 εt−1
ωt−1
 (B.4)
The VMA representation (B.4) is fundamental if all the roots of |∑qi=0Aizi|
in absolute value lie outside the unit circle. It is easy to verify that in this
case the condition is not met, since one gets |z| = 0. Hence, in this economic
system, inference based on an estimated VAR which includes yt and gt only
would be incorrect.
24Forni et al. (2013) investigate the case in which economic agents deal with noisy news.
Agents are assumed to receive signals regarding the future realization of TFP shocks. Since
such signals are noisy, agents react not only to genuinely informative news, but also to
noise shocks that are unrelated to economic fundamentals. They find that such noise shocks
explain about a third of the variance of output, consumption, and investment. We leave the
quantification of the role of noise shocks in the fiscal context to future research.
25This process is termed "degenerated news-rich process" by Beaudry and Portier (2013).
For an application, see Fève, Matheron, and Sahuc (2009).
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Importantly, if a variable ηt added to the econometrician’s information
set contains "enough" information about the structural shock εt, then the
VMA representation becomes invertible and the non-fundamentalness issue
is circumvented (Giannone and Reichlin (2006), Sims (2012), Beaudry and
Portier (2013), and Forni and Gambetti (2014)). Based on this argument, a
way to tackle the issue of non-fundamentalness is to include in the VAR a
variable which is informative about the effects that news shocks exert on the
endogenous variables of interest.26 In the case of fiscal foresight, then, one has
to find a measure of anticipated fiscal spending shocks to correctly gauge the
reaction of output to such shocks. It is easy to show that, in the context of
model (B.4) , replacing gt with its one-step-ahead forecast, i.e. Etgt+1, leads to
a fundamental VMA representation for the vector (yt, Etgt+1): yt
Etgt+1
 =
 δ 1
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
 εt
ωt
+
 1 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
 εt−1
ωt−1

This can be seen by verifying that |A0 + A1z| ≠ 0, ∀z.
It is important to notice that expectations per se do not necessarily provide
a correct measure of fiscal shocks. Consider the case h = 1 and q = 2, so that
gt = εt−1 + φ2εt−2 (B.5)
The VMA representation for (yt, gt) is: yt
gt
 =
 δ (1 + δφ2) 1
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
 εt
ωt
+
 1 + δφ2 0
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
 εt−1
ωt−1

+
 φ2 0
φ2 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
 εt−2
ωt−2

26Alternative ways of dealing with this issue have been proposed in the literature. Lippi
and Reichlin (1993) propose to use Blaschke matrices to "flip" the roots that are outside
the unit circle in order to recover the fundamental representation of the process of interest.
Alessi, Barigozzi, and Capasso (2011) and Forni and Gambetti (2014) propose to augment the
VAR with information coming from factors extracted from large datasets. However, in the
context of fiscal foresight, non-fundamentalness has a clearly detectable cause, i.e., omitted
information due to the absence in the VAR of an informative measure regarding (variations
concerning) future fiscal spending moves (Leeper et al. (2013), Beaudry and Portier (2013)).
Hence, a direct, fiscal-related way of tackling the presence of foresight appears to be desirable.
129
which is non-fundamental since the roots of |A0 + A1z + A2z2| are z1 = 0
and |z2| = φ−12 . In this case, adding the one-step-ahead forecast of gt does not
solve the problem. The VMA representation for the vector (yt, Etgt+1) is given
by:  yt
Etgt+1
 =
 δ (1 + δφ2) 1
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
 εt
ωt

+
 1 + δφ2 0
φ2 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
 εt−1
ωt−1
+
 φ2 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
 εt−2
ωt−2

which is non-fundamental if |φ2| > 1.
The role of forecast revisions. Expectation revisions help solving the
problem. Consider the variable ηt = Etgt+1−Et−1gt+1. The VMA representation
for the vector (yt, ηt) is given by: yt
ηt
 =
 δ (1 + δφ2) 1
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
 εt
ωt
+
 1 + δφ2 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
 εt−1
ωt−1

+
 φ2 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
 εt−2
ωt−2

which is fundamental, since |A0 + A1z + A2z2| ̸= 0, ∀z. It can recursively be
shown that expectations revisions of the form Etgt+1 − Et−1gt+1 help tackling
the issue of non-fundamentalness for any q > h = 1.
However, when h > 1 is unknown, even expectation revisions are not of
help. Consider for example the process:
gt = εt−2 + φ3εt−3.
This is not an unlikely case, given that typically the implementation lag for
fiscal policy decisions is longer than one quarter. The VMA representation for
the vector (yt, gt) is:
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 yt
gt
 =
 δ2 (1 + δφ3) 1
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
 εt
ωt
+
 δ (1 + δφ3) 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
 εt−1
ωt−1

+
 1 + δφ3 0
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
 εt−2
ωt−2
+
 φ3 0
φ3 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
 εt−3
ωt−3

and the roots of |A0 + A1z + A2z2 + A3z3| are z1,2 = 0, |z3| = φ−13 . Using
expectations revisions as before is in this case uninformative, since Etgt+1 −
Et−1gt+1 = 0.
Knowing exactly the number of anticipation periods h would solve the
problem, since Etgt+2 − Et−1gt+2 = εt. However, h is typically unknown. To
solve this issue, Gambetti (2012a) proposes to use an alternative, more general
measure of expectations revisions, i.e., the news variable defined as:
ηg1J =
J∑
j=1
(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) ,
with J large enough to ensure that J ≥ h. It can be shown that setting J ≥ 2
leads to a fundamental representation associated with the vector (yt, ηg1J), since
ηg12 = εt, ηg13 = (1 + φ3) εt and so on. In our example, if J = 2, the VMA
representation for (yt, ηg12) is: yt
ηg12
 =
 δ2 (1 + δφ3) 1
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
 εt
ωt
+
 δ (1 + δφ3) 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
 εt−1
ωt−1

+
 1 + δφ3 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
 εt−2
ωt−2
+
 φ3 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
 εt−3
ωt−3
 ,
where the determinant of |A0 + A1z + A2z2 + A3z3| ≠ 0, ∀z.27
In general, when the period of foresight h is unknown or uncertain, the
solution would be to include in the VAR a measure of expectations revisions
27It is important to notice that, though related in spirit, Perotti’s (2011) variable
(Etgt − Et−1gt) + (Etgt+1 − Et−1gt+1) is uninformative in a case like this, because it does
not contain any valuable information about εt, i.e., it is equal to zero. The reason is that the
forecast horizon covered by such a variable is too short.
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taken over a long enough horizon:
ηg1J =
J∑
j=1
(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) =
 (1 + φ1 + ...+ φJ−h) εt if J < q(1 + φ1 + ...+ φq−h) εt if J > q (B.6)
(where φ0 = 0), which correctly identifies the news shock if J > h.
Further robustness checks
Our baseline analysis suggests that evidence in favor of countercyclical fiscal
multipliers is borderline when we condition upon recessions vs. expansions,
while it becomes much clearer and solid when conditioning upon extreme events.
Chapter 3 presents the robustness checks conducted by considering a different
measure of fiscal spending news (obtained by regressing the baseline fiscal news
variable on a constant and a number of controls), a different ordering of the
variables in our VAR, the debt/GDP ratio as an extra-variable in our VAR
as well as the transition indicator, and a longer sample (an analysis that we
conducted by working with Ramey’s (2011) indicator of fiscal spending news).
Table 2.6 documents the robustness of our results by collecting multipliers
computed over a 4-year horizon. Table B.1 in this Appendix confirms the
solidity of our results conditional on a 2-year horizon.
We then conduct a variety of robustness checks to verify the solidity of our
results. We present the robustness checks below and discuss our results by
referring to Table B.2, which summarizes the outcome.
FAVAR. Our baseline VAR is meant to parsimoniously model a set of key
macroeconomic indicators crucial to quantify fiscal spending multipliers. A
further reason to prefer a parsimonious VAR is the somewhat limited number
of observations available to construct the measures of forecast revisions we deal
with, as well as the nonlinearity of our framework, in which a large number of
VAR coefficients is estimated. Despite its advantages, a parsimonious model
might suffer from an omitted-variable problem, which may bias the results of
our baseline scenario. In particular, reactions of variables like the real interest
rate and the real exchange rate may be important for the computation of
the fiscal spending multipliers. Interactions between financial variables and
real aggregates may also be at work conditional on our fiscal news shock. We
tackle this informational insufficiency issue by adding to our VAR a factor
extracted from a large dataset, so to purge the (possibly bias-contaminated)
132 Appendix B
estimated shocks. This strategy leads us to deal with a nonlinear version of
the Factor-Augmented VAR (FAVAR) model popularized, in the monetary
policy context, by Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005). In particular, we
consider a large dataset composed of 150 time-series, all reported in Table B.3,
along with their respective transformations, and extract the common factors
which maximize the explained variance of such series. Following Stock and
Watson (2012) in their recent analysis on the drivers of the post-WWII U.S.
economy, we extract six common factors and then focus on the fiscal FAVAR
Xfavart = [f 1t , Gt, Tt, Yt, η
g
13,t]′, where "f 1t " is the factor explaining the largest
share of variance of the series in our enlarged database. Due to the limited
number of degrees of freedom, we focus on a VAR model with two lags, a
choice that we will keep for all the five-variate VARs we estimate to check
the robustness of our baseline results. Results on the difference of the fiscal
multiplier in different states of the economy are collected in Table B.2 under
the label "FAVAR".
Expectation revisions of output. Our baseline results rests on the
identifying assumption that our fiscal news variable carries valuable information
regarding fiscal shocks which may have led economic agents to revise their
expectations of future public spending. However, such revisions may have
been undertaken because of "news" about some other shocks. Suppose news
about the future evolution of technology become part of agents’ information
sets between time t − 1 and t. This might induce agents to revise their
expectations regarding future realizations of output. Given the link between
output and public spending (due to, e.g., automatic stabilizers), such revisions
may induce agents to further revise their expectations of future fiscal spending
as well. Hence, revisions of future fiscal spending may be triggered not only by
anticipated fiscal shocks, but also by anticipated shocks of a different nature (say,
news concerning technology). We tackle this issue by modeling the five-variate
VAR XYt = [ηY13,t, Gt, Tt, Yt, η
g
13,t]′, where ηY13 stands for the sum of forecast
revisions regarding future real GDP. The construction of this variable replicates
the construction of ηg13 explained in Chapter 3, section 3.2, eq.(3.4). We put ηY13
before ηg13 in the vector to control for the effects exerted by contemporaneous
movements in ηY13 on η
g
13.28 Notice that one can interpret this robustness check
as pointing to the role of an identified factor omitted in the baseline analysis,
28Given the choice of a Cholesky-identification scheme, the ordering of the variables before
ηg13 is irrelevant for the computation of our impulse responses to a fiscal news shock.
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i.e., the role of expectation revisions on output. Table B.2 collects our results
under the label "ηY13".
Contemporaneous effects of ηg13 shocks. Our approach features a
recursive identification scheme. Our choice aims at purging the movements of
the ηg13 fiscal variable by accounting for its systematic response to government
spending, tax revenues, and output. However, such a choice has an obvious
limitation, i.e., output is not allowed to move immediately after the realization
of the news shock. We then perform a robustness check by focusing on the
five-variate VAR Xη
g
t = [ηg13,t, ηY13,t, Gt, Tt, Yt]′, which enables fiscal news shocks
to move output immediately. We keep the measure of news on output to
control for the systematic movements of fiscal news due to output news. Notice
that this VAR allows for (without forcing) an immediate response of fiscal
spending G, which would however be inconsistent with the idea of a news
shock. Interestingly, a look at our GIRFs (available upon request) suggest that
public spending moves in neither of the two states. This result confirms the
potential of the measure of fiscal news shocks employed in this paper to capture
anticipated fiscal shocks, i.e., shocks which do not exert an immediate impact
on public spending but, possibly, trigger an immediate reaction of output.29
As for the difference in fiscal multipliers, the results are presented in Table B.2
under "ηg13 first".
Expectation revisions of total government spending. Our baseline
analysis hinges upon a ηg13, which is based on revisions of forecasts over the
growth rates of federal spending only. However, expectations concerning levels
of future fiscal spending regarding state and local expenditures are also available.
We then construct levels of expected total spending and compute the growth
rates of such expected realizations. We use this variable as a proxy of the
expected growth rates of total fiscal spending that are not readily available in
the SPF dataset. We then use this proxy as an alternative to our ηg13 variable
in our vector. Our results are collected in Table B.2 under the label "ηg13 total".
Ricco’s news indicator. In a recent paper, Ricco (2014) shows that
the news variable we employ in our study to account for fiscal foresight may
29Interestingly, our impulse responses suggest that output moves immediately in recessions,
while its contemporaneous response is not significant when expansions are considered (IRFs
not shown for the sake of brevity, but available upon request). The contemporaneous zero
reaction of public spending to changes in output is consistent with the evidence on the zero
contemporaneous output elasticity of government spending in the U.S. surveyed by Caldara
and Kamps (2012).
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be affected by aggregation bias. Our measure is based on forecast revisions
constructed by appealing to location measures (e.g., mean, median) of the
distribution of the forecasts (across forecasters). However, since the composition
of the pool of respondents to the SPF changes over time, one problem related
with our measure is that use of measures of central tendency might induce
a non negligible bias if the distribution of forecast revisions is skewed. The
resulting aggregation bias may in principle imply important quantitative effects
for the computation of fiscal multipliers. Ricco (2014) circumvents this problem
by constructing a measure of news based on the revisions of expectations of
each individual forecaster in the pool, whose forecast is available for at least
two consecutive quarters. Ex-post aggregation of such revisions gives rise to
a "microfounded" measure of aggregate news. Even though the correlation
between the two measures of fiscal anticipation in our sample is quite high (it
reads 0.84), it is of interest to repeat our exercise by employing Ricco’s news
measure as an alternative to our ηg13.30 Results are documented in Table B.2
under "ηg13 à la Ricco".
Overall, two main messages arise by from the results reported in Table B.2.
First, the "Normal" scenarios generally points to a rather fragile evidence of
countercyclical fiscal multipliers. The most evident exception is the case of
the news variable à la Ricco, which leads to larger multipliers in recessions.
This is in line with the fact that, in presence of a skewed distribution of
forecast revisions, our measure of news would downward-bias the estimated
fiscal multipliers (see Ricco (2014) for a detailed explanation of the sources
of this bias). Second, our extreme events analysis robustly supports larger
multipliers in recessions. Hence, our results corroborate a recent statement
by Blanchard and Leigh (2013) on the magnitude of fiscal multipliers and the
effectiveness of fiscal stabilization policies in periods of substantial economic
slack. These results lend support also to Parker’s (2011) call for empirical
models able to capture the possible countercyclicality of fiscal multipliers.
Computation of the factors for the FAVAR approach
We follow Stock and Watson (2012) to estimate the factors from a large
unbalanced data set of US variables. Let X t = (X1t, . . . , Xnt)′ denote a vector
of n macroeconomic time series, with t = 1, . . . , T . Xit is a single time series
30We thank Giovanni Ricco for providing us with his measure of fiscal news.
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transformed to be stationary and to have mean zero. The dynamic factor model
expresses each of the n time series as the sum of a common component driven
by r unobserved factors F t plus an idiosyncratic disturbance term eit:
Xt = ΛFt + et (B.7)
where et = (e1t, . . . , ent)′ and Λ is the n× r matrix of factor loadings.
The factors are assumed to follow a linear and stationary vector autoregres-
sion:
Φ (L)F t = ηt (B.8)
where Φ (L) is a r×r matrix of lag polynomials with the vector of r innovations
ηt. Stationarity implies that Φ (L) can be inverted and F t has the moving
average representation:
F t = Φ (L)−1 ηt. (B.9)
With n large, under the assumption that there is a single-factor structure,
simple cross-sectional averaging provides an estimate of F t good enough to
treat F̂ t as data in a regression without a generated regressor problem. With
multiple factors, Stock and Watson (2002) show that a consistent estimate of
F t is obtained using principal components.
Our data set is standard in the recent literature on factor models (see
Stock and Watson, 2012, and Forni and Gambetti, 2014). It contains an
unbalanced panel of 150 quarterly series, with starting date 1947Q1 and end
date 2012Q3. The data are grouped into 12 categories: NIPA variables (31);
industrial production (16); employment and unemployment (14); housing starts
(6); inventories, orders and sales (12); prices (15); earnings and productivity
(13); interest rates (10); money and credit (12); stock prices (5); exchange
rates (7); and other (9). Earnings and productivity data include TFP-adjusted
measures of capacity utilization introduced by Basu, Fernald, and Kimball
(2006). The category labeled "other" includes expectations variables.
The transformation implemented for the series to be stationary with zero
mean are reported in Table B.3. The factors were estimated using principal
components as in Stock and Watson (2012). The assumption that the factors
can be estimated with no breaks over the period 1947Q2-2012Q3 is motivated
by the findings of Stock and Watson (2002), who show that the space spanned
by the factors can be estimated consistently even if there is instability in Λ.
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Table B.1: Fiscal spending multipliers: Extreme events. Different Scenarios
Peak
Scenario/State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
Baseline 0.79
[0.45,1.09]
2.27
[1.45,2.93]
1.09
[0.72,2.31]
2.72
[1.32,3.96]
η˜g13 last 0.45[0.20,0.63] 3.37[2.03,4.34] 1.05[0.48,3.77] 3.15[1.50,4.21]
η˜g13 first 1.21[0.25,1.94] 3.05[1.84,6.72] 2.17[0.93,4.97] 3.64[1.58,6.80]
Long sample (Ramey’s news) 0.47
[0.19,0.80]
2.83
[1.56,5.92]
0.68
[0.23,1.56]
2.59
[1.22,6.60]
High debt Mod.+ debt Mod.− debt Low debt
Debt/GDP ratio 1.79
[1.62,2.00]
1.35
[0.68,2.15]
1.95
[1.68,2.44]
2.08
[1.54,2.78]
Sum
Scenario/State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
Baseline −2.26
[−5.63,−0.78]
1.60
[0.18,2.63]
−1.40
[−3.91,0.65]
1.38
[−0.48,3.02]
η˜g13 last −0.42
[−1.56,0.13]
3.65
[2.09,4.99]
0.76
[−0.62,3.86]
3.17
[0.99,4.43]
η˜g13 first 0.76[−1.02,2.20] 3.95[1.59,8.72] 2.35[0.38,5.43] 3.95[1.27,8.17]
Long sample (Ramey’s news) 0.43
[0.06,0.85]
2.49
[0.19,8.66]
0.02
[−1.77,1.08]
2.21
[−0.68,9.72]
High debt Mod.+ debt Mod.− debt Low debt
Debt/GDP ratio 2.43
[2.13,2.72]
0.99
[0.36,1.77]
2.29
[1.93,2.59]
2.07
[1.43,2.54]
Notes: Two-year integral multipliers. Figures conditional on our VAR analysis with GIRFs
conditional on four different sets of initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of
output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
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Table B.2: Fiscal spending multipliers: Shares of multipliers larger in recessions
Peak
Scenario/Horizon Cycle h = 4 h = 8 h = 12 h = 16 h = 20
Baseline Normal 87.80 90.80 90.00 90.60 90.20
Extreme 99.60 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
FAV AR Normal 87.40 91.00 93.20 93.40 93.40
Extreme 100.00 99.80 99.60 99.60 99.60
ηY13 Normal 62.60 80.60 82.20 84.00 84.80
Extreme 93.00 99.20 99.40 99.20 99.20
ηg13 first Normal 81.00 86.80 88.60 90.00 90.00
Extreme 97.60 99.20 99.40 99.60 99.60
ηg13 total Normal 94.60 92.60 92.60 93.20 93.40
Extreme 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
ηg13 à la Ricco Normal 95.00 94.00 94.00 94.20 94.40
Extreme 100.00 100.00 100.0 100.00 100.00
Sum
Scenario/Horizon Cycle h = 4 h = 8 h = 12 h = 16 h = 20
Baseline Normal 84.80 91.60 93.60 95.40 96.60
Extreme 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
FAV AR Normal 89.80 85.20 85.60 88.20 89.80
Extreme 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
ηY13 Normal 36.80 73.00 79.80 83.00 86.40
Extreme 86.20 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
ηg13 first Normal 74.20 84.60 88.20 90.40 91.40
Extreme 96.20 99.80 100.00 100.00 100.0
ηg13 total Normal 89.80 86.60 85.40 85.80 87.00
Extreme 98.60 95.20 99.00 100.00 100.00
ηg13 à la Ricco Normal 93.00 90.80 90.60 90.20 90.40
Extreme 99.80 99.80 99.80 99.80 99.80
Notes: Figures conditional on our VAR analysis with GIRFs conditional on four different
sets of initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample
mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in
dollars.
138 Appendix B
Ta
bl
e
B.
3:
T
im
e
se
rie
s
em
pl
oy
ed
fo
r
th
e
co
m
pu
ta
tio
n
of
th
e
fa
ct
or
s
N
Se
ri
es
M
ne
m
on
ic
Tr
.
St
ar
t
E
nd
1
R
ea
lG
ro
ss
D
om
es
tic
Pr
od
uc
t,
1
D
ec
im
al
G
D
PC
1
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
2
R
ea
lG
ro
ss
N
at
io
na
lP
ro
du
ct
G
N
PC
96
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
3
R
ea
lN
at
io
na
lI
nc
om
e
N
IC
U
R
/G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
4
R
ea
lD
isp
os
ab
le
In
co
m
e
D
PI
C
96
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
5
R
ea
lP
er
so
na
lI
nc
om
e
R
PI
6
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
6
N
on
fa
rm
Bu
sin
es
s
Se
ct
or
:
O
ut
pu
t
O
U
T
N
FB
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
7
R
ea
lF
in
al
Sa
le
s
of
D
om
es
tic
Pr
od
uc
t,
1
D
ec
im
al
FI
N
SL
C
1
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
8
R
ea
lP
riv
at
e
Fi
xe
d
In
ve
st
m
en
t,
1
D
ec
im
al
FP
IC
1
5
19
95
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
9
R
ea
lP
riv
at
e
R
es
id
en
tia
lF
ix
ed
In
ve
st
m
en
t,
1
D
ec
im
al
PR
FI
C
1
5
19
95
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
10
R
ea
lP
riv
at
e
N
on
re
sid
en
tia
lF
ix
ed
In
ve
st
m
en
t,
1
D
ec
im
al
PN
FI
C
1
5
19
95
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
11
R
ea
lG
ro
ss
Pr
iv
at
e
D
om
es
tic
In
ve
st
m
en
t,
1
D
ec
im
al
G
PD
IC
1
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
12
R
ea
lP
er
so
na
lC
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
PC
EC
C
96
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
13
R
ea
lP
er
so
na
lC
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
:
N
on
du
ra
bl
e
G
oo
ds
PC
N
D
G
C
96
5
19
95
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
14
R
ea
lP
er
so
na
lC
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
:
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
PC
D
G
C
C
96
5
19
95
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
15
R
ea
lP
er
so
na
lC
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
:
Se
rv
ic
es
PC
ES
V
C
96
5
19
95
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
16
R
ea
lG
ro
ss
Pr
iv
at
e
Sa
vi
ng
G
PS
AV
E/
G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
17
R
ea
lF
ed
er
al
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s,
G
ro
ss
In
ve
st
m
en
t,
1
D
ec
im
al
FG
C
EC
1
5
19
95
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
18
Fe
de
ra
lG
ov
er
m
en
t:
C
ur
re
nt
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s,
R
ea
l
FG
EX
PN
D
/G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
19
Fe
de
ra
lG
ov
er
m
en
t:
C
ur
re
nt
R
ec
ei
pt
s,
R
ea
l
FG
R
EC
PT
/G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
20
N
et
Fe
de
ra
lG
ov
er
nm
en
t
Sa
vi
ng
FG
D
EF
2
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
21
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
C
ur
re
nt
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s/
G
D
P
D
efl
at
or
G
EX
PN
D
/G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
22
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
C
ur
re
nt
R
ec
ei
pt
s/
G
D
P
D
efl
at
or
G
R
EC
PT
/G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
23
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
R
ea
lE
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
m
in
us
R
ea
lR
ec
ei
pt
s
G
D
EF
2
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
24
R
ea
lG
ov
er
nm
en
t
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s,
G
ro
ss
In
ve
st
m
en
t,
1
D
ec
im
al
G
C
EC
1
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
25
R
ea
lC
ha
ng
e
in
Pr
iv
at
e
In
ve
nt
or
ie
s,
1
D
ec
im
al
C
BI
C
1
1
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
of
th
e
se
rie
s:
1-
31
:
"N
IP
A
";
32
-4
7:
"I
nd
us
tr
ia
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n"
;4
8-
61
:
"E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
an
d
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t"
;6
2-
67
:
"H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
";
68
-7
9:
"I
nv
en
to
rie
s"
,"
O
rd
er
s
an
d
Sa
le
s"
;8
0-
94
:
"P
ric
es
";
95
-1
07
:
"E
ar
ni
ng
s
an
d
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
";
10
8-
11
7:
"I
nt
er
es
t
R
at
es
";
11
8-
12
9:
"M
on
ey
an
d
C
re
di
t"
;
13
0-
13
4:
"S
to
ck
Pr
ic
es
";
13
5-
14
1:
"E
xc
ha
ng
e
R
at
es
";
14
2-
15
0:
"O
th
er
s"
.
T
he
co
lu
m
n
la
be
le
d
"T
r."
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
tr
an
sfo
rm
at
io
n
ap
pl
ie
d
to
th
e
se
rie
s
(1
=
le
ve
l,
2
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
3
=
lo
ga
rit
hm
,4
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
5
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
,6
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
).
D
at
a
so
ur
ce
:
Fe
de
ra
lR
es
er
ve
Ba
nk
of
St
.
Lo
ui
s’
we
bs
ite
.
139
N
Se
ri
es
M
ne
m
on
ic
Tr
.
St
ar
t
E
nd
26
R
ea
lE
xp
or
ts
of
G
oo
ds
an
d
Se
rv
ic
es
,1
D
ec
im
al
EX
PG
SC
1
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
27
R
ea
lI
m
po
rt
s
of
G
oo
ds
an
d
Se
rv
ic
es
,1
D
ec
im
al
IM
PG
SC
1
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
28
C
or
po
ra
te
Pr
ofi
ts
A
fte
r
Ta
x,
R
ea
l
C
P/
G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
29
N
on
fin
an
ci
al
C
or
po
ra
te
Bu
sin
es
s:
Pr
ofi
ts
A
fte
r
Ta
x,
R
ea
l
N
FC
PA
TA
X
/G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
30
C
or
po
ra
te
N
et
C
as
h
Fl
ow
,R
ea
l
C
N
C
F/
G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
31
N
et
C
or
po
ra
te
D
iv
id
en
ds
,R
ea
l
D
IV
ID
EN
D
/G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
32
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n
In
de
x
IN
D
PR
O
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
33
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
Bu
sin
es
s
Eq
ui
pm
en
t
IP
BU
SE
Q
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
34
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
C
on
su
m
er
G
oo
ds
IP
C
O
N
G
D
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
35
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
D
ur
ab
le
C
on
su
m
er
G
oo
ds
IP
D
C
O
N
G
D
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
36
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
Fi
na
lP
ro
du
ct
s
(M
ar
ke
t
G
ro
up
)
IP
FI
N
A
L
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
37
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
M
at
er
ia
ls
IP
M
AT
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
38
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
N
on
du
ra
bl
e
C
on
su
m
er
G
oo
ds
IP
N
C
O
N
G
D
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
39
C
ap
ac
ity
U
til
iz
at
io
n:
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
M
C
U
M
FN
4
19
72
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
40
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
IP
M
A
N
5
19
72
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
41
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
D
ur
ab
le
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
IP
D
M
A
N
5
19
72
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
42
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
M
in
in
g
IP
M
IN
E
5
19
72
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
43
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
N
on
du
ra
bl
e
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
IP
N
M
A
N
5
19
72
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
44
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
D
ur
ab
le
M
at
er
ia
ls
IP
D
M
AT
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
45
In
du
st
ria
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n:
El
ec
tr
ic
an
d
G
as
U
til
iti
es
IP
U
T
IL
5
19
72
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
46
IS
M
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g:
PM
IC
om
po
sit
e
In
de
x
N
A
PM
1
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
47
IS
M
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g:
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
In
de
x
N
A
PM
PI
1
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
48
Av
er
ag
e
W
ee
kl
y
H
ou
rs
of
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
an
d
N
on
su
pe
rv
iso
ry
Em
pl
oy
ee
s:
M
an
uf
.
AW
H
M
A
N
1
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
49
Av
er
ag
e
W
ee
kl
y
O
ve
rt
im
e
H
ou
rs
of
Pr
od
.
an
d
N
on
su
pe
rv
iso
ry
Em
pl
oy
ee
s:
M
an
uf
.
AW
O
T
M
A
N
2
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
50
C
iv
ili
an
La
bo
r
Fo
rc
e
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
R
at
e
C
IV
PA
RT
2
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
of
th
e
se
rie
s:
1-
31
:
"N
IP
A
";
32
-4
7:
"I
nd
us
tr
ia
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n"
;4
8-
61
:
"E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
an
d
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t"
;6
2-
67
:
"H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
";
68
-7
9:
"I
nv
en
to
rie
s"
,"
O
rd
er
s
an
d
Sa
le
s"
;8
0-
94
:
"P
ric
es
";
95
-1
07
:
"E
ar
ni
ng
s
an
d
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
";
10
8-
11
7:
"I
nt
er
es
t
R
at
es
";
11
8-
12
9:
"M
on
ey
an
d
C
re
di
t"
;
13
0-
13
4:
"S
to
ck
Pr
ic
es
";
13
5-
14
1:
"E
xc
ha
ng
e
R
at
es
";
14
2-
15
0:
"O
th
er
s"
.
T
he
co
lu
m
n
la
be
le
d
"T
r."
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
tr
an
sfo
rm
at
io
n
ap
pl
ie
d
to
th
e
se
rie
s
(1
=
le
ve
l,
2
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
3
=
lo
ga
rit
hm
,4
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
5
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
,6
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
).
D
at
a
so
ur
ce
:
Fe
de
ra
lR
es
er
ve
Ba
nk
of
St
.
Lo
ui
s’
we
bs
ite
.
140 Appendix B
N
Se
ri
es
M
ne
m
on
ic
Tr
.
St
ar
t
E
nd
51
C
iv
ili
an
La
bo
r
Fo
rc
e
C
LF
16
0V
5
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
52
C
iv
ili
an
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t
C
E1
60
V
5
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
53
A
ll
Em
pl
oy
ee
s:
To
ta
lP
riv
at
e
In
du
st
rie
s
U
SP
R
IV
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
54
A
ll
Em
pl
oy
ee
s:
G
oo
ds
-P
ro
du
ci
ng
In
du
st
rie
s
U
SG
O
O
D
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
55
A
ll
Em
pl
oy
ee
s:
Se
rv
ic
e-
Pr
ov
id
in
g
In
du
st
rie
s
SR
V
PR
D
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
56
U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
U
N
EM
PL
O
Y
5
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
57
Av
er
ag
e
(M
ea
n)
D
ur
at
io
n
of
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
U
EM
PM
EA
N
2
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
58
C
iv
ili
an
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
R
at
e
U
N
R
AT
E
2
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
59
In
de
x
of
H
el
p-
W
an
te
d
A
dv
er
tis
in
g
in
N
ew
sp
ap
er
s
A
0M
04
6
1
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
60
H
O
A
N
BS
/C
N
P1
60
V
H
O
A
N
BS
/C
N
P1
60
V
4
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
61
In
iti
al
C
la
im
s
IC
SA
5
19
67
Q
3
20
12
Q
3
62
H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
:
To
ta
l:
N
ew
Pr
iv
at
el
y
O
w
ne
d
U
ni
ts
St
ar
te
d
H
O
U
ST
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
63
H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
in
N
or
th
ea
st
C
en
su
s
R
eg
io
n
H
O
U
ST
N
E
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
64
H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
in
M
id
we
st
C
en
su
s
R
eg
io
n
H
O
U
ST
M
W
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
65
H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
in
So
ut
h
C
en
su
s
R
eg
io
n
H
O
U
ST
S
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
66
H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
in
W
es
t
C
en
su
s
R
eg
io
n
H
O
U
ST
W
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
67
N
ew
Pr
iv
at
e
H
ou
sin
g
U
ni
ts
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
by
Bu
ild
in
g
Pe
rm
its
PE
R
M
IT
5
19
60
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
68
U
S
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
N
ew
O
rd
er
s
fo
r
N
on
D
ef
en
se
C
ap
ita
lG
oo
ds
U
SN
O
ID
N
.D
5
19
59
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
69
U
S
N
ew
O
rd
er
s
of
C
on
su
m
er
G
oo
ds
an
d
M
at
er
ia
ls
U
SC
N
O
RC
G
D
5
19
59
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
70
U
S
IS
M
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
Su
rv
ey
:
N
ew
O
rd
er
s
In
de
x
SA
D
J
U
SN
A
PM
N
O
1
19
50
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
71
R
et
ai
lS
al
es
:
To
ta
l(
Ex
cl
ud
in
g
Fo
od
Se
rv
ic
es
)
R
SX
FS
5
19
92
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
72
Va
lu
e
of
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
’T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
ie
s
fo
r
A
ll
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
In
du
st
rie
s
U
M
T
M
T
I
5
19
92
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
73
Va
lu
e
of
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
’T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
ie
s
fo
r
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
A
M
D
M
T
I
5
19
92
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
74
Va
lu
e
of
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
’T
ot
al
In
ve
nt
or
ie
s
fo
r
N
on
du
ra
bl
e
G
oo
ds
In
du
st
rie
s
A
M
N
M
T
I
5
19
92
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
75
IS
M
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g:
In
ve
nt
or
ie
s
In
de
x
N
A
PM
II
1
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
of
th
e
se
rie
s:
1-
31
:
"N
IP
A
";
32
-4
7:
"I
nd
us
tr
ia
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n"
;4
8-
61
:
"E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
an
d
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t"
;6
2-
67
:
"H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
";
68
-7
9:
"I
nv
en
to
rie
s"
,"
O
rd
er
s
an
d
Sa
le
s"
;8
0-
94
:
"P
ric
es
";
95
-1
07
:
"E
ar
ni
ng
s
an
d
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
";
10
8-
11
7:
"I
nt
er
es
t
R
at
es
";
11
8-
12
9:
"M
on
ey
an
d
C
re
di
t"
;
13
0-
13
4:
"S
to
ck
Pr
ic
es
";
13
5-
14
1:
"E
xc
ha
ng
e
R
at
es
";
14
2-
15
0:
"O
th
er
s"
.
T
he
co
lu
m
n
la
be
le
d
"T
r."
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
tr
an
sfo
rm
at
io
n
ap
pl
ie
d
to
th
e
se
rie
s
(1
=
le
ve
l,
2
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
3
=
lo
ga
rit
hm
,4
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
5
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
,6
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
).
D
at
a
so
ur
ce
:
Fe
de
ra
lR
es
er
ve
Ba
nk
of
St
.
Lo
ui
s’
we
bs
ite
.
141
N
Se
ri
es
M
ne
m
on
ic
Tr
.
St
ar
t
E
nd
76
IS
M
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g:
N
ew
O
rd
er
s
In
de
x
N
A
PM
N
O
I
1
19
48
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
77
Va
lu
e
of
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
’N
ew
O
rd
er
s
fo
r
C
on
s.
G
oo
ds
:
C
on
s.
D
ur
.
G
oo
ds
In
d.
s
A
C
D
G
N
O
5
19
92
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
78
M
an
uf
.s’
N
ew
O
rd
er
s:
D
ur
ab
le
G
oo
ds
D
G
O
R
D
ER
5
19
92
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
79
Va
lu
e
of
M
an
uf
.s’
N
ew
O
rd
er
s
fo
r
D
ur
.
G
oo
ds
In
d.
:
Tr
an
sp
.
Eq
ui
pm
en
t
A
N
A
PN
O
5
19
92
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
80
G
ro
ss
D
om
es
tic
Pr
od
uc
t:
C
ha
in
-ty
pe
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x
G
D
PC
T
PI
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
81
G
ro
ss
N
at
io
na
lP
ro
du
ct
:
C
ha
in
-ty
pe
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x
G
N
PC
T
PI
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
82
G
ro
ss
D
om
es
tic
Pr
od
uc
t:
Im
pl
ic
it
Pr
ic
e
D
efl
at
or
G
D
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
83
G
ro
ss
N
at
io
na
lP
ro
du
ct
:
Im
pl
ic
it
Pr
ic
e
D
efl
at
or
G
N
PD
EF
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
84
C
on
su
m
er
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x
fo
r
A
ll
U
rb
an
C
on
su
m
er
s:
A
ll
It
em
s
C
PI
A
U
C
SL
6
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
85
C
on
su
m
er
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x
fo
r
A
ll
U
rb
an
C
on
su
m
er
s:
A
ll
It
em
s
Le
ss
Fo
od
C
PI
U
LF
SL
6
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
86
C
on
su
m
er
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x
fo
r
A
ll
U
rb
an
C
on
su
m
er
s:
A
ll
It
em
s
Le
ss
En
er
gy
C
PI
LE
G
SL
6
19
57
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
87
C
on
su
m
er
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x
fo
r
A
ll
U
rb
an
C
on
su
m
er
s:
A
ll
It
em
s
Le
ss
Fo
od
&
En
er
gy
C
PI
LF
ES
L
6
19
57
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
88
C
on
su
m
er
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x
fo
r
A
ll
U
rb
an
C
on
su
m
er
s:
En
er
gy
C
PI
EN
G
SL
6
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
89
C
on
su
m
er
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x
fo
r
A
ll
U
rb
an
C
on
su
m
er
s:
Fo
od
C
PI
U
FD
SL
6
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
90
Pr
od
uc
er
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x:
Fi
ni
sh
ed
G
oo
ds
:
C
ap
ita
lE
qu
ip
m
en
t
PP
IC
PE
6
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
91
Pr
od
uc
er
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x:
C
ru
de
M
at
er
ia
ls
fo
r
Fu
rt
he
r
Pr
oc
es
sin
g
PP
IC
R
M
6
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
92
Pr
od
uc
er
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x:
Fi
ni
sh
ed
C
on
su
m
er
G
oo
ds
PP
IF
C
G
6
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
93
Pr
od
uc
er
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x:
Fi
ni
sh
ed
G
oo
ds
PP
IF
G
S
6
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
94
Sp
ot
O
il
Pr
ic
e:
W
es
t
Te
xa
s
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
O
IL
PR
IC
E
6
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
95
N
on
fa
rm
Bu
sin
es
s
Se
ct
or
:
H
ou
rs
of
A
ll
Pe
rs
on
s
H
O
A
N
BS
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
96
N
on
fa
rm
Bu
sin
es
s
Se
co
tr
:
O
ut
pu
t
Pe
r
H
ou
r
of
A
ll
Pe
rs
on
s
O
PH
N
FB
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
97
N
on
fa
rm
Bu
sin
es
s
Se
ct
or
:
U
ni
t
N
on
la
bo
r
Pa
ym
en
ts
U
N
LP
N
BS
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
98
N
on
fa
rm
Bu
sin
es
s
Se
ct
or
:
U
ni
t
La
bo
r
C
os
t
U
LC
N
FB
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
99
C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
of
Em
pl
oy
ee
s:
W
ag
es
an
d
Sa
la
ry
A
cc
ru
al
s,
R
ea
l
W
A
SC
U
R
/C
PI
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
10
0
N
on
fa
rm
Bu
sin
es
s
Se
ct
or
:
C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
Pe
r
H
ou
r
C
O
M
PN
FB
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
of
th
e
se
rie
s:
1-
31
:
"N
IP
A
";
32
-4
7:
"I
nd
us
tr
ia
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n"
;4
8-
61
:
"E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
an
d
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t"
;6
2-
67
:
"H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
";
68
-7
9:
"I
nv
en
to
rie
s"
,"
O
rd
er
s
an
d
Sa
le
s"
;8
0-
94
:
"P
ric
es
";
95
-1
07
:
"E
ar
ni
ng
s
an
d
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
";
10
8-
11
7:
"I
nt
er
es
t
R
at
es
";
11
8-
12
9:
"M
on
ey
an
d
C
re
di
t"
;
13
0-
13
4:
"S
to
ck
Pr
ic
es
";
13
5-
14
1:
"E
xc
ha
ng
e
R
at
es
";
14
2-
15
0:
"O
th
er
s"
.
T
he
co
lu
m
n
la
be
le
d
"T
r."
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
tr
an
sfo
rm
at
io
n
ap
pl
ie
d
to
th
e
se
rie
s
(1
=
le
ve
l,
2
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
3
=
lo
ga
rit
hm
,4
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
5
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
,6
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
).
D
at
a
so
ur
ce
:
Fe
de
ra
lR
es
er
ve
Ba
nk
of
St
.
Lo
ui
s’
we
bs
ite
.
142 Appendix B
N
Se
ri
es
M
ne
m
on
ic
Tr
.
St
ar
t
E
nd
10
1
N
on
fa
rm
Bu
sin
es
s
Se
ct
or
:
R
ea
lC
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
Pe
r
H
ou
r
C
O
M
PR
N
FB
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
10
2
G
ro
w
th
in
ut
ili
za
tio
n-
ad
ju
st
ed
T
FP
dt
fp
_
ut
il
1
19
47
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
10
3
G
ro
w
th
in
bu
sin
es
s
se
ct
or
T
FP
dt
fp
1
19
47
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
10
4
U
til
iz
at
io
n
in
pr
od
uc
in
g
in
ve
st
m
en
t
du
_
in
ve
st
1
19
47
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
10
5
U
til
iz
at
io
n
in
pr
od
uc
in
g
no
n-
in
ve
st
m
en
t
bu
sin
es
s
ou
tp
ut
du
_
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
1
19
47
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
10
6
U
til
iz
at
io
n-
ad
ju
st
ed
T
FP
in
pr
od
uc
in
g
eq
ui
pm
en
t
an
d
co
ns
um
er
du
ra
bl
es
dt
fp
_
I_
ut
il
1
19
47
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
10
7
U
til
iz
at
io
n-
ad
ju
st
ed
T
FP
in
pr
od
uc
in
g
no
n-
eq
ui
pm
en
t
ou
tp
ut
dt
fp
_
C
_
ut
il
1
19
47
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
10
8
Eff
ec
tiv
e
Fe
de
ra
lF
un
ds
R
at
e
FE
D
FU
N
D
S
2
19
54
Q
3
20
12
Q
3
10
9
3-
M
on
th
Tr
ea
su
ry
Bi
ll:
Se
co
nd
ar
y
M
ar
ke
t
R
at
e
T
B3
M
S
2
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
11
0
1-
Ye
ar
Tr
ea
su
ry
C
on
st
an
t
M
at
ur
ity
R
at
e
G
S1
2
19
53
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
11
1
10
-Y
ea
r
Tr
ea
su
ry
C
on
st
an
t
M
at
ur
ity
R
at
e
G
S1
0
2
19
53
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
11
2
M
oo
dy
’s
Se
as
on
ed
A
aa
C
or
po
ra
te
Bo
nd
Y
ie
ld
A
A
A
2
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
11
3
M
oo
dy
’s
Se
as
on
ed
Ba
a
C
or
po
ra
te
Bo
nd
Y
ie
ld
BA
A
2
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
11
4
Ba
nk
Pr
im
e
Lo
an
R
at
e
M
PR
IM
E
2
19
49
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
11
5
G
S1
0-
FE
D
FU
N
D
S
Sp
re
ad
G
S1
0-
FE
D
FU
N
D
S
1
19
54
Q
3
20
12
Q
3
11
6
G
S1
-F
ED
FU
N
D
S
Sp
re
ad
G
S1
-F
ED
FU
N
D
S
1
19
54
Q
3
20
12
Q
3
11
7
BA
A
-F
ED
FU
N
D
S
Sp
re
ad
BA
A
-F
ED
FU
N
D
S
1
19
54
Q
3
20
12
Q
3
11
8
N
on
-B
or
ro
we
d
R
es
er
ve
s
of
D
ep
os
ito
ry
In
st
itu
tio
ns
BO
G
N
O
N
BR
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
11
9
Bo
ar
d
of
G
ov
.
To
ta
lR
es
er
ve
s,
A
dj
us
te
d
fo
r
C
ha
ng
es
in
R
es
er
ve
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
T
R
A
R
R
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
12
0
Bo
ar
d
of
G
ov
.
M
on
et
ar
y
Ba
se
,A
dj
us
te
d
fo
r
C
ha
ng
es
in
R
es
er
ve
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
BO
G
A
M
BS
L
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
12
1
M
1
M
on
ey
St
oc
k
M
1S
L
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
12
2
M
2
Le
ss
Sm
al
lT
im
e
D
ep
os
its
M
2M
SL
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
12
3
M
2
M
on
ey
St
oc
k
M
2S
L
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
12
4
C
om
m
er
ci
al
an
d
In
du
st
ria
lL
oa
ns
at
A
ll
C
om
m
er
ci
al
Ba
nk
s
BU
SL
O
A
N
S
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
12
5
C
on
su
m
er
Lo
an
s
at
A
ll
C
om
m
er
ci
al
Ba
nk
s
C
O
N
SU
M
ER
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
of
th
e
se
rie
s:
1-
31
:
"N
IP
A
";
32
-4
7:
"I
nd
us
tr
ia
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n"
;4
8-
61
:
"E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
an
d
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t"
;6
2-
67
:
"H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
";
68
-7
9:
"I
nv
en
to
rie
s"
,"
O
rd
er
s
an
d
Sa
le
s"
;8
0-
94
:
"P
ric
es
";
95
-1
07
:
"E
ar
ni
ng
s
an
d
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
";
10
8-
11
7:
"I
nt
er
es
t
R
at
es
";
11
8-
12
9:
"M
on
ey
an
d
C
re
di
t"
;
13
0-
13
4:
"S
to
ck
Pr
ic
es
";
13
5-
14
1:
"E
xc
ha
ng
e
R
at
es
";
14
2-
15
0:
"O
th
er
s"
.
T
he
co
lu
m
n
la
be
le
d
"T
r."
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
tr
an
sfo
rm
at
io
n
ap
pl
ie
d
to
th
e
se
rie
s
(1
=
le
ve
l,
2
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
3
=
lo
ga
rit
hm
,4
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
5
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
,6
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
).
D
at
a
so
ur
ce
:
Fe
de
ra
lR
es
er
ve
Ba
nk
of
St
.
Lo
ui
s’
we
bs
ite
.
143
N
Se
ri
es
M
ne
m
on
ic
Tr
.
St
ar
t
E
nd
12
6
Ba
nk
C
re
di
t
at
A
ll
C
om
m
er
ci
al
Ba
nk
s
LO
A
N
IN
V
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
12
7
R
ea
lE
st
at
e
Lo
an
s
at
A
ll
C
om
m
er
ci
al
Ba
nk
s
R
EA
LL
N
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
12
8
To
ta
lC
on
su
m
er
C
re
di
t
O
w
ne
d
an
d
Se
cu
rit
iz
ed
,O
ut
st
an
di
ng
T
O
TA
LS
L
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
12
9
St
.
Lo
ui
s
A
dj
us
te
d
M
on
et
ar
y
Ba
se
A
M
BS
L
(C
H
N
G
)
5
19
47
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
13
0
U
S
D
ow
Jo
ne
s
In
du
st
ria
ls
Sh
ar
e
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x
(E
P)
U
SS
H
R
PR
C
F
5
19
50
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
13
1
U
S
St
an
da
rd
&
Po
or
’s
In
de
x
of
50
0
C
om
m
on
St
oc
ks
U
S5
00
ST
K
5
19
50
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
13
2
U
S
Sh
ar
e
Pr
ic
e
In
de
x
N
A
D
J
U
SI
62
...
F
5
19
57
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
13
3
D
ow
Jo
ne
s/
G
D
P
D
efl
at
or
D
O
W
Jo
ne
s/
G
D
PD
EF
5
19
50
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
13
4
S&
P/
G
D
P
D
efl
at
or
S&
P/
G
D
PD
EF
5
19
50
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
13
5
Tr
ad
e
W
ei
gh
te
d
U
.S
.D
ol
la
r
In
de
x:
M
aj
or
C
ur
re
nc
ie
s
T
W
EX
M
M
T
H
2
19
73
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
13
6
Eu
ro
/U
.S
.F
or
ei
gn
Ex
ch
an
ge
R
at
e
EX
U
SE
U
(-
1)
5
19
99
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
13
7
G
er
m
an
y/
U
.S
.F
or
ei
gn
Ex
ch
an
ge
R
at
e
EX
G
EU
S
5
19
71
Q
1
20
01
Q
4
13
8
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
/U
.S
.F
or
ei
gn
Ex
ch
an
ge
R
at
e
EX
SZ
U
S
5
19
71
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
13
9
Ja
pa
n/
U
.S
.F
or
ei
gn
Ex
ch
an
ge
R
at
e
EX
JP
U
S
5
19
71
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
14
0
U
.K
./
U
.S
.F
or
ei
gn
Ex
ch
an
ge
R
at
e
EX
U
SU
K
(-
1)
5
19
71
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
14
1
C
an
ad
a/
U
.S
.F
or
ei
gn
Ex
ch
an
ge
R
at
e
EX
C
A
U
S
5
19
71
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
14
2
U
S
T
he
C
on
fe
re
nc
e
Bo
ar
d
Le
ad
in
g
Ec
on
om
ic
In
di
ca
to
rs
In
de
x
SA
D
J
U
SC
Y
LE
A
D
Q
5
19
59
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
14
3
U
S
Ec
on
om
ic
C
yc
le
R
es
ea
rc
h
In
st
itu
te
W
ee
kl
y
Le
ad
in
g
In
de
x
U
SE
C
R
IW
LH
5
19
50
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
14
4
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
of
M
ich
ig
an
C
on
su
m
er
Se
nt
im
en
t:
Pe
rs
on
al
Fi
na
nc
es
,C
ur
re
nt
U
SU
M
PF
N
C
H
2
19
78
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
14
5
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
of
M
ich
ig
an
C
on
su
m
er
Se
nt
im
en
t:
Pe
rs
on
al
Fi
na
nc
es
,E
xp
ec
te
d
U
SU
M
PF
N
EH
2
19
78
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
14
6
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
of
M
ich
ig
an
C
on
su
m
er
Se
nt
im
en
t:
Ec
on
om
ic
O
ut
lo
ok
,1
2
M
on
th
s
U
SU
M
EC
O
1H
2
19
78
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
14
7
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
of
M
ich
ig
an
C
on
su
m
er
Se
nt
im
en
t:
Ec
on
om
ic
O
ut
lo
ok
,5
Ye
ar
s
U
SU
M
EC
O
5H
2
19
78
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
14
8
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
of
M
ich
ig
an
C
on
su
m
er
Se
nt
im
en
t:
Bu
yi
ng
C
on
di
tio
ns
,D
ur
ab
le
s
U
SU
M
BU
Y
D
H
2
19
78
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
14
9
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
of
M
ich
ig
an
C
on
su
m
er
Se
nt
im
en
t
In
de
x
U
SU
M
C
O
N
SH
2
19
91
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
15
0
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
of
M
ich
ig
an
C
on
su
m
er
Se
nt
im
en
t
-C
ur
re
nt
C
on
di
tio
ns
U
SU
M
C
N
SU
R
2
19
91
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
of
th
e
se
rie
s:
1-
31
:
"N
IP
A
";
32
-4
7:
"I
nd
us
tr
ia
lP
ro
du
ct
io
n"
;4
8-
61
:
"E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
an
d
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t"
;6
2-
67
:
"H
ou
sin
g
St
ar
ts
";
68
-7
9:
"I
nv
en
to
rie
s"
,"
O
rd
er
s
an
d
Sa
le
s"
;8
0-
94
:
"P
ric
es
";
95
-1
07
:
"E
ar
ni
ng
s
an
d
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
";
10
8-
11
7:
"I
nt
er
es
t
R
at
es
";
11
8-
12
9:
"M
on
ey
an
d
C
re
di
t"
;
13
0-
13
4:
"S
to
ck
Pr
ic
es
";
13
5-
14
1:
"E
xc
ha
ng
e
R
at
es
";
14
2-
15
0:
"O
th
er
s"
.
T
he
co
lu
m
n
la
be
le
d
"T
r."
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
tr
an
sfo
rm
at
io
n
ap
pl
ie
d
to
th
e
se
rie
s
(1
=
le
ve
l,
2
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
3
=
lo
ga
rit
hm
,4
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e,
5
=
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
,6
=
se
co
nd
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
lo
ga
rit
hm
).
D
at
a
so
ur
ce
:
Fe
de
ra
lR
es
er
ve
Ba
nk
of
St
.
Lo
ui
s’
we
bs
ite
.

Bibliography
Aastveit, K., G. Natvik, and S. Sola (2013): “Macroeconomic Uncer-
tainty and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy,” Norges Bank, mimeo.
Abadir, K., G. Caggiano, and G. Talmain (2013): “Nelson-Plosser
revisited: the ACF approach,” Journal of Econometrics, 175, 22–34.
Abildgren, K. (2012): “Financial Structures and the Real Effects of Credit-
Supply Shocks in Denmark 1922-2011,” European Review of Economic His-
tory, 16, 490–510.
Adrian, T., E. Moench, and H. Shin (2010): “Financial Intermediation,
Asset Prices, and Macroeconomic Dynamics,” Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Staff Report no.422.
Alesina, A., C. Favero, and F. Giavazzi (2013): “The Output Effect of
Fiscal Consolidations,” Harvard University and Bocconi University, mimeo.
Alessi, L., M. Barigozzi, and M. Capasso (2011): “Nonfundamentalness
and Identification in Structural VAR Models: A Review,” International
Statistical Review, 79(1), 16–47.
Alexopoulos, M. and J. Cohen (2009): “Uncertain Times, Uncertain
Measures,” University of Toronto, Department of Economics Working Paper
No. 325.
Ang, A., R. Hodrick, Y. Xing, and X. Zhang (2006): “The Cross-Section
of Volatility and Expected Returns,” The Journal of Finance, 61, 259–299.
Antonakakis, N., I. Chatziantoniou, and G. Filis (2013): “Dynamic
Co-movements of Stock Market Returns, Implied Volatility and Policy Un-
certainty,” Economics Letters, 120, 87–92.
Arellano, C., Y. Bai, and P. Kehoe (2012): “Financial Markets and
Fluctuations in Volatility,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research
Department Staff Report 466.
Atanasova, C. (2003): “Credit Market Imperfections and Business Cycle
Dynamics: A Nonlinear Approach,” Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econo-
metrics, 7, 1–22.
Auerbach, A. and Y. Gorodnichenko (2012): “Measuring the Output
Responses to Fiscal Policy,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
4(2), 1–27.
146 Bibliography
——— (2013a): “Corrigendum: Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal
Policy,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5(3), 320–322.
——— (2013b): “Output Spillovers from Fiscal Policy,” American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings, 103, 141–146.
Avdjiev, S.and Zeng, Z. (2014): “Credit Growth, Monetary Policy, and
Economic Activity in a Three-Regime TVAR Model,” BIS Working Paper
No.449.
Bachmann, R. and C. Bayer (2013): “"Wait-and-See" Business Cycles,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(6), 704–719.
Bachmann, R., S. Elstner, and E. Sims (2013): “Uncertainty and Eco-
nomic Activity: Evidence from Business Survey Data,” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 5, 217–249.
Bachmann, R. and G. Moscarini (2012): “Business Cycles and Endogenous
Uncertainty,” RWTH Aachen University and Yale University, mimeo.
Bachmann, R. and E. Sims (2012): “Confidence and the transmission of
government spending shocks,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 59, 235–249.
Bagliano, F. C. and C. A. Favero (1998): “Measuring monetary policy
with VAR models: An evaluation,” European Economic Review, 42, 1069–
1112.
Baker, S. and N. Bloom (2013): “Does Uncertainty Reduce Growth? Using
Disasters As Natural Experiments,” NBER Working Paper No. 19475.
Baker, S., N. Bloom, and S. J. Davis (2013): “Measuring Economic
Policy Uncertainty,” Stanford University and the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business, mimeo.
Balke, N. S. (2000): “Credit and Economic Activity: Credit Regimes and
Nonlinear Propagation of Shocks,” The Review of Economics and Statistics,
82, 344–349.
Barnett, A. and R. Thomas (2014): “Has Weak Lending and Activity in
the UK Been Driven by Credit Supply Shocks?” The Manchester School,
Vol.82, 60–89.
Barro, R. J. and C. J. Redlick (2011): “Macroeconomic Effects from
Government Purchases and Taxes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1),
51–102.
Barsky, R. and E. Sims (2011): “News Shocks and Business Cycles,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 58(3), 273–289.
Basu, S. and B. Bundick (2012): “Uncertainty Shocks in a Model of
Effective Demand,” Boston College, mimeo.
Bibliography 147
Basu, S., J. Fernald, and M. Kimball (2006): “Are Technology Improve-
ments Contractionary?” American Economic Review, 96, 1418–1448.
Batini, N., G. Callegari, and G. Melina (2012): “Successful Austerity
in the United States, Europe and Japan,” IMF Working Paper No. 12-190.
Bauer, M. (2012): “Monetary Policy and Interest Rate Uncertainty,” FRBSF
Economic Letter, 2012-38 (December, 24).
Baum, A., M. Poplawski-Ribeiro, and A. Weber (2012): “Fiscal Multi-
pliers and the State of the Economy,” Internaional Monetary Fund Working
Paper No. 12/286.
Beaudry, P. and F. Portier (2006): “Stock Prices, News, and Economic
Fluctuations,” American Economic Review, 96(4), 1293–1307.
——— (2013): “News Driven Business Cycles: Insights and Challenges,” NBER
Working Paper No. 19411.
Bekaert, G., M. Hoerova, and M. L. Duca (2013): “Risk, Uncertainty
and Monetary Policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 60, 771–788.
Ben Zeev, N. and E. Pappa (2014): “Chronicle of a War Foretold: The
Macroeconomic Effects of Anticipated Defense Spending Shocks,” European
University Institute, mimeo.
Berger, D. and J. Vavra (2014a): “Consumption Dynamics During Reces-
sions,” Econometrica, forthcoming.
——— (2014b): “Measuring How Fiscal Shocks Affect Durable Spending
in Recessions and Expansions,” American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings, 104(5), 112–115.
Bernanke, B. (1983): “Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Cyclical Investment,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 85–106.
——— (2013): “Long-Term Interest Rates,” Speech held at the Annual Mone-
tary/Macroeconomics Conference: The Past and Future of Monetary Policy,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, California, March 1.
Bernanke, B., J. Boivin, and P. Eliasz (2005): “Measuring Monetary
Policy: A Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(1), 387–422.
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1989): “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and
Business Fluctuations,” American Economic Review, 79(1), 14–31.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999): “The Financial
Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework,” in J. Taylor and
M. Woodford (eds.): Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, North Holland,
Amsterdam, 1341–1393.
148 Bibliography
Blanchard, O. (2009): “(Nearly) nothing to fear but fear itself,” The
Economist, Economics focus (guest article), January 29.
Blanchard, O. and D. Leigh (2013): “Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal
Multipliers,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 103(3),
117–120.
Blanchard, O., J. L’Huillier, and G. Lorenzoni (2013): “News, Noise,
and Fluctuations: An Empirical Exploration,” American Economic Review,
103, 3045–70.
Blanchard, O. and R. Perotti (2002): “An Empirical Characterization
of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on
Output,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1329–1368.
Bloom, N. (2009): “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks,” Econometrica, 77(3),
623–685.
——— (2014): “Fluctuations in Uncertainty,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
28(2), 153–176.
Bloom, N., M. Floetotto, N. Jaimovich, I. Saporta-Eksten, and
S. J. Terry (2012): “Really Uncertain Business Cycles,” NBER Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18245.
Bonciani, D. and B. van Roye (2013): “Uncertainty shocks, Banking
frictions and Economic Activity,” Kiel Working Paper No. 1843, Kiel Institute
for the World Economy.
Born, B. and J. Pfeifer (2013): “Policy Risk and the Business Cycle,”
CESifo Working Paper No. 4336.
Brogaard, J. and A. Detzel (2013): “The Asset Pricing Implica-
tions of Government Economic Policy Uncertainty,” Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2075375.
Brunnermeier, M., T. Eisenbach, and Y. Sannikov (2012): “Macroeco-
nomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey,” National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No.18102.
Brunnermeier, M. and Y. Sannikov (2014): “A Macroeconomic Model
with a Financial Sector,” American Economic Review, 104, 379–421.
Cacciatore, M. and F. Ravenna (2014): “Fearing the Worst: The Impact
of Time-Varying Uncertainty on Firms’ Decisions and the Business Cycle,”
HEC Montreal, mimeo.
Caggiano, G. and E. Castelnuovo (2011): “On the Dynamics of Interna-
tional Inflation,” Economics Letters, 112(2), 189–191.
Caggiano, G., E. Castelnuovo, V. Colombo, and G. Nodari (2015):
“Estimating Fiscal Multipliers: News From a Nonlinear World,” The Economic
Journal (forthcoming).
Bibliography 149
Caggiano, G., E. Castelnuovo, and N. Groshenny (2014a): “Uncer-
tainty Shocks and Unemployment Dynamics: An Analysis of Post-WWII
U.S. Recessions,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 67, 78–92.
Caggiano, G., E. Castelnuovo, and G. Nodari (2014b): “Uncertainty
and Monetary Policy in Good and Bad Times,” University of Padova and
University of Melbourne, mimeo.
Caldara, D., C. Fuentes-Albero, S. Gilchrist, and E. Zakrajšek
(2014): “The Macroeconomic Impact of Financial and Uncertainty shocks,”
Boston University and Federal Reserve Board, mimeo.
Caldara, D. and C. Kamps (2012): “The Analytics of SVARs: A Unified
Framework to Measure Fiscal Multipliers,” Finance and Economics Discussion
Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Calza, A. and J. Sousa (2006): “Output and Inflation Responses to Credit
Shocks: Are There Threshold Effects in the Euro Area?” Studies in Nonlinear
Dynamics and Econometrics, 10(2), 1–21.
Canova, F. and E. Pappa (2011): “Fiscal policy, pricing frictions and
monetary accommodation,” Economic Policy, 26(68), 555–598.
Cantore, C., P. Levine, G. Melina, and J. Pearlman (2013): “Optimal
Fiscal and Monetary Rules in Normal and Abnormal Times,” University of
Surrey Discussion Paper No. 05/13.
Canzoneri, M., F. Collard, H. Dellas, and B. Diba (2011): “Fiscal
Multipliers in Recessions,” Georgetown University and University of Bern,
mimeo.
Carlson, M. (2007): “A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a
Discussion of the Federal Reserve Response,” Federal Reserve Board, Finance
and Economics Discussion Series No. 2007-13.
Carlstrom, C. and T. Fuerst (1997): “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Busi-
ness Fluctuations: A Computable GeneraEquilibrium Analysis,” American
Economic Review, 87(5), 893–910.
Cesa-Bianchi, A. and E. Fernandez-Corugedo (2013): “Uncertainty in
a Model with Credit Frictions,” Bank of England, mimeo.
Chernozhukov, V. and H. Hong (2003): “An MCMC Approach to Classical
Estimation,” Journal of Econometrics, 115(2), 293–346.
Christiano, L., R. Motto, and M. Rostagno (2014): “Risk Shocks,”
American Economic Review, 104(1), 27–65.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and S. Rebelo (2011): “When is
the Government Spending Multiplier Large?” Journal of Political Economy,
119(1), 78–121.
150 Bibliography
Cogley, T. and J. Nason (1995): “Effects of the Hodrick-Prescott Filter
on Trend and Difference Stationary Time-Series: Implications for Business
Cycle Research,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19, 253–278.
Colombo, V. (2013): “Economic Policy Uncertainty in the US: Does it matter
for the Euro Area?” Economics Letters, 121, 39–42.
Corsetti, G., A. Meier, and G. J. Müller (2012): “What Determines
Government Spending Multipliers?” Economic Policy, 27(72), 521–565.
Dixit, A. (1989): “Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty,” Journal of
Political Economy, 97, 620–638.
Dow, J., G. Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2005): “Equilibrium In-
vestment and Asset Prices under Imperfect Corporate Control,” American
Economic Review, 95(3), 659–681.
Eggertsson, G. B. (2009): “What Fiscal Policy Is Effective at Zero Interst
Rates?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 402.
Ehrmann, M., M. Ellison, and N. Valla (2003): “Regime-dependent
impulse response functions in a Markov-switching vector autoregression
model,” Economics Letters, 78(3), 295–299.
Favara, G. and J. Imbs (2015): “Credit Supply and the Price of Housing,”
American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Favero, C. A. and F. Giavazzi (2012): “Measuring Tax Multipliers: The
Narrative Method in Fiscal VARs,” American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 4(2), 69–94.
Fazzari, S. M., J. Morley, and I. Panovska (2014): “State-Dependent
Effects of Fiscal Policy,” Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics,
forthcoming.
Fernández-Villaverde, J., G. Gordon, P. Guerrón-Quintana, and
J. F. Rubio-Ramírez (2012a): “Nonlinear Adventures at the Zero Lower
Bound,” NBER Working Paper No. 18058.
Fernández-Villaverde, J., P. Guerrón-Quintana, K. Kuester, and
J. Rubio-Ramírez (2012b): “Fiscal Volatility Shocks and Economic Activ-
ity,” NBER Working Papers No.17317.
Fernández-Villaverde, J., P. Guerrón-Quintana, J. F. Rubio-
Ramírez, and M. Uribe (2011): “Risk Matters: The Real Effects of
Volatility Shocks,” American Economic Review, 101, 2530–2561.
Fève, P., J. Matheron, and J.-G. Sahuc (2009): “On the dynamic
implications of news shocks,” Economics Letters, 102, 96–98.
Fisher, J. D. M. and R. Peters (2010): “Using Stock Returns to Identify
Government Spending Shocks,” Economic Journal, 120, 414–436.
Bibliography 151
Forni, M. and L. Gambetti (2011): “Fiscal Foresight and the Effects of Gov-
ernment Spending,” Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia and Universitat
Autonoma de Barcelona, mimeo.
——— (2014): “Sufficient information in structural VARs,” Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 66, 124–136.
Forni, M., L. Gambetti, M. Lippi, and L. Sala (2013): “Noisy News in
Business Cycles,” Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, mimeo.
Fortune, P. (1996): “Do Municipal Bonds Yields Forecast Tax Policy?” New
England Economic Review, September/October, 29–48.
Furlanetto, F., F. Ravazzolo, and S. Sarferaz (2014): “Identification
of financial factors in economic fluctuations,” Norges Bank Working Paper
No. 09/2014.
Galbraith, J. (1996): “Credit Rationing and Threshold Effects in the Relation
between Money and Output,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 11, 419–29.
Gambetti, L. (2012a): “Fiscal Foresight, Forecast Revisions and the Effects
of Government Spending in the Open Economy,” Universitat Autonoma de
Barcelona, mimeo.
——— (2012b): “Government Spending News and Shocks,” Universitat Au-
tonoma de Barcelona, mimeo.
Gambetti, L. and A. Musso (2012): “Loan Supply Shocks and the Business
Cycle,” European Central Bank, Working Paper No.1469.
Gerali, A., S. Neri, L. Sessa, and F. Signoretti (2010): “Credit and
Banking in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area,” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 42, 107–141.
Gertler, M. and P. Karadi (2011): “A Model of Unconventional Monetary
Policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(1), 17–34.
——— (2014): “Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs and Economic Activ-
ity,” NBER Working Paper No. 20224.
Giannone, D. and L. Reichlin (2006): “Does information help recovering
structural shocks from past observations?” Journal of the European Economic
Association Papers & Proceeedings, 4(2-3), 455–465.
Gilchrist, S., J. Sim, and E. Zakrajšek (2013): “Uncertainty, Finan-
cial Frictions, and Irreversible Investment,” Boston University and Federal
Reserve Board, mimeo.
Gilchrist, S. and E. Zakrajšek (2012): “Credit Spreads and Business
Cycle Fluctuations,” American Economic Review, 102(4), 1692–1720.
Gurkaynak, R., B. Sack, and E. Swanson (2007): “Market-Based Mea-
sures of Monetary Policy Expectations,” Journal of Business and Economic
Statistics, 25(2), 201–212.
152 Bibliography
Gurkaynak, R. S., B. Sack, and E. Swanson (2005): “The Sensitivity of
Long-Term Interest Rates to Economic News: Evidence and Implications for
Macroeconomic Models,” American Economic Review, 95(1), 425–36.
Gürkaynak, R. S. and J. H. Wright (2012): “Macroeconomics and the
Term Structure,” Journal of Economic Literature, 50(2), 331–367.
Hansen, B. E. (1999): “Testing for Linearity,” Journal of Economic Surveys,
13(5), 551–576.
Hansen, L. P. and T. J. Sargent (1991): “Two Difficulties in Interpreting
Vector Autoregressions,” in L. P. Hansen and T. J. Sargent (Eds.): Rational
Expectations Econometrics, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 77–119.
He, Z. and A. Krishnamurthy (2013): “Intermediary Asset Pricing,”
American Economic Review, 103, 732–70.
Holló, D., M. Kremer, and M. Lo Duca (2012): “CISS - A Composite
Indicator of Systemic Stress in the Financial System,” European Central
Bank, Working Paper No.1426.
Hubrich, K., A. D’Agostino, M. Červená, M. Ciccarelli, P. Guarda,
M. Haavio, P. Jeanfils, C. Mendicino, E. Ortega, M. Valder-
rama, and M. Valentinyiné Endrész (2013): “Financial Shocks and
the Macroeconomy: Heterogeneity and Non-linearities,” European Central
Bank, Occasional Paper Series No.143.
Hubrich, K. and R. Tetlow (2012): “Financial Stress and Economic
Dynamics: the Transmission of Crises,” Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
Iacoviello, M. (2005): “House Prices, Borrowing Constraints and Monetary
Policy in the Business Cycle,” American Economic Review, 95(3), 739–764.
——— (2015): “Financial Business Cycles,” Review of Economic Dynamics,
forthcoming.
Ilzetzki, E., E. G. Mendoza, and C. A. Végh (2013): “How big (small?)
are fiscal multipliers?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 60, 239–254.
Jermann, U. and V. Quadrini (2012): “Macroeconomic Effects of Financial
Shocks,” American Economic Review, 102, 238–71.
Johannsen, B. K. (2013): “When are the Effects of Fiscal Policy Uncertainty
Large?” Northwestern University, mimeo.
Jordà, O. (2005): “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local
Projections,” American Economic Review, 95(1), 161–182.
Jurado, K., S. C. Ludvigson, and S. Ng (2015): “Measuring Uncertainty,”
American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Bibliography 153
Kamber, G., O. Karagedikli, M. Ryan, and T. Vehbi (2013): “Interna-
tional Spill-Overs of Uncertainty Shocks: Evidence from a FAVAR,” Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, mimeo.
Kilian, L. (1998): “Small-Sample Confidence Intervals for Impulse Response
Functions,” Review of Economics Statistics, 80, 218–230.
Knight, F. H. (1921): “Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit,” Boston, MA: Hart,
Schaffner & Marx; Houghton Mifflin Company.
Koop, G., M. Pesaran, and S. Potter (1996): “Impulse response analysis
in nonlinear multivariate models,” Journal of Econometrics, 74, 119–147.
Kriwoluzky, A. (2012): “Pre-announcement and Timing: The Effects of a
Government Expenditure Shock,” European Economic Review, 56, 373–388.
Kueng, L. (2014): “Tax News: Identifying Tax Expectations from Municipal
Bonds with an Application to Household Consumption,” NBER Working
Paper No. 20437.
Kulish, M. (2007): “Should Monetary Policy Use Long-Term Rates?” B.E.
Journal of Macroeconomics (Advances), 7(1), 1935–1690.
Kuttner, K. (2001): “Monetary Policy Surprises and Interest Rates: Evidence
from the Fed Funds Futures Market,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 47(3),
523–544.
Kyiotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997): “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political
Economy, 105(2), 211–248.
Leduc, S. and Z. Liu (2013): “Uncertainty Shocks are Aggregate Demand
Shocks,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper 2012-10.
Leeper, E. M., A. W. Richter, and T. B. Walker (2012): “Quantitative
Effects of Fiscal Foresight,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
4(2), 115–144.
Leeper, E. M., N. Traum, and T. B. Walker (2011): “Clearing Up the
Fiscal Multiplier Morass,” NBER Working Paper No. 17444.
Leeper, E. M., T. B. Walker, and S.-C. S. Yang (2013): “Fiscal
Foresight and Information Flows,” Econometrica, 81(3), 1115–1145.
Lippi, M. and L. Reichlin (1993): “The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate
Demand and Supply Disturbances: Comment,” American Economic Review,
83(3), 644–652.
López-Salido, D., J. Stein, and E. Zakrajšek (2015): “Credit-Market
Sentiment and the Business Cycle,” Federal Reserve Board and Harvard
University, mimeo.
Luukkonen, R., P. Saikkonen, and T. Teräsvirta (1988): “Testing
linearity against smooth transition autoregressive models,” Biometrika, 75,
491–499.
154 Bibliography
McCallum, J. (1991): “Credit Rationing and the Monetary Transmission
Mechanism,” The American Economic Review, 81, 946–951.
Mertens, K. and M. O. Ravn (2010): “Measuring the Impact of Fiscal
Policy in the Face of Anticipation: A Structural VAR Approach,” Economic
Journal, 120, 393–413.
——— (2011): “Understanding the Aggregate Effects of Anticipated and
Unanticipated Tax Policy Shocks,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 14(1),
27–54.
——— (2014): “Fiscal Policy in an Expectations Driven Liquidity Trap,”
Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
Merton, R. (1974): “On The Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure
of Interest Rates,” The Journal of Finance, 29, 449–470.
Michaillat, P. (2014): “A Theory of Countercyclical Government Multiplier,”
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6(1), 190–217.
Mittnik, S. and W. Semmler (2012): “Regime Dependence of the Fiscal
Multiplier,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 83, 502–522.
Morley, J. and J. Piger (2012): “The Asymmetric Business Cycle,” Review
of Economics and Statistics, 94(1), 208–221.
Morley, J., J. Piger, and P.-L. Tien (2013): “Reproducing Business Cycle
Features: Are Nonlinear Dynamics a Proxy for Multivariate Information?”
Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, 17(5), 483–498.
Mumtaz, H. and P. Surico (2013): “Policy Uncertainty and Aggregate
Fluctuations,” Queen Mary University of London and London Business
School, mimeo.
——— (2014): “The Transmission Mechanism in Good and Bad Times,” In-
ternational Economic Review, forthcoming.
Mumtaz, H. and K. Theodoridis (2012): “The international transmission
of volatility shocks: An empirical analysis,” Bank of England Working Paper
No. 463.
Newey, W. K. and K. D. West (1987): “A Simple, Positive Semi-
Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Ma-
trix,” Econometrica, 55, pp. 703–708.
Nodari, G. (2014): “Financial Regulation Policy Uncertainty and Credit
Spreads in the US,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 41, 122–132.
Orlik, A. and L. Veldkamp (2014): “Understanding Uncertainty Shocks
and the Role of Black Swans,” NBER Working Paper No. 20445.
Bibliography 155
Owyang, M., V. A. Ramey, and S. Zubairy (2013): “Are Government
Spending Multipliers Greater During Periods of Slack? Evidence from
20th Century Historical Data,” American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings, 103(3), 129–134.
Parker, J. A. (2011): “On Measuring the Effects of Fiscal Policy in Reces-
sions,” Journal of Economic Literature, 49(3), 703–718.
Pástor, L. and P. Veronesi (2012): “Uncertainty about Government Policy
and Stock Prices,” The Journal of Finance, 67, 1219–1264.
Pellegrino, G. (2014): “Uncertainty and Monetary Policy in the US: A
Journey into Non-Linear Territory,” University of Verona, mimeo.
Perotti, R. (1999): “Fiscal policy in good times and bad,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 114(4), 1399–1436.
——— (2007): “In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy,” in
D. Acemogly, K. Rogoff, and M. Woodford (eds.): NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, 22, 169–226.
——— (2011): “Expectations and Fiscal Policy: An Empirical Investigation,”
Bocconi University, mimeo.
Philippon, T. (2006): “Corporate Governance over the Business Cycle,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 30, 2117–2141.
Poterba, J. M. (1989): “Tax Reform and the Market for Tax-Exempt Debt,”
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 19(3), 537–562.
Ramey, V. A. (2011a): “Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Economy?”
Journal of Economic Literature, 49(3), 673–685.
——— (2011b): “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the
Timing,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1), 1–50.
Ramey, V. A. and M. D. Shapiro (1998): “Costly capital reallocation and
the effects of government spending,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy, 48, 145–194.
Ramey, V. A. and S. Zubairy (2014): “Government Spending Multipliers
in Good Times and in Bad: Evidence from U.S. Historical Data,” University
of California at San Diego and Texas A&M University, mimeo.
Ricco, G. (2014): “A New Identification of Fiscal Shocks Based on the
Information Flow,” London Business School, mimeo.
Rossi, B. and S. Zubairy (2011): “What Is the Importance of Monetary
and Fiscal Shocks in Explaining U.S. Macroeconomic Fluctuations?” Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 43(6), 1247–1270.
Roulleau-Pasdeloup, J. (2014): “The Government Spending Multiplier
in a Recession with a Binding Zero Lower Bound,” University of Lausanne,
mimeo.
156 Bibliography
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe (2012): “What’s News in Business
Cycles,” Econometrica, 80(6), 2733–2764.
Sims, C. and T. Zha (2006): “Were There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary
Policy?” American Economic Review, 96(1), 54–81.
Sims, E. (2012): “News, Non-Invertibility, and Structural VARs,” in N. Balke,
F. Canova, F. Milani, and M. A. Wynne (Eds.): DSGE Models in Macroe-
conomics: Estimation, Evaluation, and New Developments, Advances in
Econometrics, Vol. 28, 81–136.
Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2007): “Shocks and Frictions in US Business
Cycle: A Bayesian DSGE Approach,” American Economic Review, 97(3),
586–606.
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2002): “Macroeconomic Forecasting
Using Diffusion Indexes,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 20,
147–162.
——— (2012): “Disentangling the Channels of the 2007-2009 Recession,” Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity, 81–135.
Sum, V. (2012): “Financial Stress and Economic Policy Uncertainty: Im-
pulse Response Functions and Causality,” International Research Journal of
Applied Finance, 3, 1633–1637.
Tagkalakis, A. (2008): “The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Consumption in
Recessions and Expansions,” Journal of Public Economics, 92(5-6), 1486–
1508.
Tenreyro, S. and G. Thwaites (2013): “Pushing on a string: US monetary
policy is less powerful in recessions,” London School of Economics, mimeo.
Teräsvirta, T., D. Tjøstheim, and C. W. Granger (2010): “Modeling
Nonlinear Economic Time Series,” Oxford University Press.
Teräsvirta, T. and Y. Yang (2013): “Specification, Estimation and Evalu-
ation of Vector Smooth Transition Autoregressive Models with Applications,”
CREATES, Aaruhs University, mimeo.
——— (2014): “Linearity and Misspecification Tests for Vector Smooth Tran-
sition Regression Models,” CREATES, Aaruhs University, mimeo.
Vavra, J. (2014): “Inflation Dynamics and Time-Varying Volatility: New
Evidence and an Ss Interpretation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1),
215–258.
Woodford, M. (2011): “Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure
Multiplier,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(1), 1–35.
Yang, S.-C. S. (2005): “Quantifying Tax Effects Under Policy Foresight,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(8), 1557–1568.
